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DYNAMICS OF ASSET PRICE CHANGES: STATISTICAL AND
DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS MODELS
Mark J. DeSantis, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2011
This dissertation is comprised of two related tracts: (i) Quantitative Modeling and (ii)
Analysis of Asset Flow Di¤erential Equations. In the former a data set of over 100,000
daily closed-end fund prices is analyzed using mixed-e¤ects regressions with the objective
of understanding price dynamics. This analysis provides strong statistical evidence that
relative daily price change is positively inuenced by valuation, recent price trend, short
term volatility, volume trend, and the M2 money supply. There is a strong nonlinearity in
the inuence of the price trend, so that a signicantly large recent uptrend has a negative
inuence on the subsequent days relative price change. The nonlinearity is the key to an
understanding of the competing role of price trend, since a single large data set exhibits both
under- and overreaction in di¤erent regimes of the independent variables. The role of long
term volatility is not a clear-cut risk/return inverse relation; rather there is an ambiguous and
complicated relationship between volatility and return. Standardization of the independent
regression variables allows for a more direct comparison of each factors inuence on the
return.
In the latter a two-group asset owmodel of a nancial instrument with one group focused
on price trend, the other on value, is considered. The existence of both stable and unstable
regions for the system of di¤erential equations is proven. It is shown that a strong motivation
based on (recent) price trend is associated with instability. Numerical computations using
a set of typical parameters describe regions of stability and instability. A precise limiting
connection between the discrete and di¤erential equations is also established.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The dynamics of asset prices and the underlying motivations have been of great interest for
both theorists and practitioners. The classical theory has, as its cornerstone, the E¢ cient
Market Hypothesis (EMH), which in one of its forms states that no publicly available in-
formation, specically price history, can be used to obtain a risk adjusted prot beyond a
market index. Fischer Black (of the famous Black-Scholes Equation) indicated in his 1986
article "Noise" [3] that markets were e¢ cient 90% of the time. He denes e¢ cient to mean
that the price is between one-half and two times the actual fundamental value. Thus, a
market is deemed e¢ cient if, for example, a stock valued at $100 has a price between $50
and $200 - a rather large deviation.
Another key tenet of the classical theory is that while investors may be inuenced by
behavioral biases and/or cognitive errors, any pricing mistakes are immediately exploited by
much more experienced practitioners with ample (usually assumed to be innite amounts of)
capital. In addition, since all investors have access to the same information, they share the
same notion of valuation. Thus, this theory stipulates that prices should uctuate randomly
about this unique valuation and leads to the classical price equation
dP
P
= dt+ dX (1.1)
where P is the price,  the risk-free rate of return, and dX = N (0; dt).
More recently, Behavioral Finance has grown in popularity. This theory seeks insights
into the psychological motivations behind investorsdecisions to buy and sell. For example,
the concepts of under- and overreaction and anchoring (which will be discussed later) have
been utilized in discussing investor behavior. Publications such as the Wall Street Journal
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consistently publish articles referring to momentum (i.e. the idea that a recent trend in price
tends to continue) and the behavioral state of investors (e.g., cautious, weary, tentative, etc.).
The role of investor psychology in trading is marginalized in classical nance and eco-
nomics on the grounds that any bias is exploited by completely rational, well informed
traders with ample capital. However, the recent (2008) chain of events that started with
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and evolved into a crisis of condence in the worlds
nancial markets reminds us that the behavioral aspects of markets cannot be neglected.
Huge daily drops cascading throughout the worlds stock indexes were rarely reported with-
out attributing to investors fear, panic, and other nouns that are nowhere to be found in
nance or economics textbooks or research papers. The hedge funds that were supposed
to exploit these shortcomings of investors were selling alongside these investors in order to
meet margin calls. Thus, the lack of innite arbitrage capital intertwined with investor fear
of plummeting prices and created a situation with no explanation in classical work.
While the classical theory can be regarded as a default hypothesis, its inability to explain
stock market bubbles and crashes is a signicant limitation. Indeed, stock market bubbles
and crashes have an impact that extends far beyond shareholders. These bubbles, in which
stock prices soar drastically above the valuation of the stock, pose a challenge to classical
nances EMH, which stipulates that the stock price should randomly uctuate about a
unique valuation on which all traders agree. The tumultuous nancial markets of September
2008 are a dramatic reminder of the diverse forces driving markets. These recent upheavals
capping a prolonged housing bubble are the most recent of a series of modern bubble/bust
cycles. Among these are the internet/high-tech bubble of the late 1990s and the Japanese
stock bubble of the late 1980s. Due to their sheer magnitude, these episodes have had
an impact far beyond the immediate shareholders who lost trillions. The ensuing years of
economic slowdowns and job losses were among the consequences of these boom/bust cycles.
Yet it is surprising that only a relative handful of works focus on these phenomena, and
nance textbooks hardly mention them. Papers that discuss motivations beyond valuation
are often expository in nature, and rarely have direct contact with market data. As the
e¤ects of these episodes can be severe and far-reaching, it is important to study the forces
that drive markets. To this end, one needs to understand the motivations, in addition to
2
the classical concept of price deviation from the perceived value, behind tradersdecisions to
buy and sell stock. Any meaningful resolution of these problems must be quantitative. The
complexity of the problem necessitates powerful mathematical and statistical techniques.
This dissertation is comprised of two related sections. Section I (Chapter 2), Quantita-
tive Modeling, utilizes linear mixed e¤ects regressions with appropriately dened variables
to determine the e¤ect various factors have on the return. The inclusion of a valuation
variable as an independent variable in the regressions accounts for changes in the valuation
thereby unmasking the e¤ects of other variables such as the recent trend in price, volatility,
and the amount of money in the system.
Section II (Chapter 3), Analysis of Asset Flow Di¤erential Equations, examines a model
developed by Caginalp and collaborators since 1990. This model contains two key features:
(i) it incorporates the notion of niteness of assets (both shares and cash) and (ii) it allows
for investment reasons beyond the classical reason of valuation. The latter is achieved via
the creation of sentiment functions that model an investor groups decision to buy or sell.
This section considers the two investor group model where one group is focused solely on the
valuation and the other solely on the recent trend in price. Focus on the trend is justied
via Section I results. Theorems demonstrating the existence and stability of equilibria
are presented. And, the use of practical values for parameters modeling investor groups
strategies allows the presentation of several graphs depicting the e¤ect these parameters have
on equilibria and stability.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 covers the Quantitative
Modeling portion of this dissertation. An introduction including prior related work followed
by a discussion of the data set is included. A review of two studies, one without [8] and one
with [9] standardized independent regression variables, is presented. Chapter 3 encapsulates
a research article [10] that provides an introduction to the Asset Flow Di¤erential Equations
along with both theoretical and practical results. This dissertation is concluded in Chapter
4 with a brief summary of the results and a listing of related future projects/problems.
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2.0 QUANTITATIVE MODELING
2.1 BACKGROUND AND PRIOR WORK
The process whereby investors and traders react to new announcements, as well as new
supplies of investment capital or cash, leads to a complicated dynamical problem beyond
merely valuation. Traders are also aware of the reactions of othersassessments through
price and volume changes. The question of whether a signicant portion of traders are
inuenced by these factors is an empirical one. If the investors who base their decisions
solely on the valuations constitute the vast majority measured through the percentage
of the assets owned by this group then statistical methods should conrm this to be the
case. If, on the other hand, a signicant fraction base decisions partly on the reactions
of others, then it should be possible, in principle, to extract some results that reveal the
strategy in their decisions. For example, concepts such as underreaction and overreaction
have been utilized in discussing investor behavior. Without a clear quantitative methodology
for distinguishing these two opposing modes, it is very di¢ cult, if not impossible to utilize
these concepts in nance. In other words, knowing only that the market dynamics sometimes
exhibit overreaction and sometimes underreaction does not provide much insight into trader
motivation nor is it useful in trading decisions.
The goal of this Quantitative Modeling methodology is to provide some quantitative
answers to these questions. Such a task has always faced a key obstacle, namely noise, which
can be dened as the randomness in the stream of information updating the valuation of
an asset. From the perspective of an investor or trader this information is stochastic. As
Fischer Black [3] noted, "noise makes it very di¢ cult to test either practical or academic
theories about the way economic or nancial markets work." And, as previously mentioned
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in Section 1, he states that markets are e¢ cient at least 90% of the time, dening e¢ ciency
as a market price that is "more than half of value and less than twice value." This point is
consistent with frequent assertions by practitioners that there are important issues beyond
valuation. However, the attempts to uncover these issues are often stymied by the presence
of noise, as Black has noted. This leads to the question of whether there are methodologies
whereby this noise can be greatly reduced to permit additional analysis of price dynamics.
One way to overcome this obstacle has been to perform a large scale statistical study
in the hope of extracting a result that is perhaps too small to be useful to traders, but
establishes the e¤ect through statistical signicance. Toward this end, Poterba and Summers
[41] established that stock returns display small positive serial correlations for short time
periods and are negatively autocorrelated over long time periods.
An early study [7] highlighting the importance of trend examined two essentially identical
closed-end funds, Future Germany Fund and Germany Fund. Closed-end funds, unlike open-
end funds, trade as other company stocks on the exchanges (see, e.g., [1]). Thus the price
can be higher or lower than the net asset value (NAV), and can vary independently of this
value. In the case of these two clone funds, any change in valuation will be identical in
both funds. In terms of valuation, the ratio would be constant. By considering the ratio
of these funds as a time series they were able to extract all noise attributable to valuation.
They found that tomorrows price is not predicted well by todays price, as e¢ cient markets
would suggest. But rather, tomorrows price is halfway between todays price and the price
obtained by continuing the pure trend from yesterday to today.
The persistence of a trend can be viewed as an underreaction, as it suggests that there is a
delay in reaching a particular price. On the other hand, the behavioral nance community has
also stipulated that participants overreact to news, as recent information tends to overshadow
more established facts (see, e.g., [28]).
To study the concepts of underreaction and overreaction, Madura and Richie [34] per-
formed a statistical study on the daily opening and closing prices of exchange traded funds
(ETFs) during the time period August 1998 to August 2002. They dene underreaction as
positive [alternatively, negative] cumulative abnormal returns following large positive [alter-
natively, negative] price movements. Similarly, overreaction is dened as reversal of returns
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following large price movements. They found evidence of overreaction after extreme price
changes of greater than 5% in either direction within normal or after hours trading periods.
If stocks are more likely to increase on a particular day if they had increased the previous
day, then one can claim that there is evidence of underreaction. In other words, investors
are not reacting fully on the rst day. For instance, a group of investors may remain un-
convinced of the new information and are waiting for further conrmation as manifested
in higher prices. Once conrmed, these investors submit their buy order further increasing
demand and thereby driving prices higher. On the other hand, if price increases tend to be
followed by price declines, then one can classify this as part of overreaction. In aggregate,
they found some evidence for overreaction. Overreaction has also been observed on a larger
time scale (see, e.g., [19]).
In an e¤ort to quantify overreactions, Sturm [47] showed that a stock with positive returns
and/or increasing book value per share tends to rebound after a large drop of 10% percent,
supporting the Madura and Richie ndings. However, a stock already on a downtrend or
su¤ering from certain negative fundamentals (e.g., declining book value per share) exhibits
no such rebound. Further bolstering the empirical evidence for overreaction, Duran and
Caginalp [22] studied 134,406 data points representing daily closing prices for a set of closed-
end funds. Focusing on the deviation between the market price and the NAV, they examined
changes in this deviation, which they divided into several distinct threshold levels (e.g.,
5% to 7.5%). With a large statistical signicance they found that large deviations from
the net asset value led to a signicant price movement in the opposite direction. More
surprisingly, they found precursors to large deviations. In addition, Caginalp and Ilieva
[12], using hybrid di¤erence equations and regressions, found that the recent price trend
is a statistically signicant factor (with positive coe¢ cient) in predicting tomorrows price
change.
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2.2 DATA AND VARIABLES
2.2.1 Data Set: Daily Closing Price for Closed-end Funds
We use data on 125 closed-end funds (28 Generalized, 66 Specialized, and 31 World funds)
consisting of 119,260 daily prices during the time period October 26, 1998 through January
30, 2008. As noted in Section 2.1, we consider these funds because their NAV is reported
on a daily basis. Thus, estimating the value of an asset is not necessary, as it would be for
most corporate stocks, thereby eliminating additional error.
Studying closed-end funds presents an opportunity to subtract out the random changes
in valuation appropriately, and thereby eliminate a large part of the "noise" discussed above.
Since closed-end funds regularly report their "net asset value" (NAV) based upon the current
value of the investments, they o¤er a substantial advantage in this regard compared with
stocks of most corporations. The set of closed-end funds we consider are those that report
their NAV on a daily (rather than weekly) basis. Thus the 125 equity closed-end funds we
study have assets that are su¢ ciently liquid, and there is a sound basis for daily evaluation
of the underlying assets. However, for our purposes the liquidity of the underlying assets is
not as important as the trading volume of the actual stock (i.e., the closed-end fund). After
all, the underlying assets of a large company such as GE or IBM are usually not very liquid,
but the stock is very active, and traders are interested in knowing the direction of the stock
price. While the discount (dened as the percentage that the trading price of the closed-end
fund is below its NAV) has been the subject of many papers (see [1] for a survey), almost all
of these focus on reasons that are essentially steady state issues, e.g., tax liability, corporate
structure or liquidity of underlying assets. In other words, even if the discount is larger due
to tax liability or the underlying illiquidity of the assets, this situation does not change from
one day to the next.
Studying the daily price changes circumvents many of these steady state issues that do
not change on a daily basis. If valuation were the only factor in price movements, then
the volatility of the trading price of closed-end funds would be similar to that of the NAV.
However, Ponti¤ [39] nds that even though closed-end funds underreact to changes in NAV,
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their prices are on average 64% more volatile than their assets. So the volatility of closed-end
funds cannot be completely attributed to changes in the NAV. Thus the questions posed
by market dynamics can be addressed e¤ectively through the study of daily price changes of
closed-end funds while compensating for changes in valuation.
We note that while the data set involves closed-end funds, there is little reason to believe
that the market price dynamics of these stocks di¤er signicantly from the average stock
on the exchanges. Key daily trading features such as trading volume, market capitalization,
and ratio of institutional to individual ownership are similar to most mid-cap stocks. The
average weekly volume of the set of closed-end funds we consider is about 400,000 shares
traded. Hence, the group of stocks we consider is comparable in activity to many ordinary
stocks, bonds and options. Our methods can be applied to a broad range of stocks upon the
adoption of a valuation model that is already well-understood in nance. However, from a
scientic perspective, the ability to use an unambiguous quantity such as the net asset value
provided by closed-end funds enhances the credibility of the methodology. Analogously,
our methods are not restricted to daily changes, and one can implement them on di¤erent
time scales of interest. Once again, however, the daily changes minimize the "noise" that is
present so that the dynamics of asset prices can be determined more precisely. For example,
an analysis of yearly changes in the US not only involves fewer data points, but also su¤ers
from diminished credibility since the statistical results may simply be artifacts of particular
eras such as the depression of the 1930s or the high-tech bubble of the late 1990s. The
analysis of daily data minimizes such possibilities. Furthermore, using data involving 1000
trading days, for example, instead of 20 yearly data points enhances the statistical power of
the tests.
We discuss the variables utilized in the regressions.
2.2.2 Denitions
Relative Price Change
The basic quantity of interest is the Relative Price Change that we dene as
8
R(t) =
P (t)  P (t  1)
P (t  1) ;
which is sometimes called the "return" for day t: The Relative Price Change for day t + 1;
namely R(t+ 1); will be used as the dependent variable in the regressions.
With the exception of the M2 Money Supply, the following variables, which are utilized
as independent variables in the regressions, are based upon the above mentioned daily close
prices and NAVs.
Valuation
As noted above, although the value (NAV) of a closed-end fund is known, it seldom trades
at that price. In fact, these funds may trade at a persistent premium (price exceeds NAV)
or discount (price is below NAV). So, if a fund has been consistently trading at a discount
of 10% and subsequently trades at a 5% discount, value investors are not likely to regard it
as a bargain despite the discount. Thus, we dene the relative premium (or discount) as
NAV (t) P (t)
NAV (t)
; and then subtract the weighted average of the relative premium/discount over
the past 10 days from this value as
D(t) =
NAV (t)  P (t)
NAV (t)
  1
3:2318
10X
k=1
NAV (t  k)  P (t  k)
NAV (t  k) e
 0:25k;
where NAV (t) is the net asset value of the fund on day t and P (t) is the funds share price
on day t. The e 0:25k factor is a smoothing factor that (i) emphasizes more recent deviations1
between the NAV and share price and (ii) gradually reduces the impact of large deviations
in the past. Large relative deviations between NAV and price (that occur with nontrivial
frequency) will therefore not drop out of this Valuation variable abruptly, but rather fade
slowly from the equation. The coe¢ cient (3:2318) 1 =
 P10
k=1 e
 0:25k 1 is used to normalize
the variable.
Price Trend
1Theoretical studies have used the concept of a declining exponential in gauging investor sentiment and
incorporated it into di¤erential equations models (see Chapter 3 and references therein, specically [6]).
There is experimental evidence [28] that individuals tend to emphasize recent events more heavily than
earlier events in their decisions.
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As noted in Section 2.1, one possible motivation for buying a stock is that the price is in
an uptrend (and analogously for selling). Since prices are uctuating and changing direction
frequently, the denition requires a choice of time scale, which we take as ten days, and a
scaling factor that determines the weightings of recent days relative to earlier days. We use
the exponential factor e 0:25k for the weighting of the relative price change k days ago, as in
the Valuation variable above. Thus with the normalization factor above, we dene the Price
Trend as
T (t) =
1
3:2318
10X
k=1
P (t  k + 1)  P (t  k)
P (t  k) e
 0:25k:
For both the Price Trend and the Valuation variables, tests of robustness have shown
similar results with a longer time scale (e.g., 25 days) and di¤erent weighting factors [12].
Money Supply
Previous theoretical [6], experimental ([15] and [16]), and empirical [12] studies have
shown that an increase in the money supply bolsters asset prices. We obtain the weekly
M2 money data2 (not seasonally adjusted) for the time period of study from the Federal
Reserve website [www.federalreserve.gov/ releases/ h6/ hist/]. We then performed a linear
interpolation to obtain daily data. The M2 Money Supply variable is dened as the relative
change in this statistic on a daily basis, i.e.,
M2(t) =
M(t) M(t  1)
M(t  1) :
Volatility
The volatility in the model is computed as the standard deviation of the relative price
change, R(t) = P (t) P (t 1)
P (t 1) ; for the past X number of days including the current day. If t
represents today, then we dene todays volatility as the standard deviation of the relative
price change values over the past X +1 days, i.e., V olatility(t) = fvariance(R[t X; t])g1=2
where R[t X; t] represents a column vector containing the relative price change values over
2M2 includes: Currency, Travelers checks, demand and other checkable deposits, retail MMMFs (money
market mutual funds), savings, and small time deposits. M2 is measured in trillions for this paper.
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the past X + 1 days. We set X = 10 for Short Term Volatility or X = 251 for 52 Week
Volatility, i.e., we compute the standard deviation of the past 11 (or 252) days (including
today). We use the unbiased estimator of the variance: 1
X
Pt X
i=t (R(i) Mean(R[t X; t]))2:
This denition determines the deviation of the relative price change about the growth
curve of the share price. If the relative price change is constant, then the price is an
exponential function of time. Indeed, representing the relative price change in a limiting
form such as 1
P
dP
dt
yields the di¤erential equation 1
P
dP
dt
= C which implies P (t) = KeCt
via separation of variables where K and C are constants. For example, if the stock price
follows the pattern e0:02t (i.e., K = 1 and C = 0:02), then the relative price change would be
constant (e0:02 1 ' 0:02) and the Volatility would be zero. Thus, with the above denition
the trend in price would not contribute to the volatility.
52 Week Price Trend
As with the Volatility variable, we are not only interested in the short term price trend,
but also the longer term trend. As such, we determine the 52 Week Price Trend variable
as follows: (i) t a straight line to the past 252 Relative Price Change values (including the
current day t), i.e., R([t  251; t]); (ii) take the slope of this line and multiply it by 252 for
conversion to annual units. The resulting value is then denoted LT (t).
Volume Trend
We incorporate the trading volume for each fund into the model by considering the trend
of the volume in the same manner as the Price Trend. The Volume Trend, V T (t); is dened
as
V T (t) =
1
3:2318
10X
k=1
V ol(t  k + 1)  V ol(t  k)
V ol(t  k) e
 0:25k
where V ol(t) represents the trading volume3 for day t.
Time
3Note that the Volume may be zero on certain days. This would cause the Volume Trend to be innite
on those days. As such, any records in the data set with a volume of zero are excluded for Study 1. For
Study 2, any fund with a zero Volume record was exluded from the data set.
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To ensure the regression results are not artifacts of a specic time period, a historical
time variable is included as an independent regression variable. This time variable, Time(t),
is dened as the approximate number of months since October 26, 1998 (the earliest date
included in the data set). More precisely, this variable is calculated by determining the
number of days from date t to October 26, 1998, dividing this number by the average
number of working days per month (i.e., 252
12
= 21); and then rounding down to the closest
integer (i.e., if the resulting number is 15:8, then the variable is assigned a value of 15).
Finally, the variable is normalized by dividing by the total approximate number of months
in the data set, 143 (this number corresponds to Regression 5 which includes this variable).
Also, Time2(t) and Time3(t) are considered to determine the nature of the relationship (e.g.,
linear, quadratic, or cubic).
Resistance
The possibility that stock prices tend to decline after approaching a recent (in this
case quarterly) high is called Resistance which we identify by an indicator variable and
use as an independent variable in a regression. The recent quarterly high is dened by
H(t) := max fP (s)g for s 2 [t   63; t   16]. The Resistance Indicator, Q(t), is set if the
following conditions are satised: (1) for s in [t   15; t   10], P (s)  0:85H(t) and (2)
0:85H(t)  P (t)  H(t) (note that there is no condition on P (s) for s in [t 9; t 1]). Thus,
we interpret Resistance as having occurred on day t if the share price on day t is between
85  100% of the recent quarterly high.
2.2.3 Discussion of Variables
The variables dened above are chosen due to their role in theory, investment practice or
experimental settings, rather than as a consequence of data-mining. We discuss below the
motivation for the inclusion of several of these variables.
Price Trend
The inuence of price trend on future price changes has been of interest from many
perspectives. Traders often express their belief in momentum. For example the phrases "the
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trend is your friend" or "dont ght the tape" are old sayings on Wall Street. The apparent
persistence of a trend provides some support for the hypothesis of underreaction. Yet the
hypothesis of overreaction also receives much attention. A quantitative methodology for
distinguishing these two competing motivations is necessary to transform these philosophical
ideas into nance. We are able to accomplish this in several ways using a single set of large
data.
Various theories such as the "a¤ect heuristic" have suggested that prices rise excessively
as investors focus on a salient feature of a company or its product [45]. As more investors are
attracted to the stock, one expects a positive trend term in the short run, consistent with
our ndings. However, when viewed on a longer time scale, it is clear that, at some point,
the fundamentals will become more evident, resulting in a return to more modest prices.
This perspective can be regarded as a basis for overreaction on a longer time horizon, and
has some statistical backing from the DeBondt and Thaler [19] study. Our results, which
encompass the e¤ects of both long and short term trends, are consistent with this study and
with that of Poterba and Summers [41].
Money Supply
When applied to any consumer good, the law of supply and demand clearly stipulates
that an increase in demand will raise prices. An investment vehicle di¤ers from a consumer
good in that there is typically no consumer at the end of the trading chain, and purchase
of the asset is solely for the purpose of re-selling at a higher price (or obtaining a stream
of dividends). As such, it is not clear that an increase in the money available for possible
investment in that asset (analogous to demand for a consumer good) will lead to higher asset
prices, as it would for a consumer good. Furthermore, the methods of classical nance (e.g.,
the no arbitrage hypothesis) would cast doubt on the concept that a larger money supply
should lead to higher prices. However, experimental asset markets have provided considerable
evidence [15] that a larger ratio of cash to asset leads to higher prices. Mathematical models
[6] have indicated that a greater cash supply leads to higher prices. There is also a belief in
some investment circles that "cheap money fuels market prices," so that when there is an
increase in money supply the increase in available investment funds tends to push up prices.
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Volatility
A basic idea in nance is that the risk and reward are inversely correlated so that investors
seeking higher return must tolerate higher risk [5]. In the classical literature, risk is identied
with volatility in the assets price. The measure of volatility, however, depends crucially on
the time scale for measurement. We consider both short term and long term volatility.
Volatility has been studied by other researchers (see [21] and the references therein).
Volume
As with the price trend, volume provides an indication to traders about the beliefs and
resources of other traders. In the process of price discovery, a trader who believes that the
asset is undervalued will nevertheless strive to purchase it at the lowest possible price. Since
he does not know the strategies and assessments of the other traders, his only recourse is
to examine the earliest manifestations of their trading decisions which are exhibited in the
changes in price and the volume of trading. Rising prices on low volume provide an indication
to traders that the buying interest is not as strong as one might believe by examining price
changes alone.
Resistance
A concept that is frequently used by traders involves resistance, or the tendency for prices
to pull back when approaching a yearly or recent high. Traders are then aware that all other
traders know that a higher price could not be attained during that time period. This could
be viewed as a manifestation of "anchoring" whereby observers focus on a particular value
and neglect to consider other possibilities. Traders have explained the concept of resistance
by stating that investors who held the stock through the recent high may experience regret
at not having reaped a prot. Thus, as the shares again approach this recent high, these
investors seek to recover their perceived "losses" by selling; thereby lowering the stock price
and preventing it from breaking through this price barrier. A yearly high, for example, also
provides information to traders by setting a price at which supply and demand for the asset
were equal after a period of rising prices. Recently, the concept of resistance has received
academic attention in a study that indicates that the yearly return is inuenced by the stocks
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proximity to the yearly high [27] though another study, [48], demonstrates some limitations
of these ndings and obtains more mixed results.4
2.3 STUDY 1
2.3.1 Objectives
The objective of this study is to provide quantitative answers to the questions of whether
and to what extent investors are inuenced by the following factors: (a) recent price trend,
(b) recent valuation, (c) changes in money supply, (d) volatility, (e) long term price trend,
(f) recent changes in volume, (g) resistance (i.e., proximity to yearly highs), and (h) e¤ects
of time (during the data period). A primary goal of this study is to identify when over-
and underreaction occur and to determine a quantitative methodology for distinguishing
between the two using nonlinearity in the price trend. Also, we are able to conrm reversion
to the mean, a Poterba and Summers [41] nding, by including the longer term trend. The
claim that an inux of money bolsters trading prices is supported by experimental [15],
theoretical [6], and empirical [12] studies. Thus, it is reasonable to incorporate a variable
which represents the amount of available money. Volatility is identied with risk in classical
nance. As such, we consider this factor in order to test the e¤ect of volatility on trading
prices. Traders often observe the volume, and believe that an uptrend is more likely to
continue if it is accompanied by rising volume, and that gradual price rise with declining
volume is a sign that the uptrend is likely to falter. Smith, Suchanek, andWilliams [46] noted
that bids (and thereby volume) tend to diminish shortly before the peak of an experimental
bubble. Resistance is included to test the relationship between the current price and a recent
high price. The e¤ect of time is considered to ensure our results are not the artifacts of a
particular time period. For a more detailed discussion of the motivation behind the inclusion
4The Resistance variable can be explored more fully by augmenting this variable within the context of our
methodology. In particular, Sturm [48] nds that investors are inuenced di¤erently based on how recently
the high price was attained (i.e., last month, two months ago, three months ago, etc.). Thus, one could
dene a variable(s) representing this time di¤erence and include it as an additional independent variable in
our regressions.
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of these factors, see Section 2.2.3.
Our basic approach is to determine the fractional change in the price of a stock as a
regression on a set of variables, including an appropriate valuation variable that e¤ectively
subtracts out much of the stochastic noise due to changes in valuation. The set of variables
is discussed in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. The denitions of the valuation, recent price trend,
and volume trend variables include a weighting so that the most recent changes have the
greatest e¤ect. In addition to the use of related terms in mathematical modeling [6] there
is both experimental [28] and empirical [47] evidence that individuals tend to emphasize
recent events more heavily than earlier events in their decisions. Furthermore, we consider
both the square and cubic price change terms, and obtain a non-linear function indicating
that a daily gain of up to 2.78% tends to yield higher prices, but larger gains lead to lower
prices. The analogous crossover point for price drops is 2.1%. There is a negative coe¢ cient of
smaller magnitude for the long term trend, consistent with mean reversion on this time scale.
Further evidence that traders are inuenced by the evidence of othersstrategies through
price patterns is the fact that the price representing the recent quarterly high is associated
with a slightly negative coe¢ cient, providing "resistance" to a stocks upward movement.
Positive changes in the money supply are associated with increases in the fractional price,
consistent with a liquidity (excess cash) perspective of markets ([15] and [16]).
Our regressions indicate an ambiguous role for volatility, indicating that the classical
concept of associating volatility with risk is more complicated. In fact, the sign is positive for
the short term, suggesting that volatility has a tendency to boost trading prices. However,
in the longer term volatility is a negative factor. The recent change in volume is a slightly
positive factor, indicating that positive (negative) changes in volume correspond to positive
(negative) changes in price. Finally, we utilize a time variable dened as the number of
months since the earliest data point. By using regressions that include up to the cubic power
in this variable, we can largely extract and eliminate any e¤ects due to a particular time
period. The Price Trend, Valuation, M2 Money Supply, Short Term Volatility, and Volume
Trend coe¢ cients are essentially unchanged upon introduction of this variable, suggesting
that our results for these factors are not artifacts of the changes during this time period.
This studys primary contributions to the literature are summarized by the following:
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(1) Identication of the nonlinearity in the price trend provides a method for distinguish-
ing between over- and underreaction. Without such a method it is di¢ cult to argue that a
systematic bias exists or that the study of these concepts would be helpful for trading.
(2) The key concept behind these regressions is the inclusion of the Valuation as an inde-
pendent variable. By including in the regression a function based on the NAV, a signicant
portion of the prices volatility is eliminated; thereby, removing (or explaining) a great deal
of "noise" from the data. Thus, the e¤ects of other factors are no longer camouaged by the
valuation.
(3) The M2 money supply is also a signicant factor in price changes, which supports
the ndings of theoretical, experimental and empirical studies.
(4) The volatility results are quite intriguing as short term volatility actually boosts
prices while long term volatility has a small negative e¤ect on price changes.
2.3.2 Methodology
To determine the inuence of variables dened above on investor decisions, we consider their
e¤ect on the relative price change. This is accomplished by performing regressions with
the next days relative price change, R(t + 1) = P (t+1) P (t)
P (t)
; as the dependent variable and
various subsets of the above factors (using the data of day t and earlier) as the independent
variables. For each variable the regression provides a coe¢ cient and its corresponding
statistical signicance (t- and p-values). The relative changes in the above variables can be
adjusted for the fact that some variables have a much larger range than others in order to
facilitate comparison of the magnitudes. For example, the average of the absolute value of
the Price Trend variable is 0.003698796, while the absolute value of the Volume Trend average
is 0.248292 or approximately 67 times larger. To facilitate comparisons of coe¢ cients, the
Volume Trend coe¢ cient should be multiplied by a factor of 67. Note that this scaling is
essentially a matter of convenience from our perspective, as it does not alter the statistical
signicance indicators. Whether scaled or not, one can use the computed coe¢ cient of the
regression multiplied with the average magnitude of the variable to determine whether it is
large enough to be of value to trading or investing (see Table 2.4).
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Our data set consists of closing prices from di¤erent funds. An ordinary linear regression
is an example of a classical modeling technique that assumes observations, in our case closing
prices, are independent and identically distributed. However, as our data set consists of
closing prices from di¤erent funds, this assumption is not necessarily valid. Thus, we need
to utilize a method that accounts for the variation within funds and between di¤erent funds.
To accomplish this, we utilize a mixed-e¤ects model, i.e., a model with both xed and
random e¤ects. A xed e¤ect is a parameter "associated with an entire population or with
certain repeatable levels of experimental factors", while random e¤ects "are associated with
individual experimental units drawn at random from a population" [38]. As we wish to
draw inferences regarding all closed-end funds based upon our sample, fund is utilized as
a random e¤ect in our model, while the other independent variables (see Section 2.2.2) are
xed e¤ects. While an ordinary linear regression would estimate parameters using expected
mean squares, our mixed-e¤ects regression utilizes the restricted maximum likelihood method
to obtain unbiased estimates of the variance components of the random e¤ects. Thus this
procedure implements a methodology that accounts for the grouped (by fund) data, while
still providing coe¢ cients and signicance values that are representative of the entire data
set.
We execute linear regressions of the form:
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1V ariable1(t) + 2V ariable2(t) +   + nV ariablen(t)
where t represents the current day, then R(t+1) = P (t+1) P (t)
P (t)
represents the following days
relative price change, or return, and V ariablei(t) represents one of the above independent
variables. Each regression includes an intercept term (0) which may be interpreted as the
"drift" term of classical nance. Retaining this intercept term in the regressions adjusts
for the average return so that non-zero coe¢ cients for any of the variables demonstrate
"abnormal return," i.e., return beyond the small daily average return of a stock within a
particular class.
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2.3.3 Results
2.3.3.1 Linear Regressions Regression 1. As a baseline, we perform a linear mixed-
e¤ects regression with only the independent variable Price Trend. The regression has the
form:
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t):
Results may be found in Table5 2.1.
Table 2.1: Regression 1 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.00043484 0.000039850 10.91202 <.0001
Price Trend -0.03787525 0.007761571 -4.87984 <.0001
Observations: 117,760; Groups: 125; Degrees of Freedom: 117,634
Although Price Trend is statistically signicant, its value is negative and small. In
quantitative terms a 1% per day increase during the recent time period, on average, yields a
0:04% decrease today. A signicant, small (and most likely not tradeable) Price Trend term
is consistent with the Poterba and Summers [41] ndings. However, the sign is negative;
whereas, Poterba and Summers found a positive trend term.
Regression 2. This baseline regression above is a standard treatment of such data,
and as such, does not circumvent the key issue of "noise" due to changes in valuation (i.e.,
fundamentals). The inclusion of our Valuation variable in the regression above removes
5We list the number of observations, groups, and degrees of freedom for each regression, because these
may vary depending upon the included independent variables. The calculation of the Price Trend, Valuation,
and Volume Trend variables requires the previous ten daysdata. Thus, these variables cannot be computed
for the rst ten days for each fund. Accordingly, the rst ten days of data are excluded from the regressions.
Similarly, the rst 63 days of data for each fund are excluded due to the Resistance and Breakout variables,
while the rst 251 records of each fund from the regression data set are ignored due to the formulas for 52
Week Volatility and 52 Week Price Trend.
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much of this noise and dramatically identies the role of Price Trend as shown below for the
regression:
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t):
Table 2.2: Regression 2 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.0004893 0.000039393 12.42070 <.0001
Price Trend 0.2270024 0.009145194 24.82204 <.0001
Valuation 0.1988558 0.003739072 53.18320 <.0001
Observations: 117,760; Groups: 125; Degrees of Freedom: 117,633
The results of this regression (see Table 2.2) show that by "subtracting out" the valua-
tion, i.e., including the Valuation in the regression, the Price Trend is not only statistically
signicant but has a positive coe¢ cient comparable in magnitude to the Valuation coe¢ cient.
Regression 3. The regression above shows the signicance of the Price Trend variable.
To explore the nonlinearities in the relationship between Price Trend and Relative Price
Change, the quadratic and cubic factors of the Price Trend and Valuation variables are added
to Regression 2. In addition, the cross terms, e.g., Price Trend multiplied by Valuation, are
also included. This regression has the form:
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t) + 3T
2(t) + 4T
3(t) + 5D
2(t)
+ 6D
3(t) + 7T (t)D(t) + 8T
2(t)D(t) + 9T (t)D
2(t)
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Table 2.3: Regression 3 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.0002 0.00004 5.61263 <.0001
Price Trend 0.3581 0.01085 33.00490 <.0001
Valuation 0.2304 0.00422 54.62312 <.0001
(Price Trend)2 3.8716 0.88137 4.39271 <.0001
(Price Trend)3 -610.7741 40.74653 -14.98960 <.0001
(Valuation)2 0.3529 0.05692 6.19928 <.0001
(Valuation)3 -1.3587 0.11411 -11.90712 <.0001
(Price Trend)(Valuation) -1.2234 0.44093 -2.77467 0.0055
(Price Trend)2(Valuation) -139.8894 27.18508 -5.14581 <.0001
(Price Trend)(Valuation)2 9.3560 5.39400 1.73452 0.0828
Observations: 117,760; Groups: 125; Degrees of Freedom: 117,626
The inclusion of the additional terms does not appear to a¤ect the signicance of the
Price Trend and Valuation terms; however, it does increase the magnitudes of their respective
coe¢ cients (see Table 2.3). The relationship between Price Trend and the Relative Price
Change can be visualized using the three dimensional graph (see Figure 2.1) of Relative
Price Change, Valuation, and Price Trend with the coe¢ cients obtained from the regression
above:
R(T;D) = 0:0002 + 0:3581T + 0:2304D + 3:8716T 2   610:7741T 3
+ 0:3529D2   1:3587D3   1:2234TD   139:8894T 2D + 9:3560TD2
with T representing Price Trend and D representing Valuation.
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Figure 2.1: The coe¢ cients of the Price Trend variable, T , and the Valuation variable, D,
together with all terms up to cubic order (namely, D, T , D2, T 2, DT , D3, T 3, D2T , DT 2)
are used as the independent variables in a regression for the Relative Price Change, R. The
coe¢ cients of these terms dene a cubic polynomial in D and T that is plotted above. The
surface describes the e¤ect on the Relative Price Change on the following day, exhibiting the
nonlinear relationship between D, T and R: In particular, a positive trend that is large can
inuence the following days Relative Price Change in the opposite direction (analogously for
negative trend). The precise point at which the magnitude changes sign depends nonlinearly
on the valuation.
From this three dimensional surface, it is clear that the relationship between the Relative
Price Change and Price Trend is highly nonlinear. Taking the cross-section of this surface
when the Valuation is zero yields the function
R(T; 0) = 0:0002 + 0:3581T + 3:8716T 2   610:7741T 3
plotted in Figure 2.2 below.
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Figure 2.2: The cross-section of the surface in Figure 2.1 obtained by setting the Valuation
variable, D, to zero is plotted with the Price Trend variable, T , on the horizontal axis and
the Relative Price Change variable, R, on the vertical. The coe¢ cients of the regression
terms dene a cubic polynomial in D and T that is plotted above. The T intercepts of the
above graph are -0.021, -0.000562, and 0.0278 indicating that if the Price Trend is between
-2.1 and 2.78, then the Relative Price Change and Price Trend have the same sign. Thus,
smaller changes in the Price Trend, tend to push the Relative Price Change in the same
direction. However, if the Price Trend is less than -2.1 or greater than 2.78, then tomorrows
price change is more likely to be opposite todays.
This regression involving nonlinear terms shows the complex nature of underreaction and
overreaction. Small changes in price tend to continue, indicating that there is underreaction,
while large changes tend to be reversed, indicating overreaction. One of the problems in uti-
lizing the concepts of underreaction and overreaction has been the di¢ culty in distinguishing
between the two. In any particular situation, if one cannot determine in advance, using a
scientic method, whether there will be overreaction or underreaction, then an e¢ cient mar-
ket advocate can claim the market is free of bias. A methodology to delineate between these
concepts can render them into practical tools rather than philosophical insights.
Note that if the terms with higher (> 1) powers of the Valuation variable are excluded
from the regression, then there is still a cubic relationship between Price Trend and Relative
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Price Change. However, instead of a change greater than 2:78% producing a negative
Relative Price Change, the necessary change is 8:37%, which is not as signicant in practical
terms. Inclusion of the additional Valuation terms provides a more complete picture of the
dynamics between Price Trend and Relative Price Change.
Regression 4. This regression examines the e¤ects of the M2 Money Supply (M2),
Short Term Volatility (STVol), 52 Week Volatility (Vol), 52 Week (Long Term) Price Trend
(LTT), and Volume Trend (VT) (in addition to the Valuation and Price Trend) on the
Relative Price Change6:
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t) + 3M2(t) + 4STV ol(t)
+ 5V ol(t) + 6LTT (t) + 7V T (t):
Table 2.4 shows that the Price Trend and Valuation variables are still statistically sig-
nicant and of approximately the same magnitude with slightly smaller positive coe¢ cients
than in Regression 3, while the Intercept term is only marginally signicant. The M2 Money
Supply has a positive coe¢ cient (t-value of 9.5). This conrms the experimental ndings in
[15] that the money supply is a signicant factor in the price change and that an infusion of
money into the market should cause prices to rise.
The Short Term Volatility coe¢ cient is statistically signicant and comparable in mag-
nitude (when scaled with respect to the average magnitude, as discussed above) to the Price
Trend, Valuation, and M2 Money Supply variables. The Short Term Volatility typically con-
tributes 0.000842 (the product of the coe¢ cient with the average magnitude of the volatility)
compared with 0.0017 for the Valuation.
6Note that as previously mentioned, with the inclusion of the 52 Week Volatility, 52 Week Price Trend,
and Volume Trend more records are excluded from each fund. The total number of records used is decreased
from 117,760 to 88,127 and the number of funds dropped from 125 to 114. The 11 excluded funds had fewer
than 253 daysdata.
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Table 2.4: Regression 4 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.000099 0.000124 0.80097 0.4231
Price Trend 0.234642 0.010836 21.65396 <.0001
Valuation 0.206172 0.004232 48.71275 <.0001
M2 Money Supply 0.385010 0.040603 9.48238 <.0001
Short Term Volatility 0.071211 0.008063 8.83150 <.0001
52 Week Volatility -0.043829 0.011562 -3.79074 0.0002
52 Week Price Trend -0.031533 0.019147 -1.64683 0.0996
Volume Trend 0.000267 0.000087 3.08137 0.0021
Term Value Mean(jV arj) (Value)(Mean(jV arj))
(Intercept) 0.000099 N/A N/A
Price Trend 0.234642 0.003698796 0.000868
Valuation 0.206172 0.008276127 0.001706
M2 Money Supply 0.385010 0.0008950968 0.000345
Short Term Volatility 0.071211 0.01183092 0.000842
52 Week Volatility -0.043829 0.0121939 -0.000534
52 Week Price Trend -0.031533 0.001934814 -0.000061
Volume Trend 0.000267 0.248292 0.000066
Observations: 88,127; Groups: 114; Degrees of Freedom: 88,006
In addition, it is surprising to note that the coe¢ cient of the Short Term Volatility is
positive, indicating that a short uptrend that has high variance leads to higher prices than
a steady uptrend. This may indicate that some large spikes in prices tend to attract the
attention of buyers, and analogously, sharp drops tend to induce more selling compared with
the same magnitude of change that is more evenly distributed.
In contrast to this evidence that Short Term Volatility actually boosts the Relative Price
Change, we nd that the coe¢ cient of the 52 Week Volatility is negative and statistically
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signicant (t-value of -3.79), indicating that an increase in the annual volatility of a fund
forces the Relative Price Change down. Thus, while short term volatility does not appear
to discourage buying, we nd evidence that longer term volatility does make funds less
attractive to investors.
The 52 Week Price Trend is marginally signicant with a t-value of -1.64 yielding limited
support for mean reversion over longer time periods as noted by Poterba and Summers [41]
using di¤erent methods. It is also consistent with the ndings of DeBondt and Thaler
[19] who found that those portfolios that performed poorly the previous year tended to
outperform the market on average the following year, and vice versa.
We nd evidence that the Volume Trend is statistically signicant. Its t-value of 3.08
implies strong statistical support for the positivity of this coe¢ cient. This is consistent
with trader beliefs that rising volume in an uptrend is a positive sign for the direction of
prices. However, the impact as measured in the product of the coe¢ cient with the average
magnitude of the variable is one order of magnitude smaller than for most of the other
variables.
Regression 5. In any regression spanning several years there is the possibility that the
results are inuenced by events or characteristics of a particular era or time period. For
example, momentum trading may have been popular when the market was rising. In order
to discount this possibility we include the time variables (up to third order) in the list of
variables in Regression 4. These variables represent the number of months, the square of
the number of months, and the cube of the number of months since October 26, 1998. In
this way if prices are rising then falling and rising again during the time period considered,
the cubic polynomial in time generated by the regression will account for this. For example,
if the Price Trend coe¢ cient is entirely due to this time issue, then the coe¢ cient of Price
Trend in this new regression would be statistically zero. Hence, this new regression is of the
form:
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R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t) + 3M2(t) + 4STV ol(t)
+ 5V ol(t) + 6LTT (t) + 7V T (t) + 8Time(t)
+ 9Time
2(t) + 10Time
3(t):
Table 2.5: Regression 5 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.00015 0.000371 0.41238 0.6801
Price Trend 0.22643 0.010867 20.83641 <.0001
Valuation 0.20262 0.004247 47.70291 <.0001
M2 Money Supply 0.38763 0.040588 9.55020 <.0001
Short Term Volatility 0.08290 0.008206 10.10215 <.0001
52 Week Volatility -0.02654 0.012917 -2.05492 0.0399
52 Week Price Trend -0.06216 0.019528 -3.18314 0.0015
Volume Trend 0.00025 0.000087 2.81859 0.0048
Time -0.00961 0.002518 -3.81704 0.0001
(Time)2 0.02821 0.005146 5.48264 <.0001
(Time)3 -0.02011 0.003068 -6.55358 <.0001
Observations: 88,127; Groups: 114; Degrees of Freedom: 88,003
All three Time terms are statistically signicant (see Table 2.5). In addition, the absolute
value of the relative percentage changes of the Price Trend, Valuation, M2 Money Supply,
and Volume Trend coe¢ cients from Regression 4 to Regression 5 are less than 6.5%, while
the percentage change of the Short Term Volatility is 16%. This leads to the conclusion that
our results for these variables are not signicantly inuenced by the particular time period
included in this study. The magnitude of the relative percentage changes for the 52 Week
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Volatility and 52 Week Price Trend are 40% and 97%, respectively. Since these variables
involve data for an entire year, they are most strongly inuenced by inclusion of the time
variables.
To determine whether the hypothesized phenomenon of resistance is statistically signi-
cant we perform two regressions below, the rst involving only the basic two variables, the
second involving all of the factors we have found to be signicant above.
Regression 6. This regression includes the Resistance along with the Price Trend and
Valuation as independent variables. It has the form:
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t) + 3Q(t):
Table 2.6: Regression 6 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.0005491 0.000040813 13.45485 <.0001
Price Trend 0.2248558 0.009401159 23.91788 <.0001
Valuation 0.2021202 0.003837561 52.66893 <.0001
Resistance -0.0011975 0.000520305 -2.30156 0.0214
Observations: 111,135; Groups: 125; Degrees of Freedom: 111,007
Although the Resistance variable appears to be small in magnitude (see Table 2.6), its
impact is comparable to the other variables since the indicator variable is 1 when the criteria
are met compared with relatively small magnitudes for the other variables (see discussion
after Regression 4). Since the criteria for resistance are met infrequently compared to all
data points (namely 687 of 111,135) one does not obtain the overwhelming p-values as in
the other variables. However, one still has 98% condence that the coe¢ cient is negative.
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Regression 7. Augmenting Regression 6 with the remaining independent variables
(M2 Money Supply, Short Term Volatility, Long Term Volatility, Long Term Price Trend,
and Volume Trend) yields a regression of the form:
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t) + 3M2(t) + 4STV ol(t) + 5V ol(t)
+ 6LTT (t) + 7V T (t) + 8Q(t):
Table 2.7: Regression 7 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.0000844 0.00012428 0.67890 0.4972
Price Trend 0.2357864 0.01084270 21.74610 <.0001
Valuation 0.2060078 0.00423260 48.67172 <.0001
M2 Money Supply 0.3852189 0.04060101 9.48791 <.0001
Short Term Volatility 0.0717047 0.00806476 8.89111 <.0001
52 Week Volatility -0.0427853 0.01156665 -3.69902 0.0002
52 Week Price Trend -0.0308970 0.01914791 -1.61360 0.1066
Volume Trend 0.0002703 0.00008667 3.11880 0.0018
Resistance -0.0038353 0.00132225 -2.90056 0.0037
Observations: 88,127; Groups: 114; Degrees of Freedom: 88,005
Table 2.7 shows that the statistical signicance of the Resistance variable increases from
Regression 6 to Regression 7 (p-value increases from 0.0214 to 0.0037) and remains negative
(t-value of -2.90056). In addition, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient increases three-fold from
Regression 6 to Regression 7. The fact that the signicance of Resistance in Regression 7
is much stronger than in Regression 6 demonstrates the importance of including variables
that are known to have an e¤ect on the dependent variable. The percentage relative changes
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in the other coe¢ cients (excluding Intercept) from Regression 4 (which does not include
Resistance) to Regression 7 are less than 2.4%.
Note that the inclusion of the Time variables has little e¤ect on the Resistance (coe¢ cient
of -0.0039525 with p-value equal to 0.0028) with negligible di¤erences between the results for
the other variables and Regression 5. While the p-value of 0.0037 does not yield the same
overwhelming degree of condence as with some of the other variables, it is nevertheless
very signicant, attaining the 99.5% level. The reason for the di¤erence (e.g. 3 standard
deviations for Resistance instead of 21 for Price Trend) is probably attributable to the
fact that only 687 points satised our criteria for Resistance. The impact of Resistance,
when it does occur is large, as one can see by multiplying the coe¢ cient, -0.0038353 by the
value (namely, 1) when the criteria are met. Comparing this with the analogous product
for valuation, namely, 0.001706, we see that Resistance asserts a negative inuence that is
twice as large as a typical positive Valuation change. Stated otherwise, if one is within
the Resistance criterion, as we have dened it, the Valuation variable needs to be twice
the typical magnitude in the positive direction just to neutralize the e¤ect of Resistance.
Valuation aside, the Price Trend needs to be 4.4 times the average magnitude of 0.000868
in order to counteract the Resistance.
The inclusion of the same variable(s) in various regressions can be viewed as a test of
robustness. As demonstrated by the results above, once the Valuation variable has been
added to the regression, the coe¢ cients and signicance values of the other independent
variables do not vary signicantly from one regression to another.
In analyzing daily closing prices there is always the issue of the bid/ask spread at the
end of the trading day. In other words, the close may occur at either the asking price or
the bidding price. This tends to introduce some noise into the analysis of trading prices.
However, the large statistical signicance attained in our linear regressions suggests that
this randomness is not a dominating factor. Moreover, if there is a non-random bias for the
closing price to be at the asking price, for example, under particular conditions, then it has
the same e¤ect as rising prices. The bid/ask spread is usually not very signicant for active
stocks, as it is often about one cent for a $30 stock so it is an e¤ect that is about (3; 000) 1
but could be much larger for less active stocks.
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2.3.3.2 Forecasting One advantage of a linear regression is that if it models the dynam-
ics of the dependent variable well, it can be utilized to obtain predictions of that variables
behavior. The S-Plus statistics package provides forecasting functionality. As the entire
data set was used to obtain the above results, we perform an in-sample forecast utilizing
Regression 4. This forecast predicts the Relative Price Change for the 88,127 data points
included in the regression. We compare the sign (i.e., positive or negative) of the predicted
Relative Price Change with that of the actual observed Relative Price Change and nd that
the model successfully predicts the sign of the Relative Price Change 57% of the time (50,641
correctly predicted signs out of 88,127 observations). This provides some evidence that the
variables used in this regression play a key role in market price dynamics. Another approach
to forecasting using trend and valuation has been implemented in Duran and Caginalp [23]
where the coe¢ cients of these terms are optimized using market data.
2.3.3.3 Regression Per Fund We perform a linear regression individually for each of
the 125 funds with dependent variable Relative Price Change and the independent variables
from Regression 4. A regression is of the form:
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t) + 3M2(t) + 4STV ol(t)
+ 5V ol(t) + 6LTT (t) + 7V T (t):
We found that only 17 of the 125 funds have a negative Price Trend coe¢ cient, supporting
the above evidence of a positive trend e¤ect. Of these 17 funds, ve are related to the Energy
industry. In addition, these individual regressions conrm the mixed-e¤ects linear regression
results and show that the coe¢ cients are not distorted by a small number of funds. The
average values of the coe¢ cients (see Table 2.8) are close to the Regression 4 results for all
variables except the 52 Week Volatility, 52 Week Price Trend, and Volume Trend. Thus, it
appears that these variables are more dependent upon the characteristics of the individual
funds than the others.
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Table 2.8: Comparison of individual funds to entire population. Ordinary linear regressions
were run on each individual fund. The coe¢ cient values for the short and long term Price
Trend, Valuation, M2 Money Supply, short and long term Volatility, and Volume Trend
were averaged over all of the funds. These average values are compared to the corresponding
coe¢ cient values resulting from the mixed-e¤ects linear regression run for all funds.
Term Price Trend Valuation M2 Money Supply
Average Value 0.298753 0.227028 0.26835
Regression 4 Coe¢ cient 0.234642 0.206172 0.38501
Term Short Term Volatility 52 Week Volatility
Average Value 0.086857 1.6558247
Regression 4 Coe¢ cient 0.071211 -0.043829
Term 52 Week Price Trend Volume Trend
Average Value -1.248058 0.003503
Regression 4 Coe¢ cient -0.031533 0.000267
2.3.4 Conclusion
Using a methodology that compensates for the randomness of changing valuation, we nd
strong evidence that the Price Trend, M2 Money Supply, Volatility, and Volume Trend in-
uence investor decisions. Unlike some previous studies, the near elimination of the noise
associated with changing fundamentals yields results that are signicant in magnitude. Of
particular interest, we nd that the dependence of (todays) Relative Price Change on (yes-
terdays) Price Trend is nonlinear, thus supporting both of the ideas of underreaction and
overreaction, in a way that distinguishes between them quantitatively. Roughly speaking,
when the Price Trend is not large, the price tends to continue in the same direction; but
when the Price Trend is large it moves in the opposite direction. This suggests that investors
and traders view a gradual trend as information that the assets value is increasing and are
thereby willing to pay more for it. However, when there is a large change, they tend to view
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the price change as excessive and implement a strategy of capitalizing on the overreaction,
consistent with the ndings of [22].
Using the weekly changes in the M2 Money Supply (interpolated for daily changes) as one
of the independent variables, in addition to the others that we have already established, we
have implemented a regression analysis to demonstrate the positive e¤ect of money supply
on asset price changes. There is very clear statistical evidence (t-value greater than 9)
that an increase in money supply is a positive factor in price changes. For this variable
in particular, there is the possibility that an increasing money supply is associated with a
particular time period during our ten year data period. The inclusion of a time variable
with terms up to (Time)3 essentially eliminates this possibility, as the coe¢ cient and the
statistical signicance are virtually unchanged.
Short term and long term volatility both have a statistically signicant e¤ect on trading
price. Volatility that is persistent appears to deter investors, consistent with the concept of
risk aversion. Surprisingly, short term volatility has a positive e¤ect on trading price. This
may suggest that volatility may be associated with increased attention on the stock that
draws more investors, and hence, increases the demand for the stock, boosting prices.
In our study we nd denitive statistical support for the hypothesis that rising volume has
a positive inuence on price changes, thereby conrming the experimental and practitioner
ideas.
We formulate a reasonable mathematical criterion for resistance, the phenomenon by
which stock prices tend to decline after approaching a recent high, and nd strong support
for the assertion that prices are less likely to rise when they are just below the recent highs.
Looking beyond the particular variables (e.g., Price Trend, Money Supply, etc.) studied
in this paper, we note that our method is quite general and is capable of addressing other
hypotheses that can be formulated quantitatively. The use of assets in which one can ob-
jectively dene a valuation enables one to compensate for the random noise that is inherent
in fundamentals, as illustrated by the rst two regressions. Without addressing the issue
of changes in valuation, statistical methods will often show that the null hypothesis of no
e¤ect cannot be eliminated. For some variables, there may be nonlinearity which can also
be understood (as with Price Trend and Valuation in Regression 3) using this methodology.
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Nonlinearity can provide an explanation for phenomena that inuence the dependent vari-
able in competing directions, e.g., underreactions and overreactions. An important nonlinear
term can also appear as a zero coe¢ cient in a linear regression as a consequence of having a
positive e¤ect for part of the variable domain and negative on the remainder.
While our study has focused on closed-end funds and daily price changes, the methods
can be applied to any particular time horizon, and to more general stocks once a method
for valuation is chosen. From the perspective of establishing the methodology and e¤ects
of key variables, closed-end funds have the advantage that there is no ambiguity in their
valuation. More generally, one would need to use a method of valuation (which is available
from classical nance) together with our methodology in order to obtain predictions on
relative price changes.
A major challenge in the analysis of nancial markets has been the development of a
methodology that can establish and quantify the e¤ect of various forces that move prices.
Our study has taken a step in this direction, and provides considerable statistical evidence for
the implementation of the asset ow di¤erential equations utilizing these concepts. Through
optimization of parameters relating to trend, for example, one can use these equations to
predict price dynamics (see [23] for the di¤erential equations and [12] for the di¤erence
equations).
2.4 STUDY 2: STANDARDIZATION OF INDEPENDENT REGRESSION
VARIABLES
2.4.1 Objectives
The dynamics of asset prices and the underlying motivations have been of great interest for
both theorists and practitioners. A basic rationale for price movement is due to the changes
in the value of the asset. In the absence of any insight into the motivations of investors
and traders, one might stipulate that prices should uctuate randomly about this basic
valuation. One can regard this concept as a default hypothesis expressing a distinguished
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limit in which there is (a) unlimited information, that ensures all participants share the same
notion of valuation, and (b) essentially innite arbitrage capital, whereby informed investors
vie with one another to quickly exploit any deviations from this valuation.
There is little doubt among practitioners that additional factors are at work in mar-
kets. The fact that some studies nd evidence of overreaction while others demonstrate
underreaction has led some to assert that this may be evidence that markets are e¢ cient.
Our perspective, however, is that perhaps there are nonlinear relationships between price
movements. One of the key goals of this study is to demonstrate this nonlinearity and to
establish its form on an empirical and statistical basis. In particular, does an uptrend have
a negative impact on daily returns after a particular threshold? And how does the valuation
enter into that threshold? A second goal is to have an objective measure of the impact of
various competing e¤ects, e.g., price trend, valuation, etc.
Similar to Study 1, these goals are achieved by quantifying the e¤ect of various factors
on the daily relative price change. Given the unambiguous nature of the denition of a
closed-end funds valuation (namely, its NAV), we consider a data set comprised of 111,356
daily closing prices for 119 closed-end funds (28 Generalized, 62 Specialized, and 29 World
funds)7. The records correspond to daily closing prices for the time period October 26,
1998 through January 30, 20088. We perform linear regressions with the relative change
in daily price as the dependent variable and various decision-making factors as independent
variables. Specically, we consider (i) the recent and long term trend in fund price; (ii) the
valuation of the fund; (iii) the M2 money supply; (iv) the recent and long term volatility
of the stock price; (v) the recent trend in volume; and (vi) resistance, i.e., the idea that
rising stock prices tend to slow their increase when approaching a recent high price, which
acts as a barrier. As shown by the regressions of [12], the incorporation of valuation in
the appropriate form will greatly reduce the "noise" inherent in the stochastic nature of the
valuation and enable the analysis of these other contributing factors.
7While the same data set was used for both Study 1 and Study 2, fewer funds were included in Study 2.
This is due to the denition of the Volume Trend variable. In Study 1, any record (daily) with a trading
volume of zero was eliminated; whereas for Study 2, any fund with a trading volume of zero on any day was
excluded.
8Due to the denition of certain independent variables, all funds were required to have at least one years
worth of data.
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By standardizing the independent variables, i.e., subtracting the mean values and di-
viding by the standard deviations, we are then able to easily compare the e¤ects of each
variable. Note that the methodology we employ to nd quantitative measures of e¤ect can
be extended for use on ordinary stocks provided a valuation measure for these stocks is em-
ployed. In addition, this process is not limited to the above mentioned variables, but can
be used to examine any decision-making factor provided it may be expressed as a variable.
An important aspect of this study involves a judicious denition of valuation. Without a
mechanism for extracting the valuation, the remaining terms would quite likely be masked
by the "noise" inherent in changes in valuation (see Regressions 4 and 5 in Appendix A).
2.4.2 Approach and Rationale for Standardization
The objective of this paper is to determine whether various factors such as Price Trend,
Valuation, Money Supply, Volume Trend, and Volatility inuence an assets Relative Price
Change, R(t+1) = P (t+1) P (t)
P (t)
where P (t) is the asset price on day t. This is accomplished by
executing several linear regressions with the relative price change as the dependent variable
and subsets of the other factors as independent variables. The linear regression produces
a regression coe¢ cient, p-value, and t-value for each independent variable. The regression
coe¢ cient provides the "magnitude" of the e¤ect, while the statistical signicance (p-value
and t-value) of the dependent variable determines whether the e¤ect is truly present. This
approach, however, has two shortcomings: (i) our data set consists of multiple stocks, each
with its own individual attributes and (ii) the scales of the variables vary over several orders
of magnitude (e.g., the mean value for Price Trend is approximately 0.0004 while the mean
value for the Volume Trend is 0.21).
Prior studies [12] have shown that the rst issue can be circumvented by performing
a mixed e¤ects linear regression which accounts for the unique statistical characteristics of
each fund.
The second issue can be addressed by standardizing the data, a methodology whereby
all independent variables are placed on a common footing to facilitate comparisons of e¤ect
[17]. This is accomplished by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
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This makes the variables and resulting regression coe¢ cients unitless by putting them on the
scale of standard deviations. It also facilitates comparison, for example, of a two standard
deviation event for one variable compared with another. However, as noted by Bring [4], a
drawback of this approach to standardization is that the standard deviation unit may vary
across groups - in our case funds within the data set. To mitigate this issue we standardize
the coe¢ cients by fund. That is, we compute the mean and standard deviation for each
variable by fund, and then standardize each funds data with these values. Ultimately, as
noted by Cohen et al. [17] the standardized regression coe¢ cient "is often the most useful
coe¢ cient for answering questions about the inuence of one variable on another, with or
without other variables in the equation."
All of the independent variables have been standardized with the exception of the Re-
sistance Indicator, Q(t), and the time variable, Time(t). The Resistance Indicator is a
highly skewed binary variable in that it is either "set" (corresponding to 1) or "not set"
(corresponding to 0) and less than 1% of the records satisfy the criteria. Consequently,
standardizing this binary variable would distort the results.9
The Time variables are included in regressions to determine if the historical periods have
an e¤ect that could be disguised as one of the other variables. For example, Regression 2
below includes the same variables as Regression 1, but also incorporates the Time variables.
Thus, any discrepancies in the output for the variables common to both regressions are due
to the inclusion of the Time variables. Thus, while we are concerned with the statistical sig-
nicance of the Time variables, their coe¢ cients are not directly relevant to this study. Also,
the Time variable is already scaled between zero and one. As such, we do not standardize
this variable.
9Gelman [26] notes that we run the risk of overstating the importance of such a binary variable relative
to the other standardized variables if our standardization procedure only divides by one standard deviation.
He considers the possibility of division by two standard deviations. He indicates that a binary variable
with equal probabilities has a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.5. Then, the di¤erence between a
"0" and a "1" on the original (unstandardized) scale is actually 2 standard deviations. Now, suppose the
binary variable is "highly skewed", which our Resistance variable is - only approximately 1% of the records
meet the criteria (so, the mean is 0.01 and the standard deviation is approximately (0:01  0:99) 12 ). Then,
the di¤erence between a "0" and a "1" on the original (unstandardized) scale is actually approximately 9.8
standard deviations. Thus, Gelman suggests that by not standardizing the Resistance variable, we might
actually overstate its importance because standardization in this case will actually yield larger values, which
in turn will result in smaller regression coe¢ cients.
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When utilizing standardized coe¢ cients, one has the option to either standardize or
not standardize the dependent variable. We choose not to standardize the Relative Price
Change to facilitate the interpretation of results. For example, Regression 1 below shows the
Price Trend variable to have a regression coe¢ cient of 0.0012. In other words, a positive
one standard deviation change in the recent trend will yield, on average, a 0.12% positive
change in the daily relative price change (i.e.,the Relative Price Change variable).
2.4.3 Results
We perform a set of regressions, each one of the form:
R(t+ 1) = 0 +
nX
i=1
ixi
where xi is one of the above independent variables or a product of these variables. Since
the variables have been standardized (as discussed above), i may be interpreted as the
standardized regression coe¢ cient determined by the mixed e¤ects linear regression. The
intercept term, 0, is present as we do not standardize the dependent variable, and it may
be interpreted as the "drift" of classical nance. In other words, this is the average relative
daily price change. The dependent variable is evaluated at day t+ 1 which indicates that it
represents the following days relative price change or return.
Note that for each regression the total number of observations is 80,351 corresponding to
108 funds10. The number of observations included in the regressions does not equal the total
number of records in the data set because the calculations for some (long term) variables
required data from the previous year. For example, the computation of the Long Term
Price Trend and Long Term Volatility records required the previous 251 data points.
Regression 1. We consider the Relative Price Change regressed against all of the above
mentioned variables with the exception of the Time variables. This regression has the form:
10The number of degrees of freedom for each regression is dependent upon the number of independent
variables. As such, this statistic is included in the results for each regression.
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R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t) + 3M2(t) + 4STV (t) + 5LTV (t)
+ 6LTT (t) + 7V T (t) + 8Q(t):
Table 2.9: Regression 1 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.000417343 0.0000478596 8.72015 <.0001
Price Trend 0.001184948 0.0000578973 20.46639 <.0001
Valuation 0.002658618 0.0000547312 48.57592 <.0001
M2 Money Supply 0.000470137 0.0000478630 9.82257 <.0001
Short Term Volatility 0.000520087 0.0000555387 9.36440 <.0001
Long Term Volatility -0.000138966 0.0000530404 -2.62000 0.0088
Long Term Trend -0.000050647 0.0000539793 -0.93827 0.3481
Volume Trend 0.000310028 0.0000481547 6.43816 <.0001
Resistance -0.000708118 0.0006023445 -1.17560 0.2398
Degrees of Freedom: 80,235
The Valuation, Price Trend, Money Supply, Short Term Volatility, and Volume Trend
terms are all highly statistically signicant with positive coe¢ cients (refer to Table 2.9).
The coe¢ cient of Price Trend indicates that a one standard deviation change in the Price
Trend will induce a 0.12% change in the Relative Price Change in the same direction, i.e.,
if the Price Trend increases, then so will the Relative Price Change (provided all other
independent variables are unchanged). The standardization allows a comparison of impact
of the di¤erent independent variables. Thus, the Price Trend coe¢ cient is approximately
one half the magnitude of the Valuation coe¢ cient. The M2 money supply variable has
a coe¢ cient that is approximately half the magnitude of the Price Trend. This supports
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theoretical [6], experimental ([15] and [16]), and empirical [12] studies which suggest that
an inux of cash will bolster the trading price. These studies have helped in resolving the
paradox of experimental bubbles (see, e.g., [46] and [40]). The volatility variables are quite
interesting in that both are statistically signicant, but while the Long Term Volatility has a
negative coe¢ cient, the Short Term Volatility coe¢ cient is positive. Thus, recent volatility
in the fund price tends to raise the price, while longer term volatility has a negative e¤ect on
the price. The Long TermTrend variable is only marginally statistically signicant. However,
its small negative coe¢ cent agrees with the ndings of Poterba and Summers [41] of stock
price regression to the mean over longer time frames. The Volume Trend is also statistically
signicant with a positive coe¢ cient that is approximately one quarter the magnitude of the
Price Trend coe¢ cient. This conrms a widely held belief among traders that rising volume
is associated with rising prices. Finally, we note that the Resistance variable has a negative
coe¢ cient which indicates that when the Resistance criteria are satised, the price is pushed
downward. However, the statistical signicance of this variable is marginal, probably due
to the small number of records in the data set that met these criteria (518 out of 80,351).
The Intercept term is both statistically signicant and positive.
Regression 2. The Time variables are included to ascertain whether any of the results
from Regression 1 are artifacts of a particular era. This regression has the form:
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t) + 3M2(t) + 4STV (t) + 5LTV (t)
+ 6LTT (t) + 7V T (t) + 8Q(t) + 9Time(t)
+ 10Time
2(t) + 11Time
3(t):
Results for Regression 2 are included in Table 2.10. Each Time variable is statistically
signicant. The inclusion of these variables had little e¤ect on the coe¢ cients of the Price
Trend, Valuation, M2 Money Supply, and Resistance (see Table 2.11) and slightly more
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Table 2.10: Regression 2 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.00137697 0.000378576 3.63724 0.0003
Price Trend 0.00115478 0.000057919 19.93789 <.0001
Valuation 0.00262333 0.000054807 47.86512 <.0001
M2 Money Supply 0.00047234 0.000047831 9.87515 <.0001
Short Term Volatility 0.00061354 0.000056140 10.92873 <.0001
Long Term Volatility 0.00014445 0.000060335 2.39407 0.0167
Long Term Trend -0.00014979 0.000054925 -2.72721 0.0064
Volume Trend 0.00031614 0.000048187 6.56077 <.0001
Resistance -0.00066603 0.000602981 -1.10456 0.2694
Time -0.01588736 0.002819201 -5.63541 <.0001
Time2 0.04328314 0.005828924 7.42558 <.0001
Time3 -0.02985772 0.003508966 -8.50898 <.0001
Degrees of Freedom: 80,232
impact on the Short Term Volatility coe¢ cient. However, the Long Term Volatility and
Long Term Trend terms were signicantly impacted by the inclusion of the Time variables.
This is to be expected as the denition of these variables includes data for the entire previous
year. Furthermore, the data set only includes 10 years of data, which essentially amounts to
10 data points. Hence, a few years in which the broad market experienced a highly volatile
year followed by a less volatile year, but one in which stock prices are increasing, could
explain the change in sign (from negative to positive) of the Long Term Volatility coe¢ cient.
The Long Term Trend variable also changed from not statistically signicant (p-value of
0.3481) to statistically signicant (p-value of 0.0064) with a small negative e¤ect.
41
Table 2.11: Comparison of the regression coe¢ cients of the variables common to both Re-
gressions 1 and 2. The relative change in magnitudes of the Intercept, Long Term Volatility,
and Long Term Trend coe¢ cients are signicant (greater than 20%). Also, note that the
Long Term Volatility coe¢ cient changed from negative to positive.
Variable Regression 1 Coe¢ cient Regression 2 Coe¢ cient % Change
(Intercept) 0.000417343 0.00137697 229.94
Price Trend 0.001184948 0.00115478 -2.55
Valuation 0.002658618 0.00262333 -1.33
M2 Money Supply 0.000470137 0.00047234 0.47
Short Term Volatility 0.000520087 0.00061354 17.97
Long Term Volatility -0.000138966 0.00014445 -203.95
Long Term Trend -0.000050647 -0.00014979 195.75
Volume Trend 0.000310028 0.00031614 1.97
Resistance -0.000708118 -0.00066603 -5.94
Time NA -0.01588736 NA
Time2 NA 0.04328314 NA
Time3 NA -0.02985772 NA
Regression 3. In order to explore the nonlinearity in the Price Trend and Valuation
variables, the interactions (multiplicative products) up to third order of these variables are
included in the regression. Regression 6, which is presented in Appendix A, includes the
additional variables that we exclude here for simplicity. There are relatively minor di¤er-
ences between the two regressions. Note that the Price Trend and Valuation variables are
standardized (in both regressions), while the interactions are products of the standardized
variables (i.e., the interaction variables are not standardized). This regression has the form:
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R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t) + 3T
2(t) + 4T
3(t) + 5D
2(t)
+ 6D
3(t) + 7T (t)D(t) + 8T
2(t)D(t) + 9T (t)D
2(t)
Table 2.12: Regression 3 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.000265656 0.00005434210 4.88858 <.0001
Price Trend 0.001668129 0.00006798784 24.53570 <.0001
Valuation 0.002911161 0.00006232596 46.70865 <.0001
Price Trend2 -0.000117148 0.00003880772 -3.01868 0.0025
Price Trend3 -0.000105260 0.00001123276 -9.37080 <.0001
Valuation2 0.000064430 0.00001803873 3.57174 0.0004
Valuation3 -0.000007622 0.00000160542 -4.74795 <.0001
Price Trend * Valuation -0.000268997 0.00004854760 -5.54089 <.0001
Price Trend2 * Valuation -0.000087231 0.00001771199 -4.92498 <.0001
Price Trend * Valuation2 -0.000008461 0.00000977158 -0.86592 0.3865
Degrees of Freedom: 80,234
With the exception of the interaction of Price Trend with the square of the Valuation,
all of the independent variables are statistically signicant (see Table 2.12). Using these
results, we dene a function representing the Relative Price Change as a function of the
Price Trend and Valuation:
R(T;D) = 0:0003 + 0:0017T + 0:0029D   0:0001T 2   0:0001T 3
+ 0:0001D2   0:00001D3   0:0003TD   0:0001T 2D   0:00001TD2:
Plotting this function yields the three dimensional surface depicted in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: The plot was produced using the coe¢ cient values from Regression 3. These
coe¢ cients dene a cubic polynomial in two variables, Price Trend (T ) and Valuation (D).
The surface describes the e¤ect on the following days Relative Price Change (R), and
exhibits the nonlinear relationship between D, T , and R. Overreaction is evident as a
large positive trend can result in a negative Relative Price Change (analogously for negative
trend). The precise point at which the magnitude changes sign depends nonlinearly on the
valuation.
To better understand the nonlinear relationship between Price Trend and Valuation we
consider the cross-sections of the above graph for D =  1; 0; and 1.
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R(T; 1) = 0:0003 + 0:0017T + 0:0029( 1)  0:0001T 2   0:0001T 3 + 0:0001( 1)2
  0:00001( 1)3   0:0003T ( 1)  0:0001T 2( 1)  0:00001T ( 1)2
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Figure 2.4: With the Valuation held constant at -1, the Relative Price Change may be
represented as a cubic function of the Price Trend variable, T . For a large enough positive
change in the Price Trend, T > 3:6044, the next days Relative Price Change is negative.
Analogously, for a Price Trend <  4:9891 the next days Relative Price Change is positive.
Figure 2.4 displays the cross-section of the surface in Figure 2.3 with the valuation held
constant at D =  1. This cubic function intersects the T -axis at T =  4:9891, 1:3847,
and 3:6044. So, for a negative one standard deviation change in the Valuation variable, the
Relative Price Change will also be negative for  4:9891 < T < 1:3847 and T > 3:6044. But,
for 1:3847 < T < 3:6044, the Relative Price Change will be positive implying that the Price
Trend will have a greater impact on the price than the Valuation. Approximately 92% of
the Price Trend values will actually be less than 1.3847 standard deviations.
R(T; 0) = 0:0003 + 0:0017T + 0:0029(0)  0:0001T 2   0:0001T 3
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Figure 2.5: A cross-section of Figure 2.3 is represented with the Valuation variable held
constant, D = 0. As in Figure 2, overreaction is present if the Price Trend variable, T ,
is large enough in magnitude, i.e., for T > 3:7486 the next days Relative Price Change is
negative; while for T <  4:5736, the next days Relative Price Change is positive. Hence an
uptrend has a postive inuence on price change for T satisfying  4:5736 < T < 3:7486.
Figure 2.5 corresponds to the cross-section of Figure 2.3 with D = 0. If the Price Trend
is positive, then the Relative Price Change is also positive up to 3.7486 standard deviations.
However, if the Price Trend is greater than 3.7486 standard deviations, the Relative Price
Change is negative. Thus, we see that a large (and unusual) change in the Price Trend
produces a negative Relative Price Change supporting the theory of overreaction. Similarly,
a negative Price Trend yields a negative Relative Price Change unless the change in the Price
Trend is less than -4.5736 standard deviations. Thus, there is evidence for underreaction for
 4:5736 < T < 3:7486 (approximately 99.9921% of the time) and evidence for overreaction
when large (either positive or negative) changes in the Price Trend occur.
Part of the curve lies above the negative T -axis for  0:17498 < T < 0 due to the drift
(intercept) term from the regression.
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R(T; 1) = 0:0003 + 0:0017T + 0:0029(1)  0:0001T 2   0:0001T 3 + 0:0001(1)2
  0:00001(1)3   0:0003T (1)  0:0001T 2(1)  0:00001T (1)2
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Figure 2.6: A cross-section of Figure 2.3 is represented with the Valuation variable held
constant, D = 1. Thus, we have the next days Relative Price Change, R, as a function of
the Price Trend, T . If T > 3:8435, then the next days Relative Price Change is negative;
thereby, providing evidence to support overreaction in stock prices. However, notice that for
T < 3:8435, the Relative Price Change is always positive. Thus, a one standard deviation
change in the Valuation variable is large enough to counteract the e¤ects of a negative Price
Trend.
With the Valuation xed at 1 in Figure 2.6, we see that the cross-section only crosses the
T -axis once at T = 3:8435. Thus, a negative Price Trend of any size does not have enough
of an impact on the Relative Price Change to counteract the positive one standard deviation
change in Valuation. However, a positive change in Price Trend of more than 3.8435 standard
deviations results in a negative Relative Price Change and exhibits overreaction.
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Figure 2.7 depicts the relationship between Relative Price Change and Valuation (holding
Price Trend constant). This relationship is essentially linear suggesting that an increase in
value is always positive for stock prices:
R(0; D) = 0:0003 + 0:0017(0) + 0:0029D   0:0001(0)2   0:0001(0)3 + 0:0001D2
  0:00001D3   0:0003(0)D   0:0001(0)2D   0:00001(0)D2
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Figure 2.7: A cross-section of Figure 2.3 is represented with the Price Trend variable held
constant, T = 0. This shows that the Relative Price Change variable, R, is essentially linear
in the Valuation variable, D.
Figure 2.8 displays a contour plot of the Relative Price Change function, R(T;D), for
R =  0:01; 0; and 0:01, which correspond to relative price changes of 1% and 0%. These
provide an intriguing view of the nonlinear relationship between the Valuation and Price
Trend variables.
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Figure 2.8: Using the coe¢ cient values from Regression 3, one can express the following
days Relative Price Change, R, as a cubic function of two variables, the Price Trend, T , and
the Valuation, D. This gure is a contour plot of this function. The curves represent level
sets on which R is held xed at 1% and 0%. The innermost curve corresponds to R =  1,
the middle curve to R = 0, and the outermost curve to R = 1.
2.4.4 Conclusion
We have presented an empirical methodology that is capable of testing almost any hypothesis
involving dynamics of asset prices. We have utilized the mixed e¤ects regressions on a set of
independent variables: valuation, short and long term trends, short and long term volatility,
the M2 money supply, volume trend and resistance. The results exhibit strong statistical
support for the assertion that the short term price trend is a factor that tends to increase
trading prices. The magnitude of this e¤ect is almost half of that for valuation. Unlike some
previous studies in which raw data was analyzed, displaying a tiny e¤ect for trend, our study
shows that the e¤ect of the trend is very important. This is largely due to a methodology
in which the changes in valuation (amounting to noise) are considered in a multi-regression
49
in an appropriate form. Similarly, positive statistically signicant coe¢ cients were found for
short term volatility, volume trend and the money supply. The latter conrms the assertions
of the asset ow theory (supported by experiments and empirical studies cited in Sections
2.2.2 and 2.2.3) that additional cash fuels trading price increases.
The positive coe¢ cient obtained for short term volatility is surprising in the context
of classical nance since the inverse risk-reward relationship stipulates that high volatility
should be interpreted as greater risk that would diminish the price that traders would pay
for the stock. The positive coe¢ cient for short term volatility may be explained by the
hypothesis that traders are attracted to higher volatility as it o¤ers the opportunity for
greater prots. As more capital is attracted the increased level of cash (as shown with the
money supply and prior studies) would tend to bolster prices. The role of long term volatility
is quite small compared to trend. Also, it is more ambiguous and complicated. While we
obtain a negative coe¢ cient (provided the historical time is not taken into account) consistent
with the expectations of classical nance, as shown in Regression 1, we also nd that the
coe¢ cient is positive in Regression 2, where the time variables are included. However, the
coe¢ cient has only about one-tenth of the magnitude of the short term trend. A basic
classical nance tenet is that investors are rational and seek to avoid risk and increase return
(see e.g., [5]). This is followed by the assumption that risk can be identied with volatility.
Our study shows that the only interpretation in which this classical concept is upheld is that
a time period exhibiting high volatility is followed by a period of slightly more negative price
changes.
The methodology uses a technique of standardizing the data prior to executing the linear
regressions. This has the salient feature that it allows direct comparison of the distinct
hypothesized factors. In particular, it allows us to go beyond the question of whether these
e¤ects are actually present to the possibility of quantifying, for the rst time, their relative
importance. In particular the aggregate e¤ect of short term trend, short term volatility and
M2 money supply is comparable to that of the valuation.
Another feature of our methodology is that the data is standardized with respect to
individual stocks. This tends to mitigate the distortion introduced by the large variations in
magnitudes of the independent variables. As a practical application, one should be able to
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obtain more accurate results by performing the regressions on only one stock of interest at
each time. Although the statistical signicance and scientic impact would be diminished,
the practical results for prediction would be enhanced.
While our sample is inadequate to make a strong statistical assertion on resistance (the
tendency for prices to move down while nearing a recent high), the fact that the size of
the coe¢ cient is comparable to most of the other variables (except short term trend and
valuation) suggests that a larger sample could result in establishing this as an important
factor.
The growing evidence for factors inuencing asset market dynamics may appear, upon
cursory analysis, to be contradictory. For example, there are studies that demonstrate the
presence of underreaction, exhibited by the continuation of a price trend. There are also
studies showing that overreaction is present as prices reverse course. The statistical analysis
involving 111,356 data points supports our assertion that the presence of both under- and
overreaction is a manifestation of the underlying nonlinearity of trader motivations. In
particular, Figure 2.3, which displays the daily return as a function of trend and valuation,
shows that while an uptrend is positive for stocks in one region (e.g., the uptrend is not too
large and the valuation range is far from zero), it may be negative in another region (e.g.,
when the trend is very large or the valuation change is large). Thus, nonlinearity is the key
to understanding competing motivations.
By incorporating the square and cubic price trend and valuation terms as well as the
interactions (up to third order) of these two key variables, we are able to express the relative
price change as a nonlinear function of the price trend and valuation. Plotting this function
in various ways (3d and 2d with valuation constant, as well as level sets) illuminates the
nonlinear relationship between these variables and renders a quantitative and empirical ex-
planation for how the competing e¤ects of overreaction and underreaction can coexist within
the same data set. For example, it yields the precise information that a positive change in
valuation at the level of one standard deviation will not be counteracted, on average, by any
short term trend. However, a similar negative change in valuation will be balanced by a
positive trend at the level of 1.38 standard deviations.
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3.0 ANALYSIS OF ASSET FLOW DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Recent events in the worlds nancial markets have demonstrated the need for developing
mathematical models that are capable of addressing issues of market dynamics and stability.
Standard theories of asset management and options assume near equilibrium conditions. In
particular, asset and option valuation theories are based on the equation
dP
P
= dX + dt (3.1)
where P is the asset price at time t; while dX is a normal random variable (mean 0 and
variance dt), 2 is the variance, and  is the drift, so that dt is the expected return on the
investment in time dt.
This formalism is based upon the idea that a su¢ ciently large proportion of investors
are informed of the realistic value of the asset and act solely on that basis. It assumes that
there is an innite amount of arbitrage capital that is ever-present to quickly exploit any
deviation from fundamental value. However, it has been noted (see [44]) that there exist
practical limitations to arbitrage in real markets. Thus, while an arbitrage opportunity
might exist, arbitrageurs might not be able to act on it due to risk of losses and the need to
liquidate the portfolio due to pressure from investors. Furthermore, on a larger time scale
the assumption of rapid assimilation of information leads to an inverse relationship between
volatility, dened as  and mean expected return, . A standard optimization result [5]
is that all investors should invest in a mixture of a risk-free asset (e.g., Treasury bills) and
a single portfolio of risky assets consisting of stocks and bonds. The fraction of wealth
52
invested in risky assets will di¤er among investors who di¤er in their utility (or preference)
functions, and consequently, risk tolerances.
The classical theories are idealizations that are limiting cases. In particular, the capital
owned by knowledgeable investors focused on value is assumed to be innite. Starting from
a theory in which a crucial quantity is innite, it is often di¢ cult to design a unique gen-
eralization or modication in which it is nite. The expectation, or hope, in the research
community is that more rened theories with smaller e¤ects will augment an existing, es-
tablished theory. Thus it is di¢ cult, if not impossible, to build on a theory that does not
recognize a key nite quantity. One must model such e¤ects from rst principles. Yet utiliz-
ing a perspective of basic modeling that does not emanate from a familiar theory encounters
di¢ culties as a result of the sociology of scientic research.
Two perspectives in addressing this issue are noted below. (i) One can consider rst
the modeling of an experimental asset market, pioneered by Vernon Smith (2002 Economics
Nobel Laureate) and collaborators, where one or two dozen participants trade an asset
dened by the experimenter with the objective of earning real money based on their trades.
Within this setting one knows precisely the quantity of cash, asset, payouts etc. Thus, one
can develop and test mathematical models of these experiments. (ii) Upon generalizing
such a model to several groups with varying motivations and assuming some randomness
one can try to recover the classical models as a limit of the value oriented group having a
preponderance of the assets. This is an issue that we consider in Appendix B of this paper.
We summarize an approach that has been developed by Caginalp and collaborators
since 1990 (see www.ssrn.com). This model is exible enough to account for a variety of
factors that may a¤ect investor sentiment, allow for multiple investor groups, and incorporate
concepts such as the gradual di¤usion of information across the investor population. If we
focus on a simple experimental asset market setting, there are a set number of traders who
trade a single asset whose worth is dened by its payouts or dividends. The experimenter
has the option of allowing these dividends to be traded during the experiment, or deferred
to the end of the experiment. Thus we may dene M as the constant representing the total
cash in the system (assuming for the time being that dividends are deferred), and N as the
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(constant) number of shares of the asset. We let
B :=
NP
NP +M
(3.2)
be the fraction of total wealth invested in the stock in terms of the trading price, P (t), at
time t: Then one also has
1 B = M
NP +M
and
B
1 B =
NP
M
=:
P
L
: (3.3)
The liquidity, L := M=N , is a key variable introduced in [6] that has units of dollars per
share. Thus, the quantities L , P , and the fundamental value of the asset, Pa(t), determined
by the denition of the asset, all have these units, and one can measure price in natural units
of liquidity. The modeling of asset price dynamics starts by using a simple equation that
stipulates that price moves in proportion to the imbalance between demand, D, and supply,
S:
P 1
dP
dt
=
D   S
S
, (3.4)
where  is a time scale [50]. Within a closed system one can express the demand for the
asset as D = k(1  B) and the supply as S = (1  k)B, where k is a transition rate. One
can interpret k as the probability of a unit of cash being submitted as a buy order per unit
time. Classical game theory ([37] and [25]) would suggest that k should depend solely on
the valuation, since each trader is aware of the same information. However, the dependence
of k on other quantities such as the trend in price (price trend or trend) can be determined
experimentally [15] and empirically (in the case of world markets)([8], [9], and [41]). Given
a particular motivation, one can use the discrete version of these di¤erential equations in
conjunction with statistical methods to determine whether there is statistical support for it
[13]. With these denitions, one can rewrite 3.4 as
P 1
dP
dt
=
k(1 B)
(1  k)B   1. (3.5)
The key issue is the dependence of k on investor strategy and behavior. The investor
sentiment can be described by a function  (t) with range in R, and can be written in terms
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of a nite set of components:  (t) = 1 (t) + 2 (t) + ::: + n . Since k must have values in
[0; 1] a simple way to map values of  into k is through a function such as
k := f1 + tanh(1 + 2 + :::+ n)g =2. (3.6)
Considering valuation, Pa(t), and just one other motivation, namely trend, we have
1(t) = q1c1
Z t
 1
e c1(t )
1
P ()
dP ()
d
d ; (3.7)
2(t) = q2c2
Z t
 1
e c2(t )
Pa()  P ()
Pa()
d
where qi and ci characterize the magnitudes and time scales of the two motivations for
investing [11]. The rst of these indicates that investors are inuenced by the change
in price but are more strongly inuenced by recent changes. A small value for the time
scale 1=c1 indicates that investors are focused on short term changes in the trend. The
2 (t) parameter represents investorsfocus on the deviation between the asset price and its
fundamental value. Again, more recent changes have a greater e¤ect on investor decisions.
A large value for 1=c2 indicates that investors take action slowly when there is an over- or
undervaluation. An alternative explanation for the 1=ci parameters is that they regulate
the rate at which information di¤uses to the investor population. The magnitudes of q1
and q2 represent the signicance of these motivations in trading decisions for the aggregate
(homogeneous) investor population. Note that other motivations, 3 (t), 4 (t), etc. are
possible. For example, statistical studies ([8] and [9]) have shown that the M2 Money
Supply and asset price volatility also impact investor decisions to buy and sell.
One can also show (see equations 2.6 and 3.5 in [6]) that the change in the fraction of
wealth invested in the asset is given by
dB
dt
= k(1 B) + (k   1)B +B(1 B) 1
P
dP
dt
. (3.8)
The system of equations 3.5 - 3.8 is a complete set of ODEs that have been studied in a
number of papers. We will study generalizations of these equations to two or more groups.
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One can simplify these equations by taking the limit of short time scale and using the
approximation tanh (x) ' x, leading to the approximation
k
1  k = 1 + 2
q1
P
dP
dt
+ 2q2

1  P
Pa

. (3.9)
One of the concepts that has emerged from this analysis is that the equilibrium price
depends not only on Pa (which would be the case in classical economics) but also on the
liquidity, L. The equilibrium price was found to be
Peq
L
=
1 + 2q2
1 + 2q2

L
Pa
 . (3.10)
When q2 is large (i.e. there is a great deal of importance attached to valuation), the equi-
librium price, Peq, is close to Pa. However, if q2 is small, the equilibrium price is close to L,
as the valuation is marginalized.
This approach to modeling incorporates the issues of trend, overreaction, underreaction,
disparate information and motivation of distinct groups as well as the e¤ect of niteness of
assets within a single mathematical model. Thus it is evident that these e¤ects arise from the
dynamics of trading when the assumptions are more realistic than the classical idealizations.
In the years since 1990 several works have implemented various aspects of this approach.
In particular, [31] models overreaction, underreaction, and momentum via the interaction
between two heterogeneous investor groups: news watchers and momentum traders. In other
words, members of the fundamental group are called "news watchers" since they update the
fundamental value via news reports. Similarly, an asset prices tendency to follow a recent
trend in price has been studied ([32], [33]) along with the competing concepts of overreaction
and underreaction.
In addition several models including [18] attempt to explain momentum prots by in-
vestorsinherent biases in interpreting information. They consider overcondent investors
who overreact to private information. Within our models, this corresponds to one group
setting a higher price on the fundamental value. The Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny [2]
model incorporates the psychological concepts of representativeness [49] and conservatism
[24]. Grinblatt and Han [29] explained momentum via the concept of market disposition,
i.e. investors are more likely to sell to realize a gain than a loss ([43], [42]).
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Note that trend e¤ects need not be exclusively due to overreaction or underreaction.
For example, due to the niteness of assets, a large buyer attempting to build a position
without drastically pushing up prices could cause an upward trend in price. Another possible
explanation could be the observation that others are proting, which causes even the value-
based investor to act [13].
Duran and Caginalp [23] utilized optimization methods to estimate the parameters of the
asset ow di¤erential equations using market data. These equations were applied to typical
secondary stock o¤erings by Caginalp and Merdan [14], who obtained quantitative results
relating an inux of shares with lower prices within this model. A sensitivity analysis of
parameters was performed in [21]. Recently, liquidity issues were further explored in [35]
and [36].
In this paper we present a detailed derivation of the discrete and continuum equations
for asset dynamics with disparate groups with di¤ering assessments of valuation and mo-
tivational characteristics. We determine the region of equilibrium points given the basic
parameters governing the investor group motivations and assets (see Theorem 4 in Section
3.4). Theorem 10 (see Section 3.4) establishes regions of stability and instability. In Section
3.5 numerical computations for typical parameters display precise regions of stability and
instability.
3.2 THE DISCRETE EQUATIONS
We consider two groups of investors (that can easily be generalized to an arbitrary number
of groups) so that group i (i = 1; 2) is endowed at time Tj with N (i)(Tj) shares and M (i)(Tj)
in cash. The probability that a unit of cash is submitted by investor group i for purchase
during the time interval (Tj; Tj+1) of the single equity in the system is given by k
(i)
 and may
depend on many factors including the price history, as discussed below. Similarly, ~k(i) is the
probability that a unit of stock will be submitted for sale. The demand (in terms of dollars)
at time interval T := Tj+1   Tj (assume a uniform spacing so that T is independent of j)
is given by D (T ) = k(1) (T )M (1) + k
(2)
 (T )M (2) while the supply (in terms of dollars) is
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S := ~SP with ~S (T ) := ~k(1) (T )N (1) + ~k
(2)
 (T )N (2). An equilibrium trading price is one
for which the supply, ~S (Tj), and demand, D (Tj), balance, i.e.
P (Tj) = F
 
Tj; k
(i)
 (P (T0) ; :::; P (Tj)) ;M
(i) (Tj) ; N
(i) (Tj)

(3.11)
where
F
 
Tj; k
(i)
 (P (T0) ; :::; P (Tj)) ;M
(i) (Tj) ; N
(i) (Tj)

(3.12)
:=
D (Tj; :::)
~S (Tj; :::)
=
k
(1)
 M (1)(Tj) + k
(2)
 M (2)(Tj)
~k
(1)
 N (1)(Tj) + ~k
(2)
 N (2)(Tj)
and, for brevity, we have replaced k(i) (P (T0) ; :::; P (Tj)) by k
(i)
 on the right hand side. We
dene  as a relaxation time that determines the rate at which a non-equilibrium situation
returns to equilibrium. For simplicity we can assume ~k(i) := 1  k(i) though the modeling is
similar in the more general case. Next, we describe the dynamics of price. Similar to [30]
we postulate that the change in price in a unit time is proportional to the extent to which
it is away from equilibrium:
1
P (Tj)
P (Tj+1)  P (Tj)
Tj+1   Tj =
1


F (Tj)
P (Tj)
  1

, (3.13)
where we have suppressed the dependence of F on the other variables. As in earlier papers
(see [14] and references therein) we consider a limiting form of this microeconomic equation,
i.e. 3.24 below. Unlike past work, however, we derive this limiting form precisely in Section
3.3. Note that by using the denition of F , we see that the right hand side is the excess
demand, (D   S) =S. Hence, this equation is compatible with basic price theory [50] as well
as observations in experimental asset markets [46].
The time scale. Since T is simply the time interval on which we choose to perform
the computations in the discrete case, a natural choice for T is given by T :=  since the
imbalance is restored on this time scale. Then 3.13 is simply
P (Tj+1) = F (Tj). (3.14)
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This indicates that if the supply and demand do not balance, then a new price, dened as
P (Tj+1), is discovered. This price restores the balance between supply and demand, i.e.
k
(1)
 M (1) + k
(2)
 M (2)
~k
(1)
 N (1) + ~k
(2)
 N (2)

P (Tj+1)
= 1, (3.15)
within a time frame that is the natural relaxation time for the problem.
Equation 3.13 states that if the price is not at an equilibrium value then it moves toward
this price on a time scale given by  . We can regard T := Tj+1   Tj as the time interval
between trades in a discrete system, e.g. a market in which bids and asks are submitted at
noon each day or an experimental setup with discrete periods.
The choice T =  is perhaps the most natural and closest to an e¢ cient market since
it suggests that the basic time scale for readjustment to equilibrium is the one period time
scale dened by the market institution.
Prior to focusing on T =  we consider the implications of choosing T := a for a 6= 1.
In this case 3.13 can be written as
P (Tj+1)
P (Tj)
  1 = a

F (Tj)
P (Tj)
  1

(3.16)
or
P (Tj+1) = F (Tj) +  fF (Tj)  P (Tj)g (3.17)
where  := a  1.
For  1 <  < 0, i.e. 0 < a < 1, when F (Tj) 6= P (Tj) the price at time Tj+1 does not
attain F (Tj) as it does for  = 0. For example, if  =  1=2, then
P (Tj+1) =
1
2
F (Tj) +
1
2
P (Tj)
so that P (Tj+1) is only the average of the old price, P (Tj), and the "target equilibrium
price," F (Tj).
Interpreting  6= 0 within the context of experimental markets, one can consider  = 3
and T = 1 so that a = 1=3 and  =  2=3. This means that the time scale of adjustment to
equilibrium is 3 units while the trading time scale is 1. Hence by 3.17 the price adjustment
at time Tj+1 attains 1=3 of the deviation, F (Tj)  P (Tj), from equilibrium.
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Unless specied otherwise, we assume T =  below. For T 6=  the equations 3.18
and 3.19 below must be modied by replacing P (Tj+1) by F (Tj).
The equation 3.13 remains valid if there is an inux or outow of cash or shares during the
time period between Tj and Tj+1 with the assumption that this new cash or shares cannot be
submitted until time Tj+1. At this point we distinguish between a totally conserved system
in which no shares or cash are added or subtracted versus one in which there is an inux
or outow of shares or cash. In the latter case, we can dene m(i) (Tj)T and n
(i)
 (Tj) T as
the net inows of cash and shares during this time period between Tj and Tj+1. Note that
negative values for either of these variables denote outows. Thus we can write the basic
conservation law as
M (i)(Tj+1) M (i)(Tj) =  k(i) (T )M (i)(Tj) (3.18)
+ ~k(i) (T )N
(i)(Tj)P (Tj+1) + (T )m
(i)
 (Tj).
In other words, during the time period from Tj to Tj+1 the cash decreases due to the fraction
of existing cash, k(i) T , that is submitted for purchase of the equity, and increases due to the
fraction of shares, ~k(i) T , that is submitted for sale. Setting m
(i)
 = 0 for all time and each
group, i, species the special case in which we have no additional cash entering or leaving
the system. Similarly, for each group i, the change in the number of shares owned must
satisfy:
P (Tj+1)

N (i)(Tj+1) N (i)(Tj)
	
= k(i) (T )M
(i)(Tj) (3.19)
  ~k(i) (T )N (i)(Tj)P (Tj+1)
+ (T )n(i) (Tj)P (Tj+1).
For each group i, the change in the value of stock owned must be balanced by the ow
plus the inux of cash or shares. In fact, comparing the right hand sides of 3.18 and 3.19 we
observe:
P (Tj+1)

N (i)(Tj+1) N (i)(Tj)
	
=  M (i)(Tj+1) M (i)(Tj)	 (3.20)
+ (T )m(i) (Tj) + (T )n
(i)
 (Tj)P (Tj+1).
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The system of equations 3.13, 3.18, and 3.19 can be studied as a system of di¤erence equa-
tions upon specifying initial conditions together with k(i) as a function of (P (T0); :::; P (Tj))
and possibly other variables. In other words, these equations can be solved algebraically
for
 
P (Tj+1);M
(i) (Tj+1) ; N
(i) (Tj+1)

in terms of the variables at earlier times. The choice
of k(i) involves assumptions on the motivations of the traders. The dependence of these
functions on various factors characterizes the trader population.
Remark 1. In the case of no additional cash or asset, if we sum either 3.18 or 3.19 over
all groups i, then we obtain from
P
iN
(i)(Tj) = Constant or
P
iM
(i)(Tj) = Constant that
the left hand sides vanish. As a result, we obtain simply the denition of F (Tj) so it is
consistent with conservation. With non-zero m(i) or n
(i)
 one has from 3.18
X
i

M (i)(Tj+1) M (i)(Tj)
T

(3.21)
=
X
i
n
 k(i) M (i)(Tj) + ~k(i) N (i)(Tj)P (Tj+1) +m(i) (Tj)
o
,
yielding
M (1)(Tj+1) M (1)(Tj)
T
+
M (2)(Tj+1) M (2) (Tj)
T
= m(1) (Tj) +m
(2)
 (Tj) (3.22)
for n = 2, i.e. two investor groups, using P (Tj+1) = F (Tj) and the denition of F .
Remark 2. The relationship between the discrete asset ow equations 3.13, 3.18, and 3.19
and the stochastic asset pricing equation 3.1 can be understood formally in the following
sense. One considers two groups, one of which has the preponderance of assets and focuses
on value, buying slightly below and selling slightly above the valuation, Pa (t) = Pa (0) et,
where  is the risk-free rate. The other group employs a variety of strategies that cancel out
one another. The additional funds entering into the system are a random process leading
to a price dynamics that is stochastic and similar to 3.1. Further details are provided in
Appendix B.
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3.3 THE CONTINUUM LIMIT
In deriving the continuum limit it is essential to examine the roles of T and  . The
relaxation parameter  is intrinsic to the system and describes the time scale on which the
traders react to the changes in price and other variables. On the other hand, T is a
computational time scale so that we can consider the limit T ! 0. In practice, T is small
compared to the overall time period, e.g., daily prices within a year of trading.
We can regard the discrete equations (particularly with T = ) as the exact equa-
tions, with the continuum as an approximation. Thus, we can approximate the ratio
fP (Tj+1)  P (Tj)g =T by P 0(Tj): More precisely, for a smooth function, P , we have
P (Tj+1) = P (Tj) + (T )P
0(Tj) +
(T )2
2
P 00(); for some  2 (Tj; Tj+1) (3.23)
which we can write as
fP (Tj+1)  P (Tj)g =T   P 0(Tj) = O [T ]
where f(x) = O [x] signies
lim sup
x!0
jf(x)j
jxj <1:
Hence we replace the discrete derivative on the left hand side of 3.13 with a very small error
and obtain the continuum limit

1
P (t)
dP
dt
(t) =
F (t)
P (t)
  1 (3.24)
where we have replaced the discrete variables Tj with the continuum variable t in F (see
below) and P . Note that the discarded term is O [T ].
Another perspective on this is that in equation 3.13 the discrete derivative is O [1] so
that one must have F=P   1 = O [ ] in order to maintain equality in this equation. Hence,
in the discrete equation with T :=  as a small parameter, we write 3.13 as

1
P (Tj)
fP 0(Tj) +O [T ]g =

F (Tj)
P (Tj)
  1

:
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Then each term is of order  except for the second term O [T ] which is order  2 and can
be neglected, leading to 3.24.
To obtain the continuum approximation for the remaining equations we rst dene
k(i) := k(i)  , ~k
(i) := ~k(i)  , m
(i) := m(i)  , n
(i) := n(i)  .
We treat the m(i) and n(i) as known functions that represent the inow/outow of cash and
shares, respectively, due to macroscopic factors. Following a similar argument as above the
equations describing the cash and stock position of each group can be written as

dM (i)(t)
dt
=  k(i)(t)M (i)(t) + ~k(i)(t)N (i)(t)F (t) +m(i)(t), (3.25)

dN (i)(t)
dt
=
k(i) (t)M (i)(t)
F (t)
  ~k(i) (t)N (i)(t) + n(i)(t). (3.26)
We dene the continuous version of the function F as
F (t) :=
k
(1)
 M (1)(t) + k
(2)
 M (2)(t)
~k
(1)
 N (1)(t) + ~k
(2)
 N (2)(t)
.
Thus, equations 3.24 - 3.26 can be studied numerically subject to initial conditions upon
specifying k(i). By rescaling time we can set  to unity in each of the three equations.
Equilibrium Conditions. In the totally conserved case (no shares or cash added or
withdrawn from the system) setting the time derivatives in 3.24 - 3.26 to zero yields
P = F = Constant (3.27)
0 =  k(i)M (i) + (1  k(i))N (i)P;
provided we dene ~k(i) := 1 k(i), so that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for equilibrium
(which we denote now by Peq) is
Peq =
k(i)
1  k(i)
M (i)
N (i)
for i = 1; 2. (3.28)
Note that 3.27 and 3.28 imply the identities
k(1)M (1) + k(2)M (2)
(1  k(1))N (1) + (1  k(2))N (2) =
k(1)
1  k(1)
M (1)
N (1)
=
k(2)
1  k(2)
M (2)
N (2)
(3.29)
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establishing a compatibility relationship between preferences (determined by k(i)) and asset
positions of the two groups. Thus, given a compatible set (k(1); k(2); M (1); M (2); N (1); N (2))
there is a unique equilibrium price Peq. This di¤ers from classical theory where Peq would
be uniquely determined by Pa alone. If we regard the k(i) as known, then we have two
nonlinear equations, i.e. equations 3.28, for three unknowns, namely M (1), N (1), and P .
Remark 3. The equations 3.24 - 3.26 reduce to the single group model of [6] when the assets
of one group are reduced to zero. To verify this, let M (2) = N (2) = 0 and drop the subscript
1 on the rst group. Thus, Group 1 controls the total amount of cash, M , and total number
of shares, N , in the system; and any trading must be among traders within Group 1. Hence,
the denition of F , i.e.
F =
k(1)M (1)
~k(1)N (1)
=
kM
~kN
,
and the price equation 3.24 with ~k = 1  k imply the result
1
P (t)
dP (t)
dt
=
1


k
1  k
M
NP (t)
  1

.
The concept of a liquidity value, L := M=N , was introduced in this paper. With this substi-
tution we have the equation
1
P (t)
dP (t)
dt
=
1


k
1  k
L
P
  1

.
In the limit of a single group without inux of additional shares or cash, the variables, M , N ,
and L are all constants in time. Nevertheless, the fraction of funds in the asset, B, dened
by
B :=
NP
NP +M
,
varies in time and satises
B
1 B =
N
M
P =
P
L
yielding the di¤erential equation 3.5
P 1
dP
dt
=
k(1 B)
(1  k)B   1.
Hence, for any denition of k(i) the multi-group model dened above reduces to the single
group model.
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3.4 ANALYSIS OF EQUILIBRIUM AND STABILITY WITH ARBITRARY
PARAMETER VALUES
As noted above, the transition rate functions, k(i) , account for the di¤erent motivations
investors have to buy or sell an asset. Through statistical modeling and regression analysis
on market data [8], it has been shown that two such motivations are (i) the assets recent trend
in price and (ii) the asset prices deviation from its fundamental value. These motivations
are modeled by equations (3.7). To account for multiple groups, these equations are modied
as follows:

(i)
1 (t) := q
(i)
1 c
(i)
1
Z t
 1
e c
(i)
1 (t ) 1
P ()
dP ()
d
d (3.30)

(i)
2 (t) := q
(i)
2 c
(i)
2
Z t
 1
e c
(i)
2 (t )P
(i)
a ()  P ()
P
(i)
a ()
d (3.31)
where the superscript i = 1; 2; :::; n represents the investor group. The parameters, now
group-specic, are discussed in Section 3.1. For example, (i)2 (t) represents group is moti-
vation arising from the deviation between the assets price and group is assessment of the
assets fundamental value, P (i)a (t), when trading [14]. Thus, a quantication of an investor
groups motivation to buy/sell is given by (i)(t) = (i)1 (t) + 
(i)
2 (t).
Di¤erentiating equations 3.30 and 3.31 yields the ordinary di¤erential equations
d
(i)
1 (t)
dt
= q
(i)
1 c
(i)
1
1
P (t)
dP (t)
dt
  c(i)1 (i)1 (t) (3.32)
d
(i)
2 (t)
dt
= q
(i)
2 c
(i)
2
P
(i)
a (t)  P (t)
P
(i)
a (t)
  c(i)2 (i)2 (t). (3.33)
Adding these to equations 3.24 - 3.26 gives the following system

dN (i)
dt
=
k(i)M (i)(t)
F (t)
  ~k(i)N (i)(t) + n(i)(t) (3.34)

dM (i)
dt
=  k(i)M (i)(t) + ~k(i)N (i)(t)F (t) +m(i)(t) (3.35)

dP
dt
= F (t)  P (t) (3.36)
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d
(i)
1 (t)
dt
= q
(i)
1 c
(i)
1
1
P (t)
dP (t)
dt
  c(i)1 (i)1 (t) (3.37)
d
(i)
2 (t)
dt
= q
(i)
2 c
(i)
2
P
(i)
a (t)  P (t)
P
(i)
a (t)
  c(i)2 (i)2 (t) (3.38)
where i = 1; 2; :::; n and
F (t) :=
k(1)(t)M (1)(t) + k(2)(t)M (2)(t) + :::+ k(n)(t)M (n)(t)
~k(1)(t)N (1)(t) + ~k(2)(t)N (2)(t) + :::+ ~k(n)(t)N (n)(t)
.
Thus we have a system of 4n+ 1 equations with 5n+ 1 parameters.
For the remainder of Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 we consider the two group system with
conserved cash and shares, i.e. M (1)(t) +M (2)(t) = M0 and N (1)(t) + N (2)(t) = N0, where
M0 and N0 are xed parameters representing the total amount of cash and the total number
of shares in the system. In addition we make the following assumptions:
(A1) ~k(i) = 1  k(i)
(A2) Group 1 is focused solely on the recent trend in price and Group 2 is focused solely
on the deviation from its perception of the fundamental value, P (2)a (t). Classical nance
suggests that the price uctuates randomly about this value [51].
(A3) To simplify calculations we use the Taylor series approximation tanh(x) ' x. Rea-
sonable realistic parameter values will typically result in the argument, (i)i (t), i = 1; 2, lying
in the interval ( 1; 1), so that di¤erences between the two models, i.e. with or without this
approximation, should be negligible. Assumptions (A2) and (A3) imply k(i) ' 1
2

1 + 
(i)
i

,
i = 1; 2.
(A4) P (2)a (t) = P
(2)
a is constant.
(A5) 0  N (1)  N0 and 0 M (1) M0.
(A6) As discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we set  = 1, i.e. one period. As noted in
Section 3.3, through a rescaling of time we may set  = 1, i.e. one period, which implies
k(i)(t) = k
(i)
 (t).
(A7) M0, N0, q
(i)
i , c
(i)
i , and P
(i)
a , i = 1, 2 are strictly positive constants.
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With these assumptions the system corresponding to equations 3.34 - 3.38 becomes
dN (1)
dt
=
1
2
(1 + 
(1)
1 )M
(1) ( (1)1 + (2)2 )N (1) + (1  (2)2 )N0
(
(1)
1   (2)2 )M (1) + (1 + (2)2 )M0
  1
2
(1  (1)1 )N (1) (3.39)
dM (1)
dt
=  1
2
(1 + 
(1)
1 )M
(1) +
1
2
(1  (1)1 )N (1)
(
(1)
1   (2)2 )M (1) + (1 + (2)2 )M0
( (1)1 + (2)2 )N (1) + (1  (2)2 )N0
(3.40)
dP
dt
=
(
(1)
1   (2)2 )M (1) + (1 + (2)2 )M0
( (1)1 + (2)2 )N (1) + (1  (2)2 )N0
  P (3.41)
d
(1)
1
dt
= q
(1)
1 c
(1)
1
1
P
dP
dt
  c(1)1 (1)1 (3.42)
d
(2)
2
dt
= q
(2)
2 c
(2)
2
P
(2)
a   P
P
(2)
a
  c(2)2 (2)2 (3.43)
where we have suppressed the dependence of M (1); N (1); P; (1)1 ; and 
(2)
2 on t. Equations
3.39 and 3.40 give the following relationship
dN (1)
dt
=   1
F (t)
dM (1)
dt
. (3.44)
We dene equilibrium in terms of all time derivatives set to zero. Note that equations
3.42 and 3.43 indicate that existence of equilibria is independent of the parameters c(1)1 , c
(2)
2 ,
and q(1)1 . Setting the time derivatives in equations 3.41, 3.39, and 3.40 to zero yields the
following relationship between N^ (1) and M^ (1), where the hat notation is used to denote the
equilibrium value,
N^ (1) =
M^ (1)
Peq
. (3.45)
Thus, at equilibrium the algebraic system of equations admits a one-dimensional curve of
equilibrium points that may be parameterized by one of the dynamic variables, i.e. N^ (1),
M^ (1), Peq, ^
(1)
1 , or ^
(2)
2 . Caginalp and Balenovich [6] proved that the equilibrium price for
the one group model is between the liquidity value, L, and the fundamental value, Pa. We
prove a similar result (see Theorem 4) for the two group model with conserved cash and
shares.
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As noted above, the parameter P (2)a represents Group 2s assessment of the fundamental
value of the asset; while the parameter L =M0=N0 equals the total amount of cash divided
by the total number of shares in the system1.
Theorem 4. Consider the system 3.39 - 3.43 and assume (A1)-(A7). Let L and Pa be
arbitrary in R+ where L = M0
N0
is the liquidity value and Pa is Group 2s assessment of the
fundamental value of the asset.
(i) Suppose L 6= Pa. For any Peq 2 R+, Peq 2 (min [Pa; L] ;max [Pa; L]) the system has
a unique equilibrium point of the form
x^ = (N^ (1); M^ (1); Peq; ^1; ^2)
= (
[Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]N0Peq   [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]M0
2Peqq2 (Peq   Pa) ; PeqN^
(1); Peq; 0;
q2
Pa   Peq
Pa
).
Consider the limiting case, L = Peq 6= Pa. For any ^2 2 ( 1; 1) n f0; q2g the system has a
unique equilibrium point of the form
x^ = (N0;M0; Pa(1  ^2
q2
); 0; ^2).
(ii) Suppose Peq = Pa. Then Peq = Pa = L, and for any N^ (1) 2 R+, 0  N^ (1)  N0, the
system has a unique equilibrium point of the form
x^ = (N^ (1); N^ (1)Peq; Peq; 0; 0).
Moreover, under the above assumptions any equilibrium point of this system must lie in the
interval [min(Pa; L);max(Pa; L)].
1For notational convenience we set Pa = P
(2)
a , q2 = q
(2)
2 , ^2 = ^
(2)
2 , ^1 = ^
(1)
1 , c1 = c
(1)
1 , and c2 = c
(2)
2 for
the remainder of the paper.
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Remark 5. Classical nance suggests that, because (1) all traders have the same information
and (2) any advantage is quickly exploited by completely rational, well informed traders with
ample capital, there exists a unique equilibrium price for a given time t. For example, the
basic Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) assumes all traders are rational mean-variance
optimizers and share a common economic view of the world, i.e. the investor population has
homogeneous expectations [5]. The CAPM theory then provides a method for calculating
the unique equilibrium price, which corresponds to what we have labeled Pa, the fundamental
value of the asset. As noted in Appendix B, if Group 2 has the vast majority of the assets,
then the formal limit of the solution(s) of the di¤erence equations, 3.13, 3.18, and 3.19,
is the solution of the classical price equation 3.1. This suggests the price, P , is a small
uctuation about this unique equilibrium price. However, if neither group has an innite
amount of capital, then our model, as shown in Theorem 4, suggests that there exists a range
of equilibrium prices. Thus, our model encompasses the classical theory as a subset, and
one may determine from market data and optimization of parameters which assumptions are
applicable at any given time.
Remark 6. It is appropriate to consider the scenario L = Peq 6= Pa as a distinguished limit
of Case (i). Indeed, in Case (i) for given M0, N0, and Pa the variable N^ (1) can vary,
forming a one-dimensional curve of equilibrium points. However, in the limit L! Peq, i.e.
the case L = Peq 6= Pa, for given M0, N0, and Pa, the ^2 variable is uniquely determined.
Proof. Let L, Pa 2 R+ be arbitrary.
(i) Suppose the system 3.39 - 3.43 is at equilibrium, i.e. all time derivatives vanish. We
solve the resulting algebraic system of equations and denote the solution, i.e. the equilibrium
point, by x^ := (N^ (1); M^ (1); Peq; ^1; ^2). Equation 3.42 yields:
^1 = 0 (3.46)
while equation 3.43 yields:
^2 = q2
Pa   Peq
Pa
(3.47)
^2 is dened as Pa > 0 by assumption (A7) and ^2 6= 0 as Peq 2 (min [Pa; L] ;max [Pa; L]).
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Next, solve 3.41 for Peq and then substitute this value along with ^1 = 0 into 3.39. This
yields
M^ (1) = N^ (1)Peq.
Then substituting this result into 3.41 gives
Peq =
 ^2M^ (1) + (1 + ^2)M0
^2N^
(1) + (1  ^2)N0
=
 ^2N^ (1)Peq + (1 + ^2)M0
^2N^
(1) + (1  ^2)N0
.
Solving for N^ (1) yields
N^ (1) =
 (1  ^2)N0Peq + (1 + ^2)M0
2Peq ^2
.
Using equation 3.47 we obtain
N^ (1) =
 (1  q2 Pa PeqPa )N0Peq + (1 + q2
Pa Peq
Pa
)M0
2Peqq2
Pa Peq
Pa
(3.48)
=
  [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]N0Peq + [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]M0
2Peqq2 (Pa   Peq) .
Using equation 3.45 we obtain the form of an arbitrary equilibrium point
x^ = (
[Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]N0Peq   [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]M0
2Peqq2 (Peq   Pa) ; PeqN^
(1); (3.49)
Peq; 0; q2
Pa   Peq
Pa
)
for any Peq 2 R, Peq 6= 0 and Peq 6= Pa. Substitution of the above point into system 3.39
- 3.43 shows that the point given by equation 3.49 is indeed an equilibrium point of the
system.
Although the equilibrium point given by equation 3.49 holds for all Peq 2 R, Peq 6= 0 and
Peq 6= Pa, we must restrict Peq to the interval [min (Pa; L) ;max (Pa; L)] in order to satisfy
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assumptions (A1)-(A7). Indeed, suppose the contrary, i.e. Peq > max (Pa; L) and consider
equation 3.48:
N^ (1) =
fPa   q2 (Pa   Peq)gN0Peq   fPa + q2 (Pa   Peq)gM0
2Peqq2 (Peq   Pa)
= N0
Pa (Peq   L) + q2 (Peq   Pa) (Peq + L)
2Peqq2 (Peq   Pa) .
Notice that we have N^ (1)  0 as needed. However, we also require N^ (1)  N0 by assumption
(A5). For this latter condition we require
0  Pa (Peq   L) + q2 (Peq   Pa) (Peq + L)
2Peqq2 (Peq   Pa)  1
The left inequality is satised. Thus we verify the right inequality:
Pa (Peq   L) + q2 (Peq   Pa) (Peq + L)
2Peqq2 (Peq   Pa)  1,
 1  q2(1  Peq
Pa
) = ^2.
This contradicts assumption (A3) as we require  1 < ^2 = q2

1  Peq
Pa

< 1.
Similarly, one may show Peq < min (Pa; L) is not permissible.
We have proven that we cannot have Peq > max (Pa; L) or Peq < min (Pa; L). Thus,
min (Pa; L)  Peq  max (Pa; L). An arbitrary equilibrium point is given by equation 3.49
provided min (Pa; L) < Peq < max (Pa; L). The cases where Peq is constant, Peq = Pa and
Peq = L, are considered in (ii) and (iii) below. These cases also exhibit a one dimensional
curve of equilibrium points; however, as Peq is constant, we parameterize this curve by
variables N^ (1) and ^2, respectively.
We next consider the limiting case Peq = L 6= Pa and show the existence of an equilibrium
for any ^2 2 ( 1; 1) n f0; q2g.
Suppose Peq = L. Equation 3.41 with ^1 = 0 yields Peq =
 ^2M^(1)+(1+^2)M0
^2N^
(1)+(1 ^2)N0
= L = M0
N0
.
Cross multiplying gives:
^2(2M0N0   M^ (1)N0   N^ (1)M0) = 0 (3.50)
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which implies (1) ^2 = 0 or (2) M^
(1) = M0 and N^ (1) = N0, i.e. group 1 has all of the
systems cash and shares. Indeed, assuming ^2 6= 0 and dividing both sides of equation 3.50
by ^2M0N0 gives
2  M^
(1)
M0
  N^
(1)
N0
= 0.
As 0  M^(1)
M0
 1 and 0  N^(1)
N0
 1 by assumption (A5), this holds if and only if M^ (1) = M0
and N^ (1) = N0.
If ^2 = 0; then Peq = Pa = L. However, if ^2 6= 0, then we must have M^(1)M0 = N^
(1)
N0
= 1.
Thus, equilibrium may exist where Peq = L 6= P (2)a , and an arbitrary equilibrium point has
the form
x^ = (N0;M0; Pa(1  ^2
q2
); 0; ^2) (3.51)
where ^2 2 ( 1; 1) n f0; q2g is arbitrary. A simple calculation shows that x^ is an equilibrium
point of the system 3.39 - 3.43.
Note this result may also be obtained by taking the limit as Peq ! L of the arbitrary
equilibrium point given by 3.49.
(ii) We show that if the equilibrium price equals group 2s estimation of the fundamental
value of the asset, i.e. Peq = Pa, then it must also equal the liquidity value, i.e. Peq = Pa =
L = M0
N0
.
Indeed, suppose Peq = Pa. Then equation 3.47 yields ^2 = 0 which implies Peq =
M0
N0
= L
by considering equation 3.41. Thus, if Peq = Pa, then we must have Peq = Pa = L. By
assumption (A4) Pa and thus Peq is a constant. Therefore, we parameterize the curve of
equilibrium points by N^ (1). It is clear from equations 3.42 and 3.43 that ^1 = ^2 = 0. Using
equation 3.45 an arbitrary equilibrium point is of the form
x^ = (N^ (1); N^ (1)Peq; Peq; 0; 0) (3.52)
for any N^ (1) 2 R, 0  N^ (1)  N0 and N0 > 0.
As in the above case, a simple calculation shows that the point x^ given by equation 3.52
is an equilibrium point of the system 3.39 - 3.43.
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Combining assumptions (A1)-(A7) with the results from Theorem 4 allows us to rewrite
the criteria for equilibrium in Corollary 7. As noted above the parameters c1, c2, and q1 do
not a¤ect the existence of equilibrium points.
Corollary 7. Consider the system 3.39 - 3.43 under assumptions (A1)-(A7). Then any
equilibrium point(s) must satisfy the following criteria:
Case (1) L < Peq < Pa
(a) Pa > Peq > 0, (b) 0 < q2 <
Pa
Pa   Peq , and
(c)
M0
Peq
< N0  M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] .
In the limit Peq ! L we have the subcase Pa > Peq = L.
(a) 0 < ^2 < 1, (b) q2 > ^2, and (c) L = Pa
q2   ^2
q2
.
Case (2) Pa < Peq < L
(a) 0 < Pa < Peq, (b) 0 < q2 <   Pa
Pa   Peq , and
(c)
M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]  N0 <
M0
Peq
.
In the limit Peq ! L we have the subcase Pa < Peq = L.
(a)   1 < ^2 < 0 and (b) L = Pa
q2   ^2
q2
.
Case (3) Pa = Peq = L
(a) 0  N^ (1)  N0 with N0 > 0, (b) Pa = Peq = L, and (c) ^1 = ^2 = 0.
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Remark 8. For cases (1) and (2) the given criteria may be rewritten to provide bounds for
the equilibrium price, Peq. Indeed, dene
E :=
1
2q2N0

N0Pa ( 1 + q2)  q2M0 +
q
4q2M0N0Pa (1 + q2) + [q2M0 +N0Pa (1  q2)]2

.
Then for case (1) we have
E  Peq > max

L;
Pa (q2   1)
q2

(3.53)
and for case (2) we have
E  Peq < min

L;
Pa (1 + q2)
q2

. (3.54)
Mathematicas Reduce command was utilized to obtain these expressions. Note the quadratic
formula was employed and the "negative" solution was disregarded as it conicted with the
assumptions previously made. In addition, the strict inequality is due to assumption (A3)
which restricts  1 < ^2 < 1. Indeed, along the boundary curves Pa(q2 1)q2 and
Pa(1+q2)
q2
the
variable ^2 = 1 and  1, respectively. These curves correspond to the "upper" boundary
curves in Figures 3.1 and 3.3.
Proof. Case (1) L < Peq < Pa
By assumption (A3) and the condition L < Peq < Pa, we have 0 < ^2 < 1. As
^2 = q2
Pa Peq
Pa
by equation 3.49 we have
Pa
Pa   Peq > q2 > 0, (3.55)
which is (b). Also, Pa > Peq and N0 > M0Peq imply (a) and the left inequality in (c). Thus,
it remains to show:
M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]  N0.
From assumption (A5) we have
0  N^ (1)  N0.
Using the denition of N^ (1) from equation 3.49 yields
0  [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]N0Peq   [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]M0
2Peqq2 (Peq   Pa)  N0.
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Multiplying the inequality by 2Peqq2 (Peq   Pa) gives
0  [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]N0Peq   [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]M0  2N0Peqq2 (Peq   Pa) ,
which is equivalent to
  [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]N0Peq    [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]M0
 N0Peq [ q2 (Pa   Peq)  Pa] .
Dividing by   [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]Peq gives the desired result
N0  [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]M0
[Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]Peq 
N0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
[Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] .
Note that from equation 3.55 we have
0 < Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq) < Pa.
This justies reversing the inequalities when we divided by  [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]Peq above.
We next consider the limiting case Pa > Peq = L. The criterion Pa > Peq = L along with
assumption (A3) implies (a). Condition (c) holds as equation 3.51 gives L = Peq = Pa(1  ^2q2 ).
Condition (b) is necessary to ensure Peq > 0. Indeed, by equation 3.51
Peq = Pa(1  ^2
q2
).
The inequality q2  ^2 implies Peq  0, which is not feasible. Thus, q2 > ^2 is necessary.
Case (2) Pa < Peq < L
By assumption (A3) and the condition Pa < Peq < L we have  1 < ^2 < 0. Again,
equation 3.49 implies ^2 = q2
Pa Peq
Pa
which leads to
  Pa
Pa   Peq > q2 > 0, (3.56)
namely, (b). Also, Pa < Peq and N0 < M0Peq verify (a) and the right inequality in (c). Thus,
it remains to show:
M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]  N0.
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By assumption (A5) we have
0  N^ (1)  N0.
Using the denition of N^ (1) from equation 3.49 yields
0  [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]N0Peq   [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]M0
2Peqq2 (Peq   Pa)  N0.
Multiplying the inequality by 2Peqq2 (Peq   Pa) gives
0  [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]N0Peq   [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]M0  2N0Peqq2 (Peq   Pa) ,
which is equivalent to
  [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]N0Peq    [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]M0
 N0Peq [ q2 (Pa   Peq)  Pa] .
Dividing by   [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]Peq gives the desired result
N0  [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]M0
[Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]Peq 
N0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
[Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] .
Note that from equation 3.56 we have
2Pa > Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq) > Pa > 0
This justies reversing the inequalities when we divided by  [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]Peq above.
We next consider the limiting case Pa < Peq = L. It is easily seen that the criterion
Pa < Peq = L along with (A3) implies (a). Condition (b) holds because in this case
L = Peq = Pa(1  ^2q2 ) by equation 3.51.
Case (3) Pa = Peq = L
It is clear from the arbitrary form of an equilibrium point, equation 3.52, that criteria
(a)-(c) hold.
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Now that criteria for equilibria have been established, we consider the stability of an
arbitrary equilibrium point for each of the four cases identied in Corollary 7. For stabil-
ity, we linearize about an arbitrary equilibrium point and consider the eigenvalues of the
corresponding Jacobian matrix evaluated at the equilibrium point. As noted above, this
system admits a curve of equilibria. As such, this system will always have a zero eigenvalue
with corresponding eigenvector tangent to this curve of equilibria. In addition, we will see
that  1 is also a root of the characteristic polynomial in all four cases. Thus, consider the
following denition:
Denition 9. The equilibrium point is considered stable if the remaining three eigenvalues
have real parts strictly less than zero and unstable if any one of these eigenvalues has a real
part greater than zero.
Theorem 10 utilizes the Routh-Hurwitz criterion (see Appendix B) to prove the existence
of stable and unstable regions of equilibrium points within the appropriate (parameter)
spaces for each of the four cases. As 0 and  1 are always roots, we focus on the cubic factor
of the characteristic polynomial. Routh-Hurwitz applied to a cubic polynomial (3
3 +
2
2 + 1
1 + 0) can be stated as: The real parts of all roots are strictly negative if and
only if i > 0, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and 21   30 > 0 [20].
We dene the following constants which will be used in the statement and proof of
Theorem 10:
A :=M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] +N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]
B :=M0

P 2eqq2 + P
2
a (1 + q2)  PaPeq (3 + 2q2)

+N0Peq
 P 2a ( 1 + q2)  P 2eqq2 + Pa (Peq + 2Peqq2)
C :=M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] [ Peqq2 + Pa ( 2q1 + q2)]
 N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] [Peqq2   Pa (2q1 + q2)]
D := [(1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) q2A+ c1C] [c2q2B + c1 f(Pa   Peq) q2A+ c2Cg]
Recall that q1 > 0 by assumption (A7). This agrees with empirical studies on both experi-
mental [13] and world market [8] data which show that if the trend is positive (alternatively
negative) then the price continues to rise (alternatively fall) due to momentum traders.
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Theorem 10. Assume (A1)-(A7). (i) There exists a stable region of equilibrium points, x^,
for the system 3.39 - 3.43. For each of the following cases, one has the following su¢ cient
criteria for the stability of the equilibrium point:
(1) L < Peq < Pa:
(q1 <
1
2
) and (c1 < 1 + c2) ;
(2) Pa < Peq < L:
(q1 <
1
2
) and (c1 < 1 + c2) ;
(3) Pa = Peq = L:
q
(1)
1 < min

1
2
N0
N^ (1)
;
1 + c2
2c1
N0
N^ (1)

.
(ii) There exists an unstable region of equilibrium points. In each of the three cases one
has the following su¢ cient criteria for instability:
(1) L < Peq < Pa:
 M0 +N0Peq
M0 +N0Peq
Pa
Pa   Peq < q2 <
Pa
Pa   Peq and
q1 >
A
 M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] +N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]
1
2
M0  N0Peq
M0 +N0Peq
and
c1 >
  (1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) q2A
C
;
(2) Pa < Peq < L:
M0  N0Peq
M0 +N0Peq
 Pa
Pa   Peq < q2 <
 Pa
Pa   Peq and
q1 >
A
 M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] +N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]
1
2
M0  N0Peq
M0 +N0Peq
and
c1 >
  (1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) q2A
C
;
(3) Pa = Peq = L:
q
(1)
1 >
(1 + c1 + c2)
2c1
N0
N^ (1)
.
In addition, for L = Peq 6= Pa, a distinguished limit of cases (1) and (2), equilibrium
points are stable provided
q1 <
1 + c1
2c1
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and unstable for
q1 >
1 + c1
2c1
.
Remark 11. The conditions for stability are consistent with the intuition of the model,
as a small trend coe¢ cient, q1, and a large time scale for trend, 1=c1, favor stability (see
cases (1), (2) of (i)). The stable condition for the distinguished limit case (L = Peq 6= Pa)
shows that one can have stability for large values of q1 provided the trend time scale is large.
Furthermore, in case (3) stability can also be maintained for larger values of q1 if the number
of shares of the trend-based group is small compared with the total number of shares in the
system.
Remark 12. In cases (1), (2), and (3) the existence of stable and unstable regions is shown.
However, for the case L = Peq 6= Pa we provide necessary and su¢ cient criteria for the
stability and instability of an arbitrary equilibrium point.
Proof. Let x^ = (N^ (1); M^ (1); Peq; ^1; ^2) be an arbitrary equilibrium point.
Case (1) L < Peq < Pa
(i) We rst prove existence of a stable region of equilibrium points. Linearizing about
x^ = (
[P
(2)
a   q2(P (2)a   Peq)]N0Peq   [P (2)a + q2(P (2)a   Peq)]M0
2Peqq2(Peq   P (2)a )
; PeqN^
(1);
Peq; 0; q2
P
(2)
a   Peq
P
(2)
a
)
yields the following characteristic polynomial
 (+ 1)
 
3
3 + 2
2 + 1
1 + 0

(3.57)
where
3 = 1
2 =
(1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) q2A+ c1C
(Pa   Peq) q2A
1 =
c2q2B + c1 [(Pa   Peq) q2A+ c2C]
(Pa   Peq) q2A
0 =
c1c2B
(Pa   Peq)A .
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The zero eigenvalue is due to the curve of equilibria. As such, it does not impact the
stability. Thus, x^ is stable if the roots of the cubic factor of the characteristic polynomial
have strictly negative real parts. By the Routh-Hurwitz criterion these roots lie in the left
half of the complex plane if and only if i > 0 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and 21   30 > 0. Note
that
21   30
=
 c1c2 (Pa   Peq) q22AB
(Pa   Peq)2 q22A2
+
[(1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) q2A+ c1C] [c2q2B + c1 f(Pa   Peq) q2A+ c2Cg]
(Pa   Peq)2 q22A2
.
Any equilibrium point must satisfy the criteria given by Corollary 7, which for this case
is
(a) Pa > Peq > 0, (b) 0 < q2 <
Pa
Pa   Peq ,
and (c)
M0
Peq
< N0  M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] .
Using these conditions in conjunction with L < Peq < Pa we show that A, B, and C are
positive, which, in turn, implies the existence of a region in which i > 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4
and 21   30 > 0 (i.e. x^ is stable). In fact, A > 0 by (a) and (b). Next, show B is
positive. Indeed,
B =M0[P
2
eqq2 + P
2
a (1 + q2)  PaPeq (3 + 2q2)]
+N0Peq[ P 2a ( 1 + q2)  P 2eqq2 + Pa (Peq + 2Peq2)]
=M0[q2 (Pa   Peq)2 + Pa (Pa   3Peq)] +N0Peq[ q2 (Pa   Peq)2 + P 2a + PaPeq]
> M0[q2 (Pa   Peq)2 + Pa (Pa   3Peq)]
+N0Peq[  Pa
Pa   Peq (Pa   Peq)
2 + P 2a + PaPeq] by (b)
=M0[q2 (Pa   Peq)2 + Pa (Pa   3Peq)] + 2N0PeqPaPeq
> M0[Pa (Pa   3Peq)] + 2N0PeqPaPeq =M0[P 2a   3PaPeq] + 2N0PeqPaPeq
> M0[P
2
a   3PaPeq] + 2M0PaPeq by (c)
=M0[P
2
a   PaPeq] > 0 by (a).
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We claim there exists a region in parameter space where C is also greater than zero.
Based upon the current case and assumptions we have M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] > 0 and
N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] > 0, while [Peqq2   Pa (2q1 + q2)] is strictly less than zero. Thus,
if [ Peqq2 + Pa ( 2q1 + q2)]  0 (i.e. q1  q2(Pa Peq)2Pa ), then C > 0. Alternatively, suppose
[ Peqq2 + Pa ( 2q1 + q2)]  0 (i.e. q1  q2(Pa Peq)2Pa ). Then C > 0 provided M0Peq < N0 and
q1 <
1
2
. Indeed, one has
C =M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] [ Peqq2 + Pa ( 2q1 + q2)]
 N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] [Peqq2   Pa (2q1 + q2)]
> M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] [ Peqq2 + Pa ( 2q1 + q2)]
 M0 [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] [Peqq2   Pa (2q1 + q2)]
=M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] [q2 (Pa   Peq)  2Paq1]
+M0 [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] [q2 (Pa   Peq) + 2Paq1]
= 2M0Paq2 (Pa   Peq)  4M0q2q1Pa (Pa   Peq)
= 2M0Paq2 (Pa   Peq) (1  2q1)
> 0 provided 0 < q1 <
1
2
.
So, if [ Peqq2 + Pa ( 2q1 + q2)]  0, then q2(Pa Peq)2Pa  q1 < 12 ensures C > 0.
So, A > 0 and B > 0 for this case and the above assumptions. One also has C > 0
provided
q1 <
1
2
.
Furthermore, A and B positive implies 0 > 0; A and C positive implies 2 > 0; and A, B,
and C positive give 1 positive. Finally, consider 21 30. With A, B, and C positive,
the terms
[(1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) q2A+ c1C]
and [c2q2B + c1 f(Pa   Peq) q2A+ c2Cg]
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are positive. Thus, 21   30 > 0 if
 c1c2 (Pa   Peq) q22AB < D ,
c1c2 (Pa   Peq) q22AB < D
where
D = [(1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) q2A+ c1C] [c2q2B + c1 f(Pa   Peq) q2A+ c2Cg] .
The product of the rst terms in each factor D is
(1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) c2q22AB.
Thus, this inequality holds and 21   30 > 0 provided c1 < 1 + c2.
Therefore, if q1 < 12 and (c1 < 1 + c2), then the equilibrium is stable.
(ii) Using the Routh-Hurwitz criterion we show that an unstable region exists by showing
2 < 0. Indeed, one has
2 =
(1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) q2A+ c1C
(Pa   Peq) q2A
where
A :=M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] +N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]
C :=M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] [ Peqq2 + Pa ( 2q1 + q2)]
 N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] [Peqq2   Pa (2q1 + q2)] .
A is positive. This implies that both the denominator and the rst term in the numerator
are positive. Thus C must be negative.
C < 0,
(Pa   Peq) q2A
2Pa fM0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]g < q1
provided
2Pa fM0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]g > 0 (3.58)
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which holds for
M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] > N0. (3.59)
Recall equilibrium conditions (b) and (c) for this case
(b) 0 < q2 <
Pa
Pa   Peq and (c)
M0
Peq
< N0  M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] .
Note equation 3.59 is the strict version of the right inequality in (c). For equation 3.59 and
subsequently 3.58 to hold we require q2 6= ( M0+N0Peq)(M0+N0Peq) PaPa Peq . Thus, using condition (b), for
C < 0 we restrict q2 to the interval
 M0 +N0Peq
M0 +N0Peq
Pa
Pa   Peq < q2 <
Pa
Pa   Peq
and require
q1 >
(Pa   Peq) q2A
2Pa fM0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]g
>
A
 M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] +N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]
1
2
M0  N0Peq
M0 +N0Peq
.
Choosing c1 >
 (1+c2)(Pa Peq)q2A
C
gives 2 < 0. Since 3 = 1 > 0 there is at least one sign
change in the rst column of the Routh array. By the Routh-Hurwitz criterion there is at
least one eigenvalue with positive real part. Thus, the equilibrium is unstable.
Case (2) Pa < Peq < L
(i) We prove existence of a stable region of equilibrium points. The critical point, x^,
and characteristic polynomial both have the same form as in Case (1). Similar to the proof
of Case (1), we utilize the equilibrium conditions given by Corollary 7 to show that A > 0,
B < 0, and C < 0. These criteria are:
(a) 0 < Pa < Peq, (b) 0 < q2 <   Pa
Pa   Peq ,
and (c)
M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]  N0 <
M0
Peq
.
Note that M0[Pa+q2(Pa Peq)]
Peq [Pa q2(Pa Peq)] > 0. Indeed, [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] > 0 by (a). In addition,
[Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] > 0 by (b).
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Using these equilibrium conditions and assumption (A7) we show that i > 0 for i = 0,
1, 2, 3 and 21   30 > 0 (i.e. x^ is stable). Indeed, A > 0 by (a) and (b). Next, we
show B is negative. Indeed,
B =M0

P 2eqq2 + P
2
a (1 + q2)  PaPeq (3 + 2q2)

+N0Peq
 P 2a ( 1 + q2)  P 2eqq2 + Pa (Peq + 2Peq2)
=M0[q2 (Pa   Peq)2 + P 2a   3PaPeq] +N0Peq[ q2 (Pa   Peq)2 + P 2a + PaPeq]
< M0[  Pa
Pa   Peq (Pa   Peq)
2 + P 2a   3PaPeq] +N0Peq

0 + P 2a + PaPeq

by (b)
=M0
 Pa (Pa   Peq) + P 2a   3PaPeq+N0Peq P 2a + PaPeq
< M0 [ 2PaPeq] +M0

P 2a + PaPeq

by (c)
=M0
 PaPeq + P 2a 
< 0 by (a).
We will show that there exists a region in parameter space where C is also negative.
Based upon (a) and (b) and assumption (A7) we have M0[Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] > 0 and
N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] > 0, while [ Peqq2 + Pa ( 2q1 + q2)] is strictly less than zero.
Therefore, if [Peqq2   Pa (2q1 + q2)]  0 (i.e. q1   q2(Pa Peq)2Pa ), then C < 0. Alternatively,
suppose [Peqq2   Pa (2q1 + q2)]  0 (i.e. q1   q2(Pa Peq)2Pa ). Then C < 0 provided N0 < M0Peq
and q1 < 12 . Indeed,
C =M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] [ Peqq2 + Pa ( 2q1 + q2)]
 N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] [Peqq2   Pa (2q1 + q2)]
=M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] [q2 (Pa   Peq)  2q1Pa]
+N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] [q2 (Pa   Peq) + 2q1Pa]
< M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] [q2 (Pa   Peq)  2q1Pa]
+M0 [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] [q2 (Pa   Peq) + 2q1Pa] by (c)
= 2M0Paq2 (Pa   Peq)  4M0Paq2 (Pa   Peq) q1
= 2M0Paq2 (Pa   Peq) [1  2q1]
< 0 provided 0 < q1 <
1
2
.
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So, if [Peqq2   Pa (2q1 + q2)]  0, then  q2(Pa Peq)2Pa  q1 < 12 ensures C < 0.
So, A > 0 and B < 0 for this case and the above assumptions. C < 0 provided
q1 <
1
2
.
A > 0 and B < 0 imply 0 > 0; A > 0 and C < 0 imply 2 > 0; and A > 0, B < 0, and
C < 0 give 1 positive. Finally, consider 21   30. With A > 0, B < 0, and C < 0 the
terms [(1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) q2A+ c1C] and [c2q2B + c1 f(Pa   Peq) q2A+ c2Cg] are negative.
Thus, 21   30 > 0 if c1c2 (Pa   Peq) q22AB < D ,
c1c2 (Pa   Peq) q22AB < D
= (1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) c2q22AB
+ (1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) c1q2A f(Pa   Peq) q2A+ c2Cg
+ c1c2q2BC + c
2
1C f(Pa   Peq) q2A+ c2Cg .
where
D = [(1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) q2A+ c1C] [c2q2B + c1 f(Pa   Peq) q2A+ c2Cg] .
Notice that each term on the right side of this inequality is positive for this case. Further,
the rst term on the right side of the inequality is greater than the term on the left side of
the inequality provided c1 < 1 + c2. Thus, if c1 < 1 + c2, then 21   30 > 0.
Therefore, if q1 < 12 and c1 < 1 + c2, then the equilibrium is stable.
(ii) Using the Routh-Hurwitz criterion we show that an unstable region exists by showing
2 < 0. Indeed,
2 =
(1 + c2) (Pa   Peq) q2A+ c1C
(Pa   Peq) q2A
where
A :=M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] +N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]
C :=M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] [ Peqq2 + Pa ( 2q1 + q2)]
 N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] [Peqq2   Pa (2q1 + q2)] .
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A is positive. This implies that both the denominator and the rst term in the numerator
are negative. Thus, we need C to be positive. Consider
C > 0,
q1 >
(Pa   Peq) q2A
2Pa fM0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]g
provided
2Pa fM0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]g > 0 (3.60)
which holds for
M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)] < N0. (3.61)
Recall equilibrium conditions (b) and (c) for this case
(b) 0 < q2 <   Pa
Pa   Peq and (c)
M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)]
Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]  N0 <
M0
Peq
.
Note equation 3.61 is the strict version of the left inequality in (c). For equation 3.61 and
subsequently 3.60 to hold we require q2 6= M0 N0PeqM0+N0Peq  PaPa Peq . Thus, using condition (b), for
C > 0 we restrict q2 to the interval
M0  N0Peq
M0 +N0Peq
 Pa
Pa   Peq < q2 <
 Pa
Pa   Peq
and require
q1 >
(Pa   Peq) q2A
2Pa fM0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]g
>
A
 M0 [Pa + q2 (Pa   Peq)] +N0Peq [Pa   q2 (Pa   Peq)]
1
2
M0  N0Peq
M0 +N0Peq
.
Choosing c1 >
 (1+c2)(Pa Peq)q2A
C
gives 2 < 0. Since 3 = 1 > 0 there is at least one
sign change in the rst column of the Routh array. By the Routh-Hurwitz criterion there
is at least one eigenvalue with positive real part. Thus, the equilibrium is unstable.
Case (3) L = Peq = Pa
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(i) Linearizing about x^ = (N^ (1); N^ (1)Peq; Peq; 0; 0) yields the following characteristic
polynomial
  (1 + )
8>>><>>>:
3 + 2[(1 + c1 + c2)  2c1 N^(1)N0 q1]
+[c1 + c2 + c1c2(1  2 N^(1)N0 q1) + 2c2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)]
+c1c2[1 + 2q2(1  N^(1)N0 )]
9>>>=>>>; (3.62)
where
3 = 1
2 = (1 + c1 + c2)  2c1 N^
(1)
N0
q1
1 = c1 + c2 + c1c2(1  2N^
(1)
N0
q1) + 2c2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)
0 = c1c2[1 + 2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)]
The zero eigenvalue is due to the curve of equilibria. As such, it does not impact the
stability. Thus, x^ is stable if the roots of the cubic factor of the characteristic polynomial
have strictly negative real parts. By the Routh-Hurwitz criterion these roots lie in the left
half of the complex plane if and only if i > 0 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and 21   30 > 0. Note
that 0  N^(1)
N0
 1 by assumption (A5).
Consider 2 > 0, i.e.
(1 + c1 + c2)  2c1 N^
(1)
N0
q1 > 0,
q1 <
(1 + c1 + c2)
2c1
N0
N^ (1)
.
Next, determine a region where 1 > 0. Indeed, if q1 < 12
N0
N^(1)
, then
1 = c1 + c2 + c1c2(1  2N^
(1)
N0
q1) + 2c2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)
> 0 (Note this is independent of q2.)
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Note that 0 > 0 by assumptions (A5) and (A7). Finally, consider 21   30.
21   30
= [(1 + c1 + c2)  2c1 N^
(1)
N0
q1][c1 + c2 + c1c2(1  2N^
(1)
N0
q1) + 2c2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)]
  c1c2[1 + 2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)]
= [(1 + c1 + c2)  2c1 N^
(1)
N0
q1][c1f1 + c2(1  2N^
(1)
N0
q1)g+ c2f1 + 2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)g]
  c1c2[1 + 2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)]
= (1 + c1 + c2)c1f1 + c2(1  2N^
(1)
N0
q1)g+ (1 + c1 + c2) c2f1 + 2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)g
  2c21
N^ (1)
N0
q1f1 + c2(1  2N^
(1)
N0
q1)g   2c1 N^
(1)
N0
q1c2f1 + 2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)g
  c1c2[1 + 2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)]
If q1 <
(1+c1+c2)
2c1
N0
N^(1)
, which ensures 2 > 0, and q1 < 12
N0
N^(1)
, which ensures 1 > 0, then
(1 + c1 + c2)c1f1 + c2(1  2N^
(1)
N0
q1)g   2c21
N^ (1)
N0
q1f1 + c2(1  2N^
(1)
N0
q1)g > 0.
Thus, we obtain
(1 + c1 + c2)c2f1 + 2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)g   2c1 N^
(1)
N0
q1c2f1 + 2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)g
  c1c2[1 + 2q2   2N^
(1)
N0
q2]
= [(1 + c2)c2   2c1 N^
(1)
N0
q1c2][1 + 2q2(1  N^
(1)
N0
)]
> 0
provided
(1 + c2) c2   2c1 N^
(1)
N0
q1c2 > 0,
q1 <
1 + c2
2c1
N0
N^ (1)
.
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Thus, the equilibrium point x^ is stable if
0 < q1 < min[
(1 + c1 + c2)
2c1
N0
N^ (1)
;
1
2
N0
N^ (1)
;
1 + c2
2c1
N0
N^ (1)
],
i.e.
0 < q1 < min[
1
2
N0
N^ (1)
;
1 + c2
2c1
N0
N^ (1)
].
as c1 > 0 by assumption (A7).
(ii) With respect to instability, if q1 >
(1+c1+c2)
2c1
N0
N^(1)
, then 2 < 0. Since 3 = 1 > 0 there
is at least one sign change in the rst column of the Routh array. By the Routh-Hurwitz
criterion there is at least one eigenvalue with positive real part. Thus, the equilibrium is
unstable.
Finally, we consider the limiting case of cases (1) and (2): L = Peq 6= Pa. Linearizing
about
x^ = (N0;M0; Pa(1  ^2
q2
); 0; ^2)
yields the following characteristic polynomial
  (1 + ) (c2 + )

2 + f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g+ c1

. (3.63)
The zero eigenvalue is due to the curve of equilibria. As such, it does not impact the stability.
Thus, x^ is stable if the roots of the quadratic factor of the characteristic polynomial have
strictly negative real parts. Note that stability only depends on the q1 and c1 parameters.
The quadratic formula yields
+;  =
 f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g 
q
f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g2   4c1
2
.
Note that
q
f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g2   4c1 <
q
f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g2 = j  f1 + c1 (1  2q1)gj .
As such, there are two cases to consider.
89
Case 1. f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g2   4c1 > 0 and  f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g < 0. If these criteria are
met then we have +;  2 R and +;  < 0. These criteria are met when q1 <  2
p
c1+1+c1
2c1
.
Indeed, consider
f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g2   4c1 > 0,
f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g2 > 4c1 ,
q1 <
 2pc1 + 1 + c1
2c1
.
Note that  2pc1+1+ c1 > 0, 1+ c1 > 2pc1 , (1 + c1)2 > 4c1 , (1  c1)2 > 0, c1 6= 1.
Next, consider
 f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g < 0,
q1 <
1 + c1
2c1
.
So, for the above criteria to be met we need q1 < min
h
 2pc1+1+c1
2c1
; 1+c1
2c1
i
=
 2pc1+1+c1
2c1
with
c1 6= 1.
Case 2. f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g2   4c1  0 and  f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g < 0. If these criteria are
met then we have Im (+; )  0. The second criteria ensures Re (+; ) < 0. These criteria
are met when  2
p
c1+1+c1
2c1
< q1 <
1+c1
2c1
. Indeed, consider
f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g2   4c1  0,
q1   2
p
c1 + 1 + c1
2c1
And the second criterion gives
< (+; ) < 0,
 f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g < 0,
q1 <
1 + c1
2c1
.
Thus, Re (+; ) < 0 provided
 2pc1+1+c1
2c1
 q1 < 1+c12c1 .
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Note that since
q
f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g2   4c1 <
q
f1 + c1 (1  2q1)g2
= j  f1 + c1 (1  2q1)gj ,
Re (+; ) < 0 if 0 < q1 < 1+c12c1 . Further, this also indicates that if q1 >
1+c1
2c1
, then the
equilibrium is unstable.
3.5 EQUILIBRIUM AND STABILITY FOR SPECIFIC PARAMETER
VALUES
The system 3.39 - 3.43 has eight parameters ( ; c1; c2; q1; q2; M0; N0; Pa) which may assume
any real and positive value. Now that the existence of stable and unstable regions has been
established, we compute specic regions of stability and instability. To this end we set some
of these parameters to specic values in order to facilitate the analysis of equilibrium and
stability. We set c1 = 110 and c2 = 1 indicating that Group 1 focuses on the price trend over
the past two weeks, while Group 2 considers the current days deviation from its assessment
of the assets fundamental value. The values for M0 and N0 are set at 30; 000 and 3; 000 so
that L = 10. Pa is set to 12, 8, or 10 depending upon the case. These are typical values for
L and Pa in that the fundamental value of the asset is set to 120% or 80% of the liquidity
value. Note that for L, Pa, and P it is their relative magnitudes rather than absolute values
that are essential.
We consider the e¤ect of the q2 parameter on the existence of equilibrium points, and the
e¤ects of the q1 and q2 parameters on the stability of these equilibrium points. It is clear
from equations 3.42 and 3.43 that the existence of equilibria is independent of the values
for the q1, c1, and c2 parameters. Given Theorem 4, we determine the conditions for the
existence and stability of equilibria for the following four cases: (1) L < Peq < Pa, (2)
Pa < Peq < L, (3) Peq = Pa = L, and (4) L = Peq 6= Pa, a distinguished limit of cases (1)
and (2). Note that assumptions (A1)-(A7) are still applicable to all results in this section.
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Refer to Appendix F for a discussion of how stability is a¤ected by the c1 and c2 para-
meters with the q1 and q2 parameters xed.
Case 1. 10 = L < Peq < Pa = 12
Equilibrium
Let Peq 2 (10; 12) be arbitrary. Then equation 3.49 gives the form of an equilibrium
point dependent upon the value of q2. All Peq between L and Pa yield an equilibrium point
of the system 3.39 - 3.43; however, only some (Peq; q2) pairs yield an equilibrium satisfying
assumptions (A1)-(A7). The region of (Peq; q2) pairs that yield permissible equilibrium
points is derived from Corollary 7 and given by
L < Peq < Pa and
(Peq   L)Pa
(L+ Peq) (Pa   Peq)  q2 <
Pa
Pa   Peq .
For the specic parameter values given above the region is described by
10 < Peq < 12 and
(Peq   10) 12
(10 + Peq) (12  Peq)  q2 <
12
12  Peq
and shown in Figure 3.1. Note the "lower" boundary curve is solid indicating it corresponds
to permissible equilibrium points of the system. The "upper" boundary curve is dashed
indicating it is not part of the equilibrium region.
The shape of this region is analogous to the Caginalp and Balenovich [6] nding for the
single group model. Specically, a large value for q2 implies Peq is close to Pa, while a small
q2 means that Peq must be close to L. Indeed, suppose Group 2 is strongly inuenced by
the prices deviation from Pa. If the price is above (below) this value, then Group 2 will sell
(buy) the asset; thereby, lowering (raising) the price. Thus, it is reasonable to expect the
equilibrium price, Peq, to be close to Pa. Refer to Appendix C for more details regarding
the relationship between q2, Peq, Pa, and L.
Stability
Linearization about an arbitrary equilibrium point yields a Jacobian matrix, which is
included in Appendix E. The characteristic polynomial can be factored into the form:
 (+ 1) (cubic polynomial in ) .
92
10.0 10.5 11.0 11.5 12.0
0
5
10
15
20
Peq
q 2
Figure 3.1: Region of (Peq; q2)-pairs that yield permissible, i.e. satisfy assumptions (A1)-
(A7), equilibrium points (10 = L < Pa = 12).
Thus, as noted above, two of the jacobians ve eigenvalues are 0 and  1. We are interested
in the signs of the real parts of the remaining three eigenvalues. These eigenvalues correspond
to the roots of the cubic factor of the characteristic polynomial which is given by equation
3.57.
We utilize the Routh-Hurwitz criterion to determine the regions of stability in the (Peq;
q2)-plane. To determine the e¤ect q1 has on stability, we set2 q1 = 0:447, 10, 20. These
regions, which are nested subsets (the larger subset corresponding to the smaller q1 value),
are shown in Figure 3.2.
The union of the Blue, Red, and Yellow regions, which corresponds to q1 = 0:447, is
identical to the equilibrium region plotted in Figure 3.1. Thus, we see that all equilibrium
2Using linear regressions on experimental data, Caginalp and Ilieva [13] found a q1 of 0:447 and a q2 of
0:073 for their closed book experiment. Thus, we utilize these values in Cases 1-4 as appropriate.
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Figure 3.2: Region of (Peq; q2) pairs for L = 10 and Pa = 12 corresponding to q1 = 0:447
(Blue, Red, and Yellow), 10 (Red and Yellow), and 20 (Yellow) that yield stability. Areas
outside of the designated colored regions but inside the dashed/solid black lines correspond
to non-stable equilibria.
points are stable for q1 = 0:447. As previously noted, the region of equilibria does not
change as the value of q1 changes. However, the value of q1 does a¤ect the regions of stable
and non-stable equilibria. For example, for q1 = 20 all equilibrium points inside the Yellow
region in Figure 3.2 are stable, while the equilibrium points in the Blue and Red regions are
not stable. Note that while the "lower" boundary curve of the stable region(s) is included
within the stable region(s), the "upper" boundary curves (i.e. curve separating Blue and
Red regions and curve between Red and Yellow regions) are not. Indeed, the Routh-Hurwitz
criterion (via Mathematica) indicates the system admits a pair of pure imaginary eigenvalues
along these curves. Thus, the equilibrium points along these curves are marginally stable.
Refer to Scenario (iii) in Appendix D with i > 0, i = 0; 1; 2; 3 and 21   30 = 0.
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The q2 parameter controls the existence of equilibria, while the q1 parameter is a key
factor in the stability of the equilibria (at least for this parameter region). For example, if
q2 is large, then the equilibrium price, Peq, must be close to Pa for stability. The magnitude
of the q1 parameter determines how close Peq must be to Pa for this equilibrium to be stable.
Alternatively, if Group 1 is very strongly focused on the price trend while Group 2 is not
strongly a¤ected by the asset prices deviation from the fundamental value (i.e., large q1 and
small q2), then Peq must be very close to L for stability. Indeed, from Figure 3.2 it is clear
in this scenario that the equilibrium is most likely not stable.
Case 2. 8 = Pa < Peq < L = 10
Equilibrium
This case contains the same curve of equilibrium points (prior to substituting any parame-
ter values) as in Case 1 where Peq 6= Pa may assume any value between Pa and L. Requiring
these equilibrium points to satisfy assumptions (A1)-(A7) restricts the set of (Peq; q2)-pairs
that yield equilibrium to the following region
Pa < Peq < L and
(Peq   L)Pa
(L+ Peq) (Pa   Peq)  q2 <
 Pa
Pa   Peq
which is derived from Corollary 7. For the specic parameter values given above the region
is described by
8 < Peq < 10 and
(Peq   10) 8
(10 + Peq) (8  Peq)  q2 <
 8
8  Peq
and shown in Figure 3.3. Similar to Case 1, note the "lower" boundary curve is included
within the equilibrium region, while the "upper" boundary curve is not part of the equilib-
rium region.
Large q2 implies Peq is close to Pa, while small values for q2 mean Peq must be close to L.
Again, this result is analogous to that of [6] for the single group model. Refer to Appendix
C for more details regarding the relationship between q2, Peq, Pa, and L.
Stability
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Figure 3.3: Region of (Peq; q2)-pairs that yield permissible, i.e. satisfy assumptions (A1)-
(A7), equilibrium points (8 = Pa < L = 10).
The Jacobian matrix and characteristic polynomial for this case are identical (prior to
setting parameter values) to those of Case 1. Refer to Appendix E for the Jacobian matrix
and equation 3.57 for the characteristic polynomial.
Using the Routh-Hurwitz criterion, we determine regions in the (Peq; q2)-plane that yield
stable equilibrium points. To understand the e¤ect of the q1 parameter on stability, we
produce plots for q1 = 0:447, 10, and 20: These plots are displayed in Figure 3.4. As q1
increases, each corresponding region is nested within the prior region.
The union of the Blue, Red, and Yellow regions corresponds to q1 = 0:447 and is iden-
tical to the region of permissible equilibrium points in Figure 3.3. Thus, we see that all
equilibrium points are stable for q1 = 0:447. As in Case 1, the q2 parameter controls the
existence of equilibria, while q1 is a key factor in determining stability. As the value of
the q1 parameter increases, the region of equilibria remains unchanged, while the region of
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Figure 3.4: Region of (Peq; q2) pairs for Pa = 8 and L = 10 corresponding to q1 = 0:447
(Blue, Red, and Yellow), 10 (Red and Yellow), and 20 (Yellow) that yield stability. Areas
outside of the designated colored regions but inside the dashed/solid black lines correspond
to non-stable equilibria.
(Peq; q2)-pairs that yield stable equilibria gets smaller. Thus, if q1 = 20, then the Yellow
region corresponds to stable equilibria, while the Blue and Red regions corresponds to non-
stable equilibria. Note that if Group 2 is strongly focused on the asset prices deviation
from the fundamental value and Group 1 is not strongly motivated by the recent price trend
(i.e., q1 is small and q2 is large), then Peq must remain close to Pa for stability.
Similar to Case 1 note that while the "lower" boundary curve of the stable region(s)
is included within the stable region(s), the "upper" boundary curves are not. Indeed,
the Routh-Hurwitz criterion (via Mathematica) indicates the system admits a pair of pure
imaginary eigenvalues along these curves. Thus, the equilibrium points along these curves
are marginally stable. Refer to Scenario (iii) in Appendix D with i > 0, i = 0; 1; 2; 3 and
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21   30 = 0.
It has been noted previously through experimental [15], theoretical [6], and empirical ([8]
and [9]) studies that an increase in the amount of cash available to purchase an asset boosts
the assets price. We increase the value of L (by increasing M0 while holding N0 xed) to
study the e¤ect of an increase of cash on the system. Figure 3.5 contains the plots of the
stability regions corresponding to L = 20 and 30, respectively.
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Figure 3.5: Region of (Peq; q2) pairs for Pa = 8 corresponding to q1 = 0:447 (Blue, Red, and
Yellow), 10 (Red and Yellow), and 20 (Yellow) that yield stability. The left plot corresponds
to L = 20 and the right L = 30. Compare these with Figure 3.4.
As shown in Figure 3.5, the region of permissible equilibrium points (dashed lines) be-
comes smaller as L increases, though the overall shape is similar. Note that a similar
phenomenon occurs as L is reduced with Pa xed.
Case 3. Pa = Peq = L = 10
Equilibrium
For any N^ (1) such that 0  N^ (1)  N0 and N0 > 0 equation 3.52 yields an equilibrium
point of the system 3.39 - 3.43. In contrast with Cases 1 and 2, any (N^ (1); q2)-pair yields
an equilibrium point satisfying assumptions (A1)-(A7).
Stability
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The Jacobian matrix evaluated at an arbitrary equilibrium point is given in Appendix E
while the characteristic polynomial is given by equation 3.62.
Letting q1 and q2 assume any real and positive number, the Routh-Hurwitz criterion
yields the stable region 
1 [ 
2 [ 
3 [ 
4 contained in (N (1); q1; q2) space where

1 =

0 < q1 <
11
2
and 0  N^ (1)  3; 000 and q2 > 0

,

2 =

q1 =
11
2
and 0  N^ (1) < 3; 000 and q2 > 0

,

3 =
11
2
< q1  10
and
8>>>><>>>>:

0  N^ (1)  16;500
q1
and q2 > 0

or
0B@ 16;500q1 < N^ (1) < 3; 000
and q2 >
 544;500;000+49;500N^(1)q1 (N^(1)q1)2
900;000;000 300;000N^(1) 30;000N^(1)q1+10(N^(1))2q1
1CA
9>>>>=>>>>; ,
and

4 = q1 > 10
and
8>>>><>>>>:

0  N^ (1)  16;500
q1
and q2 > 0

or
0B@ 16;500q1 < N^ (1) < 30;000q1
and q2 >
 544;500;000+49;500N^(1)q1 (N^(1)q1)2
900;000;000 300;000N^(1) 30;000N^(1)q1+10(N^(1))2q1
1CA
9>>>>=>>>>; .
This region is displayed in Figure 3.6 for various q1 and q2 values. Note that larger q1 values
yield smaller stable regions while larger q2 values correspond to larger stable regions.
From the diagram on the left in Figure 3.6 we see that the region of stable equilibrium
points increases in size as the value of the q2 parameter increases. Note that from this
diagram we see that for large q1 if N^ (1)  N0, then the equilibrium point is not stable. The
diagram on the right in Figure 3.6 shows that for small q1 all equilibrium points are stable
and as q1 increases the region of stable equilibrium points gets smaller.
For the diagram on the left in Figure 3.6 the "upper" boundary curves for the stable
regions are not included within the stable regions. Indeed, along these curves the system
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Figure 3.6: Regions in (N^ (1); q1) and (N^ (1); q2) space for 10 = L = Peq = Pa corresponding to
stability. Diagram on left shows (N^ (1); q1) pairs for q2 = 0:073 (Blue), 10 (Blue and Red), and
20 (Blue, Red, and Yellow) that yield stability. The diagram on the right displays (N^ (1); q1)
pairs for q1 = 0:447 (Blue, Red, and Yellow), 10 (Red and Yellow), and 20 (Yellow) that
yield stability. Note that any point within the plotted region yields an equilibrium point
of the system. Areas outside of the designated colored regions correspond to non-stable
equilibria.
admits a pair of pure imaginary eigenvalues. For the diagram on the right in Figure 3.6
the equilibrium points along the curves separating the Yellow and Red regions and the Red
and Blue regions are not stable. Indeed, along these curves the system admits a pair of
pure imaginary eigenvalues. Mathematicas Reduce command was utilized to conrm these
results via the Routh-Hurwitz criterion.
Case 4. Peq = L = 10 6= Pa
Equilibrium
For any ^2 2 ( 1; 1) n f0; q2g an equilibrium point is given by equation 3.51. Note
that Pa may be less than or greater than Peq = L. As such, we consider two scenarios:
0 < Pa < L and Pa > L.
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If 0 < Pa < L, then the surface of equilibrium points in (2; q2; Pa)- space is given by
3
 1 < ^2 < 0 and q2 > 0 and Pa =
10q2
q2   ^2
,
and if Pa > L, then this surface is described by
0 < ^2 < q2 and Pa =
10q2
q2   ^2
.
In both cases we have ensured these equilibrium points satisfy assumptions (A1)-(A7). These
regions are depicted graphically in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Surface of (^2; q2; Pa)- triples that yield permissible, i.e. satisfy assumptions
(A1)-(A7), equilibrium points (10 = Peq = L 6= Pa).
Note that Figure 3.7 shows that equilibrium may exist for values of Pa that are drastically
di¤erent from Peq.
Stability
With Pa =
10q2
q2 ^2
(found by solving the Peq critical point equation for Pa) the Jacobian
matrix evaluated at an arbitrary equilibrium point is given by:
3The actual criteria necessary to ensure a valid equilibrium is ^2 less than zero. However, as noted above
we assume
^2 < 1 which gives the rst inequality.
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with characteristic equation:
  1
10
 (1 + )2

1 + (11  2q1)+ 102
	
= 0.
This system has a zero eigenvalue and a negative one eigenvalue with algebraic multiplicity
two. Thus, the sign of the real parts of the remaining two eigenvalues will determine the
stability of the equilibrium point. Note that the stability is independent of q2 and only
depends upon the value of parameter q1.
The remaining eigenvalues are of the form:
4;5 =
 11 + 2q1 
p
81  44q1 + 4q21
20
.
The real parts of these eigenvalues are negative for q1 < 112 , equal to zero for q1 =
11
2
, and
positive for q1 > 112 . So, the equilibrium point is stable for q1 2
  1; 11
2

and unstable
for q1 2
 
11
2
;1. It is interesting to note that the point of transition from stability to
instability, q1 = 112 , is also signicant in Case 3, Peq = Pa = L, in that this is the point where
parameter q1 begins to inuence the stability.
3.6 CONCLUSION
The stability of nancial markets is of crucial practical importance; however, studying sta-
bility is not feasible within classical models that are idealizations based on near equilibrium
conditions. A key assumption in classical nance is the existence of an innite amount of
capital controlled by experts, free of bias, and unanimous in their assessment of true value
of the asset. Thus any study of price dynamics within this setting leads to prices that evolve
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quickly and smoothly to the equilibrium price with some random uctuations, or noise, along
the way. The equations developed by Caginalp and collaborators since 1990 model asset
price dynamics by utilizing basic microeconomics of supply and demand but also allowing
these functions to depend on motivations beyond valuation. Also inherent in this approach
is the niteness of assets and the possibility that di¤erent investor groups (controlling parts
of the total asset pool) may also di¤er in their assessments of the value of an asset. We
show in Appendix A that the formal limit of solutions of this model corresponds to solutions
of the classical price equation 3.1. Thus, this model encompasses the classical model upon
removal of the generalized features.
After a precise derivation of the link between the discrete (di¤erence equations) and
the continuum (di¤erential equations) for the multi-group models, we study the stability
properties with the objective of determining the parameter regions for equilibrium, stability,
and instability. An important di¤erence between the neoclassical dynamics and our asset
ow models is that equilibrium is not uniquely determined by the valuation in the latter.
Instead it is determined by a set of algebraic equations incorporating the characteristics of
each group. In other words, given a particular valuation (held by Group 2 that focuses on
value) there are a spectrum of equilibrium prices. One has a unique price given the other
parameters such as the cash and share position of each group, etc.
Specically, for the two group system with conserved cash and shares we prove (Section
3.4) the existence of a 1-dimensional curve of equilibrium points under various parameter
regimes. In addition, this equilibrium price, Peq, must lie between the liquidity value,
L := (total amount of cash) = (total number of shares) ,
and Group 2s assessment of the fundamental value, Pa. In Theorem 10 the existence of
local stable and unstable regions for an arbitrary equilibrium point is established. We note
that existence of equilibrium is independent of the q1 parameter, i.e. the magnitude of trend
based investing does not impact the existence of equilibrium.
Numerical computations (Section 3.5) with specic parameter values establish the exact
stable regions for an equilibrium point. In general, we showed that if Group 2 is strongly
focused on valuation, i.e. q2 is large, then the equilibrium price is close to Pa. The strength
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of Group 1s motivation due to the recent price trend determines how close Peq must be to
either Pa or L to ensure stability. For instance, if q1 is large, i.e. Group 1 is very strongly
focused on the recent trend in price, and q2 is small, then Peq must be close to L for stability
(see Figure 3.2).
The results show that in Cases 1, 2, and 4 the parameter q2 controls the existence of
equilibria, while in Case 3 existence of equilibria is independent of the q2 parameter. In
all four cases, the q1 parameter plays a key role in determining the stability. In Cases 1,
2, and 3 as q1 increases, the region of (Peq; q2) pairs that yield stable equilibria gets smaller
(see Figures 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6). In Case 4 the equilibrium point is stable for q1 < 11=2
and unstable for q1 > 11=2. In Case 3 as the value for q2 increases, the stable region also
grows larger. Figure 3.6 also shows that if Group 1 is strongly focused on the trend, i.e. q1
large, and owns a vast majority of the shares, then the equilibrium is most likely not stable.
Our results regarding the inuence of the q1 parameter are analogous to those of Duran [21]
where he nds that the market price is more sensitive to small changes in the q1 parameter
than the q2 parameter.
Thus the asset ow models are capable of addressing stability issues. The remaining
challenge is to establish a stronger connection with world markets by estimating the assets
controlled by di¤erent groups characterized by their trading strategy. This requires not
only estimation of the q1 and q2 parameters but also an estimate of the magnitudes of the
assets of each group. With these estimates one can develop criteria that lead to instability
in markets.
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4.0 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RELATED PROJECTS
The Quantitative Modeling portion of this dissertation provides a quantitative methodology
for determining the e¤ect of various factors on the return. Moreover, the e¤ect of any hy-
pothesized factor that can be expressed quantitatively may be determined via this approach.
While the studies presented focus on closed-end funds, the methodology may be applied to
any set of funds provided a suitable valuation methodology is employed. One of the crit-
icisms of Behavioral Finance is that its insights and ideas are not easily veried with real
market data. The approach outlined in this dissertation provides a method to test these
philosophical insights thereby transforming them into practical tools.
There is strong statistical support that the return depends signicantly on (i) the recent
price trend in a nonlinear manner, (ii) recent changes in valuation, (iii) recent changes in
money supply (M2), (iv) longer term trend, and (v) recent volume changes. Proximity to a
recent high price is a marginally signicant factor. The dependence on the volatility is more
subtle, as short term volatility has a positive inuence, while the longer term is negative. The
cubic nonlinearity in the weighted price trend shows that, in the absence of any valuation
change, a percentage daily gain of up to 2.78% (Study 1 (Non-standardized variables): Table
2.3) or 3.75 standard deviations (Study 2 (standardized variables): Table 2.12) tends to
yield higher prices, but larger gains lead to lower prices. Thus, the nonlinearity of price
trend establishes an empirical and quantitative basis for both underreaction and overreaction
within one large data set, facilitating an understanding of these competing motivations in
markets. Increasing money supply is found to have a signicant positive e¤ect on stock price,
while proximity to recent high prices has a slight (and marginal) negative e¤ect.
The Analysis of Asset Flow Di¤erential Equations section presents the derivation of the
ordinary di¤erential equations model that has been utilized by Caginalp and collaborators
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since 1990. Specically, the two investor group model is considered. This model ad-
mits a one-dimensional curve of equilibria, which is parameterized by the equilibrium price,
Peq. Three key quantities, all with the same units of dollars per share, are identied in
[6]. They are the equilibrium price, the fundamental value of a share of the asset, Pa,
and the liquidity value, L, which is dened as the total amount of money in the system
divided by the total number of shares. It is proven that any equilibrium of the system
must have its equilibrium price between the fundamental value and the liquidity value, i.e.
Peq 2 [min (Pa; L) ;max (Pa; L)]. Moreover, any price between Pa and L corresponds to
an equilibrium point. Theorem 10 proves the existence of stable and unstable regions of
equilibria within the parameter space.
Future work will include an investigation into the e¤ect of the investor groupsstrategies,
as determined by the ci and qi parameters, on the existence of stable and unstable equilibria.
Specically, the transition from stable to unstable is a function of these parameters. As
such, understanding how this transition point behaves will help to illuminate the impact
of changes in an investor groups strategy. From a global perspective, these parameters
also impact the solution trajectorys "excursion" from unstable to stable equilibrium points.
This is particularly interesting from a practical point of view as these excursions can be quite
large and, thus, can be directly related to how risky an investment is. For example, consider
Figure 4.1 which was produced via Matlab for the following parameter values1: M0 = 100,
N0 = 10, Pa = 8, q1 = 1=10, q2 = 0:073, c1 = 1=10, and c2 = 1. Even though the values for
M0 and N0 di¤er from those in Section 3.5, their ratio, which is the value of interest, is the
same, i.e. L =M0=N0 = 10.
Consider trajectory 4. While the trajectorys starting price of 9.939 is close to its ending
price of 9.834, at its furthest point from the curve of equilibria it has a price of 55.304 which
is almost 7 times the fundamental value of the asset. Thus, this model provides an avenue
for exploring instability in asset prices and risk. Note the curve of equilibria ranges from
Peq = 9:6953 to Peq = 10. This range is derived according to the expression given in the
Remark to Corollary 7.
1To produce 4.1 assumption (A3) was relaxed, i.e. it is no longer assumed that tanh(x)  x.
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Figure 4.1: Curve of equilibrium points for the case 8 = Pa < Peq < L = 10. Red points
correspond to unstable equilibria, while green correspond to stable. There are 5 sample
trajectories (obtained via Matlabs ode23s solver). Trajectories start at the points 1B, 2B, ...,
5B and end at the points 1E, 2E, ..., 5E, respectively. Note the large excursions trajectories
3, 4, and 5 take before returning to equilibrium.
This investigation should provide a better understanding of the existence and stability
of the equilibrium of the two investor group system. Once the nature of the equilibrium is
understood, the e¤ect of various parameters and behavioral factors on the dynamics of the
system can be explored.
A subsequent major project can be to establish a stronger connection between real world
markets and the model discussed in this thesis by using statistical methods to determine ap-
propriate values for the c(i)j and q
(i)
j parameters. These will then be utilized in the discretized
version of this model to obtain numerical results. A primary goal of this work will be to
verify and expand upon (by considering additional motivations) the results in [13], where
the authors used asset market experiments in conjunction with statistical methods and a
discretized version of Equation 3.36 to better understand the formation of market bubbles.
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Using NYSE data instead of experimental data will provide an interesting challenge not
present in [13], as trader-specic data (bids and asks at each price and period) will not be
available. Thus, using actual market data, a method for distinguishing the two groups and
the sizes of their assets and determining each groups estimate of the value of the asset will
need to be established.
There are numerous other avenues of research to consider. Specically, two such avenues
are: (i) the addition of noise to the system of di¤erential equations and (ii) the formation of
a valuation methodology for stocks that will allow the approach outlined in the Quantitative
Modeling section to be extended to assets other than closed-end funds. With respect to the
former, Appendix B contains a formal argument showing the limit of solutions to the discrete
two group model corresponds to solutions of the classical price equation, 3.1. Closed-end
funds have been the subject of much scrutiny. Refer to [1] for a summary of the literature.
Development of a methodology to value funds/stocks (without utilizing the NAV of closed-
end funds) will allow the approach outlined in Chapter 2 to be applied to other nancial
instruments.
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APPENDIX A
QUANTITATIVE MODELING STUDY 2: ADDITIONAL REGRESSIONS
As noted in Chapter 2, the key to obtaining meaningful coe¢ cients for the independent
variables involves formulating a suitable denition for the valuation. To illustrate this point,
suppose that we perform a linear regression in the manner of most nancial studies, i.e.,
without making any attempt to subtract out the valuation. If we consider the most signicant
of the remaining variables, namely, Price Trend, then we obtain the relation below.
Regression 4. As a baseline we consider the linear regression with the single indepen-
dent variable, Price Trend:
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t):
The regression results are included in Table A1.
Table A1: Regression 4 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.0004126711 0.00004845682 8.516265 <.0001
Price Trend -0.0001618137 0.00004847659 -3.337976 0.0008
Degrees of Freedom: 80,242
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From this we see that although the Price Trend is statistically signicant, the coe¢ cient
has one-tenth of the magnitude of the previous regressions, and the opposite sign. Without
accounting for changes in valuation, a one standard deviation change in the Price Trend
variable corresponds to a change of -0.016% in the Relative Price Change.
Regression 5. By incorporating the Valuation variable in the regression, namely,
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t);
we can readily demonstrate that the true e¤ect of the Price Trend is extracted. Indeed the
regression results are summarized in Table A2.
Table A2: Regression 5 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.000412679 0.00004775848 8.64096 <.0001
Price Trend 0.001103913 0.00005451764 20.24873 <.0001
Valuation 0.002630504 0.00005452487 48.24412 <.0001
Degrees of Freedom: 80,241
Hence, the Price Trend is now much more signicant (t-value 20.25 versus -3.34), positive,
and approximately 10 times larger in magnitude. By accounting for the Valuation, we nd
that the trend in price is statistically signicant and has roughly half the e¤ect of Valuation
on the Relative Price Change.
From these two regressions, we can conclude that ignoring the changes in value (as most
studies have done in the past) leads to coe¢ cients for Price Trend that are totally inconclusive
in terms of practical trading.
Regression 6. To further explore the nonlinear relationship between Price Trend and
Valuation we consider a regression that incorporates all of the signicant variables from
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Regression 2 as well as the Price Trend and Valuation interaction terms. This regression
has the form:
R(t+ 1) = 0 + 1T (t) + 2D(t) + 3M2(t) + 4STV (t) + 5LTV (t)
+ 6LTT (t) + 7V T (t) + 8T
2(t) + 9T
3(t) + 10D
2(t)+
+ 11D
3(t) + 12T (t)D(t) + 13T
2(t)D(t) + 14T (t)D
2(t)
+ 15Time(t) + 16Time
2(t) + 17Time
3(t)
Comparing the results in Table A3 with those from Regression 3, we nd that the Inter-
cept, Price Trend2; and Price Trend*Valuation2 terms are the only variables with signicant
(i.e., greater than 20%) relative changes in the magnitudes of their coe¢ cients.
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Table A3: Regression 6 results
Term Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.00139316 0.000378472 3.681 0.0002
Price Trend 0.00168829 0.00007044 23.96784 <.0001
Valuation 0.00290006 0.0000625270 46.38096 <.0001
M2 Money Supply 0.00047243 0.0000477520 9.89339 <.0001
Short Term Volatility 0.00057453 0.0000591470 9.71363 <.0001
Long Term Volatility 0.00015736 0.0000602920 2.60991 0.0091
Long Term Trend -0.0001755 0.0000548500 -3.19962 0.0014
Volume Trend 0.00026413 0.0000487820 5.41459 <.0001
Price Trend2 -0.00022655 0.0000413210 -5.48258 <.0001
Price Trend3 -0.00012016 0.0000114110 -10.53101 <.0001
Valuation2 0.00005617 0.0000180640 3.10918 0.0019
Valuation3 -0.0000079 0.0000016040 -4.92458 <.0001
Price Trend * Valuation -0.00026923 0.0000488830 -5.50767 <.0001
Price Trend2 * Valuation -0.00009215 0.0000177630 -5.18788 <.0001
Price Trend * Valuation2 -0.00000651 0.0000097640 -0.66662 0.505
Time -0.01582821 0.0028159320 -5.62095 <.0001
Time2 0.04268599 0.0058229880 7.3306 <.0001
Time3 -0.02936503 0.0035057630 -8.37622 <.0001
Degrees of Freedom: 80,226
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APPENDIX B
THE CLASSICAL ASSET PRICE EQUATION AS A LIMIT OF THE ASSET
FLOW DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS
We show that solutions of the discrete asset ow equations 3.13, 3.18, and 3.19 have a formal
limit as solutions to the classical stochastic asset price equation 3.1. This is accomplished by
utilizing the basic assumptions of classical nance within the context of our equations. The
key assumption needed to attain the classical limit is that Group 2 is focused solely on the
value of the asset, Pa(t), while Group 1 consists of "noise traders," a common assumption in
classical economics and nance. In other words, these participants hope to make a prot, but
without additional information, they try a variety of strategies that amount to nothing more
than noise in the aggregate. While individual traders may have strategies, there are many
disparate ideas, and so there is no net dependence on either price or value. This summarizes
the viewpoint of classical nance.
Classical nance stipulates the existence of a risk-free interest rate (per year), which we
will call , and assume that it is constant within the time period we are considering. Since
all investors have the same publicly available information, the expectation for the return of
any asset is given by
Pa (t) = Pa (0) e
t. (B.1)
We consider a small time frame (compared to one year), and denote by Pa the funda-
mental value of the stock during that time. With the assumption of non-zero trading costs
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we assume that k(2) is given by
k(2) :=
8>>><>>>:
1 if P < Pa   
1=2 if Pa    < P < Pa + 
0 if P > Pa + 
(B.2)
for some small, positive . We can also consider the smoothed version of this function, given
by
k(2) (P ) :=
1
2

1 + tanh

Pa   P
"

(B.3)
for some small, positive ".
We make the classical assumption that the knowledgeable investors, namely Group 2,
represent the vast majority of wealth, expressed by the following.
Assumption A. At the initial time, the endowments to the two groups satisfy the
following:
M (1)=M (2) << 1 and N (1)=N (2) << 1. (B.4)
Assumption B. We assume that the available cash and asset are balanced so that the
cash supply of Group 2 satises
L2 (t) :=M
(2) (t) =N (2) (t) = Pa (t) . (B.5)
The assumption that Group 1 consists of "noise traders" implies that the net ow of
orders by this group does not depend on Pa or P .
Assumption C. The transition rate of Group 1, k(1), is a constant independent of Pa
and P and 0 < k(1) < 1.
Under Assumptions A and B, for P < Pa   , one has that k(2) = 1 from B.2, so we can
write 3.12 as
F (Tj) =
k(1)M (1) +M (2)
(1  k(1))N (1) ~=
1
(1  k(1))
M (2)
N (1)
=
Pa
(1  k(1))
N (2)
N (1)
= O

N (2)
N (1)

(B.6)
which is large and positive. Hence, by 3.13 the price quickly moves into the range P > Pa :
Similarly, when the stock is overvalued, i.e., P > Pa + ; one has k(2) = 0, yielding
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F (Tj) =
k(1)M (1)
(1  k(1))N (1) +N (2) ~=
k(1)M (1)
N (2)
= k(1)
M (1)
M (2)
Pa << Pa:
Hence,
F (Tj)
P (Tj)
  1~=  1; (B.7)
so that the price falls back into the range P < Pa +  where k(2) no longer vanishes.
Finally, we consider the range Pa    < P < Pa +  where the knowledgeable investors
are essentially inactive since it is within their trading costs. In this region of price, the "noise
traders" dominate due to the absence of Group 2 investors. Using Assumptions A and B for
prices P (Tj) near Pa; we have, from 3.12 and B.2,
F (Tj) =
M (2)
N (2)
1 + 2k(1)M (1)=M (2)
1 + 2 (1  k(1))N (1)=N (2)
yielding, from 3.13, the identity,
P (Tj+1)  P (Tj)
P (Tj)
=
Pa
P (Tj)

1 + 2k(1)M (1)=M (2)
1 + 2 (1  k(1))N (1)=N (2)

  1
~=2k(1)
M (1)
M (2)
  2  1  k(1) N (1)
N (2)
. (B.8)
Indeed, as Pa    < P < Pa + , we approximate Pa=P (Tj) ~=1. In addition, we use a
geometric series argument and drop the 4k(1)M (1)=M (2)
 
1  k(1)N (1)=N (2) as it is much
smaller in magnitude than the other terms due to Assumption A.
The system B.8, 3.18, and 3.19 is not yet close to 3.1, since M (1) and N (1) are not
constant.
We now examine M (1) (t) and assume that there is a normal random variable, X(T ),
governing the inux/outow of investors and their cash. The parameter M0 represents the
total amount of cash in the system, i.e. M (1) +M (2) =M0.
Assumption E. The cash supply M (1) (t) in 3.18 includes an inow/outow term
m(1) (Tj) := X (Tj)M0 that dominates the right hand side of B.8.
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Thus, we obtain
P (Tj+1)  P (Tj)
P (Tj)
= 2k(1)
m(1) (Tj)
M (2)
  2  1  k(1) N (1)
N (2)
~=X (Tj) (A.9)
where  incorporates the additional constants multiplying . In other words, the existing
"noise traders" e¤ectively cancel out one another as they employ a variety of strategies.
More signicant, however, is the stochastic inux and exit of new investors that becomes
the main stochastic contribution to price change. For example, if there is a net inow of
investor cash (as in the late 1990s) due to macroscopic or demographic changes, then the
larger supply of cash leads to higher prices. This holds even assuming that investors, on
average, are just as likely to sell as they are to buy. Formally taking the continuum limit of
A.9 yields
dP = PdX. (B.9)
Since, P (t) and Pa (t) are essentially identical in classical nance, we assume P (t) satises
the same di¤erential equation, namely
dP = Pdt. (B.10)
Combining B.9 and B.10 yields the stochastic equation 3.1, i.e.
dP
P
= dX + dt.
The main di¤erence is that we are assuming a deterministic motivation once the price has
moved beyond  away from the fundamental value.
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APPENDIX C
LIMIT CALCULATIONS FOR EQUILIBRIUM REGIONS IN CASES 1
(L < PEQ < PA) AND 2 (PA < PEQ < L)
Intuitively, we expect the equilibrium price, Peq, to move toward the fundamental value, Pa,
as q2 ! 1 and toward the liquidity value, L = M0=N0, as q2 ! 0. This is conrmed
graphically in Figures 3.1 and 3.3. Using the expressions in the remark to Corollary 7 we
prove these claims.
Lemma 13. Under the conditions in Corollary 7 we prove for Cases 1 and 2 that (i) as
q2 ! 1, the equilibrium price, Peq, moves toward the fundamental value, Pa; and (ii) as
q2 ! 0, the equilibrium price, Peq, moves toward the liquidity value, L.
Proof. Indeed, consider expressions 3.53 and 3.54 from the remark to Corollary 7. Dene
E :=
1
2q2N0

N0Pa ( 1 + q2)  q2M0 +
q
4q2M0N0Pa (1 + q2) + [q2M0 +N0Pa (1  q2)]2

.
For Case 1, L < Peq < Pa, we have
max

L;
Pa (q2   1)
q2

< Peq  E (C.1)
and for Case 2, Pa < Peq < L, we have
E  Peq < min

L;
Pa (1 + q2)
q2

. (C.2)
Consider the limit of the expression E as q2 ! 0 and as q2 !1.
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First, suppose q2 !1. Indeed, consider
lim
q2!1
1
2q2N0

N0Pa ( 1 + q2)  q2M0 +
q
4q2M0N0Pa (1 + q2) + [q2M0 +N0Pa (1  q2)]2

=
N0Pa  M0 +
p
4M0N0Pa +M20 +N
2
0P
2
a   2M0N0Pa
2N0
=
N0Pa  M0 +M0 +N0Pa
2N0
= Pa.
Next, suppose q2 ! 0. Indeed, consider
lim
q2!0
1
2q2N0

N0Pa ( 1 + q2)  q2M0 +
q
4q2M0N0Pa (1 + q2) + [q2M0 +N0Pa (1  q2)]2

=
0
0
.
Utilization of lHôpitals rule leads to
lim
q2!0
1
2q2N0

N0Pa ( 1 + q2)  q2M0 +
q
4q2M0N0Pa (1 + q2) + [q2M0 +N0Pa (1  q2)]2

=
N0Pa  M0 + 12 (N20P 2a )
 1=2
(4M0N0Pa   2N20P 2a + 2M0N0Pa)
2N0
=
1
2
[Pa   L+ 3L  Pa]
= L.
Therefore, we have shown that this expression goes to Pa as q2 !1 and goes to L as q2 ! 0.
Next, we consider the limits of the expressions Pa(q2 1)
q2
(for Case 1) and Pa(q2+1)
q2
(for Case
2). Indeed,
lim
q2!1
Pa (q2   1)
q2
= Pa (C.3)
and
lim
q2!0
Pa (q2   1)
q2
=  1. (C.4)
Similarly,
lim
q2!1
Pa (q2 + 1)
q2
= Pa (C.5)
and
lim
q2!0
Pa (q2 + 1)
q2
=1. (C.6)
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We now consider Case 1. From expression C.1 we have
max

L;
Pa (q2   1)
q2

< Peq  E. (C.7)
Suppose q2 ! 1 and note for large q2, as Pa > L, we have max
h
L; Pa(q2 1)
q2
i
= Pa(q2 1)
q2
.
From the limit C.3 we have that for xed (arbitrary and small) " > 0, there exists a q02 > 0
such that for all q2 > q02 we have
Pa   Pa (q2   1)
q2
=
Pa
q2
< ".
Note we choose q02 large enough so that max
h
L; Pa(q2 1)
q2
i
= Pa(q2 1)
q2
. Also, note the absolute
value in the denition of the limit is not required as Pa >
Pa(q2 1)
q2
for q2 > 0. From
expression C.7 for q2 > q02 we have
Peq >
Pa (q2   1)
q2
,
0 < Pa   Peq < Pa   Pa (q2   1)
q2
< ".
Thus, as q2 !1, Peq approaches Pa.
Next, for Case 1 suppose q2 ! 0. From the limit C.4 and expression C.7 we see that
max
h
L; Pa(q2 1)
q2
i
= L for q2 small enough. So, we use the limq2!0E = L to squeeze Peq.
Indeed, for xed (arbitrary and small) " > 0, there exists a q02 > 0 such that for all 0 < q2 < q
0
2
we have
0 < E   L < ".
Again, the absolute value in the limit denition is not required as L < Peq  E from
expression C.8. For q2 < q02 (q
0
2 chosen small enough that max
h
L; Pa(q2 1)
q2
i
= L) we have
L < Peq  E ,
0 < Peq   L  E   L < ".
Thus, as q2 ! 0, Peq approaches L.
Next, we repeat similar arguments for Case 2, Pa < Peq < L. Indeed, consider expression
C.2
E  Peq < min

L;
Pa (1 + q2)
q2

. (C.8)
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Suppose q2 ! 1 and note for large q2, as Pa < L, we have min
h
L; Pa(1+q2)
q2
i
= Pa(1+q2)
q2
.
From the limit C.5 we have that for xed (arbitrary and small) " > 0, there exists a q02 > 0
such that for all q2 > q02 we have
Pa (1 + q2)
q2
  Pa = Pa
q2
< ".
Note we choose q02 large enough so that min
h
L; Pa(1+q2)
q2
i
= Pa(1+q2)
q2
. Also, the absolute value
is not required as Pa(1+q2)
q2
> Pa for q2 > 0. From expression C.8 for q2 > q02 we have
Peq <
Pa (1 + q2)
q2
,
0 < Peq   Pa < Pa (1 + q2)
q2
  Pa < ".
Thus, as q2 !1, Peq approaches Pa.
Next, for Case 2 suppose q2 ! 0. From the limit C.6 and expression C.8 we see that
min
h
L; Pa(1+q2)
q2
i
= L for q2 small enough. So, we use the limq2!0E = L to squeeze Peq.
Indeed, for xed (arbitrary and small) " > 0, there exists a q02 > 0 such that for all 0 < q2 < q
0
2
we have
0 < L  E < ".
Again, the absolute value is not required as E  Peq < L from expression C.7 for q2 small
enough. For q2 < q02 (q
0
2 chosen small enough that min
h
L; Pa(1+q2)
q2
i
= L) we have
E  Peq < L,
E   L  Peq   L < 0,
" > L  E  L  Peq > 0.
Thus, as q2 ! 0, Peq approaches L.
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APPENDIX D
ROUTH-HURWITZ CRITERION: SUMMARY AND APPLICATION
Two necessary conditions for the real parts of all roots of a polynomial (with real coe¢ cients)
to lie in the left half of the complex plane are: (i) all coe¢ cients must be nonzero and (ii) all
coe¢ cients must have the same sign. Thus, if either condition (i) or (ii) is not satised, then
the equation has a root(s) with real part greater than or equal to zero. The Routh-Hurwitz
criterion, however, gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the real parts of the roots of
a polynomial to be negative. As such, this method is utilized to determine the stability, i.e.
real parts of all eigenvalues strictly negative, of the equilibrium points considered in Sections
3.4 and 3.5.
We consider the specic case of a cubic polynomial p() = 3
3+2
2+1+0. The
Routh Array is:
3 3 1
2 2 0
1 21 30
2
0
0 0 0
.
The Routh-Hurwitz criterion states that the number of roots with positive real parts is given
by the number of sign changes in the middle column. In general there are four scenarios to
consider:
(i) There are no zero elements in the middle column.
(ii) A zero appears in the middle column but the other element in the same row (right-
most column) is non-zero, i.e. 3 = 0 or 2 = 0. In this case the zero should be replaced
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with a very small " > 0. For instance, consider the scenario 3 = 1, 2 = 0, 1 > 0, and
0 > 0. The second entry in the middle column would be 2 = 0. We replace this with
" > 0. The Routh Array becomes
3 1 1
2 " 0
1 "1 0
"
0
0 a0 0
.
As " ! 0, the sign of the term "1 0
"
becomes negative as 0 > 0 in this scenario. Thus,
there are 2 sign changes in the middle column indicating two roots with positive real parts.
(iii) There is a row of zeros in the array. This means that the polynomial has roots
that are located symmetrically about the origin of the complex plane, i.e. the roots are of
the form (  a) (+ a), indicating instability, or (  ia) (+ ia), a 2 R, indicating a pair
of pure imaginary roots. These roots are solutions of the auxiliary polynomial [20]. The
coe¢ cients of this auxiliary polynomial are taken as the elements in the row immediately
above the row of zeros.
For example, suppose 21 = 30, i 6= 0, i = 0 , 1, 2, 3. The auxiliary polynomial
has the form a() = 2
2 + 0 = 0. Solving a() = 0 yields 1;2 = 
q
 0
2
. So, if 2 and
0 are of the same sign, then the roots will be pure imaginary. Otherwise, they will be real
roots with opposite sign.
To determine the sign of the remaining eigenvalue, one may use long division, i.e. divide
the cubic polynomial, 3
3 + 2
2 + 1 + 0, by the auxiliary polynomial, 2
2 + 0.
This divides evenly since the roots of the auxiliary polynomial are roots of the original cubic
polynomial. In this case the quotient is 3
2
+1. Thus, the third root of the cubic polynomial
is  =  2=3. If 3 and 2 are of the same sign, then this root is negative. Otherwise,
this root is positive.
(iv) Same as (iii) but in this case there are repeated roots on the imaginary axis. This
cannot occur for the cubic polynomial case because it only has three roots.
For a cubic polynomial the following is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for stability:
all roots of the polynomial have negative real parts if and only if the coe¢ cients are positive
and 21   30 > 0 [20].
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This criterion was utilized to determine the stable and non-stable regions in Sections 3.4
and 3.5. Specically, the gures in Section 3.5 and Appendix F were produced by utilizing
this criterion to determine the stable regions.
Identication of the stable region boundary curves in Figures 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6 that are
not included within the actual stable regions was determined numerically via Scenario (iii)
above with i > 0, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and 21 30 = 0. Indeed, each equilibrium point along
these curves admits a pair of pure imaginary eigenvalues with a third, negative eigenvalue.
We term this case to be Marginally Stable.
For the Cases in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 the cubic factor of the characteristic polynomial
has the form
3
3 + 2
2 + 1+ 0
where we assume 3 = 1. As the Routh-Hurwitz criterion is based upon the sign of the
coe¢ cients, i.e. 2 > 0, 2 < 0, or 2 = 0, there are 27 cases to consider. We utilized
the Mathematica Reduce1 command to determine which of the 27 scenarios are applicable,
i.e. which scenarios correspond to a valid equilibrium - meaning the assumptions in Section
3.4 are satised. For example, to determine if (and when) Scenario A (see Table D1) is
applicable for Case 2 (8 = Pa < Peq < L = 10) with q1 = 10, the Reduce command was run
for the following conditions:
(i) 2 > 0 and 1 > 0 and 0 > 0 and 21   0 > 0 (for stable case) and
(ii) 0  M^ (1) M0 and 0  N^ (1)  N0 and  1 < ^(2) < 1 and
(iii) Pa = 8 and M0 = 30000 and N0 = 3000 and Pa < Peq < M0=N0 and
(iv) q1 = 10 and q2 > 0 and c1 = 1=10 and c2 = 1.
If the Reduce command returns a region in the parameter space, then these criteria are
met and the scenario is applicable. Specically, for this example any equilibrium point(s)
in the region returned by the Reduce command would be deemed stable. This region
1The Reduce command attempts to simplify equations and inequalities by replacing them with simpler
expressions. For example, Reduce[x > 0 and  1 < x < 1] returns the inequalities [x > 0 and x < 1]. If the
inequalities and/or equations are not compatible, then the Reduce command returns "False." For example,
Reduce[x > 0 and  1 < x < 1 and x = 5] returns "False." While the rst two expressions are compatible,
they are certainly not in agreement with the third.
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corresponds to the union of the Red and Yellow areas in Figure 3.4. The scenarios applicable
to the 12 parameter regimes considered in Section 3.5 are listed in Table D1. This table
indicates that scenarios B through I yield unstable equilibrium points, i.e. at least one root of
the characteristic polynomial has positive real part. Scenario A may yield stable, unstable,
or marginally stable equilibrium points depending upon the sign of the 21   0 term.
Table D1: Of the 27 scenarios resulting from the signs of i, i = 0, 1, 2 only nine are
applicable to the 12 parameter regimes from Section 3.5. Note that only Scenario A may
yield stable equilibrium points provided 21   0 > 0.
Scenario 3 2 1 0 21   0 Stability
A 1 + + + ? Stable, Unstable, Marginally stable. See notes.
B 1 +   +   Unstable
C 1   + +   Unstable
D 1     + ? Unstable
E 1 0 + +   Unstable. Used " argument.
F 1 0   +   Unstable. Used " argument.
G 1 0 0 +   Unstable. See notes.
H 1 + 0 +   Unstable
I 1   0 +   Unstable
Notes for selected scenarios in Table D1.
Scenario A. If 21   0 > 0, then the system is stable. If 21   0 < 0, then the
system is unstable as there will be two sign changes in the middle column. If 21 0 = 0,
then according to the above criteria the system will be marginally stable with a pair pure
imaginary eigenvalues as 2 and 0 are both positive. As 2 and 3 = 1 are both positive,
the remaining eigenvalue will be negative in this case.
Scenario G. The characteristic equation is given by
3 + 0 = 0,
 = 3
p 0.
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The other roots are a complex conjugate pair. As 0 > 0, we have  < 0. Then we can
compute the remaining roots by rst dividing 3+0 by (  3
p 0). This yields a quotient
of
2 + 3
p 0+ ( 0)2=3 .
Using the quadratic formula gives the roots
+;  =
  3p 0 
q
( 0)2=3   4 ( 0)2=3
2
=
  3p 0 
q
 3 ( 0)2=3
2
.
The real part of +;  is positive as 0 > 0. Therefore, the equilibrium is unstable.
The parameter regimes considered in Section 3.5 are:
(1) 8 = Pa < Peq < L = 10; q1 = 0:447
(2) 8 = Pa < Peq < L = 10; q1 = 10
(3) 8 = Pa < Peq < L = 10; q1 = 20
(4) 10 = L < Peq < Pa = 12; q1 = 0:447
(5) 10 = L < Peq < Pa = 12; q1 = 10
(6) 10 = L < Peq < Pa = 12; q1 = 20
(7) 10 = L = Peq = Pa; q1 = 0:447
(8) 10 = L = Peq = Pa; q1 = 10
(9) 10 = L = Peq = Pa; q1 = 20
(10) 10 = L = Peq = Pa; q2 = 0:073
(11) 10 = L = Peq = Pa; q2 = 10
(12) 10 = L = Peq = Pa; q2 = 20
Table D2 lists these regimes and the corresponding scenarios from Table D1. A "Yes"
indicates the scenario is applicable to the corresponding parameter regime. Note that
Scenario A may result in a stable, unstable, or marginally stable equilibrium depending
upon the sign of the 21   0 term. Thus, "Yes - all 3" indicates that there exists regions
consisting of stable, unstable, and marginally stable equilibrium points.
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Table D2: The nine scenarios from Table D1 are listed along with the 12 parameter regimes
from Section 3.5. A "Yes" indicates the scenario is applicable for the corresponding para-
meter regime. Only Scenario A may result in stable equilibrium points. All other scenarios
yield instability. For parameter regimes 1, 4, and 7 all equilibrium points are stable.
Scenario Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4 Regime 5 Regime 6
A Stable Yes - all 3 Yes - all 3 Stable Yes - all 3 Yes - all 3
B No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
C No No Yes No No Yes
D No No Yes No No Yes
E No No Yes No No Yes
F No No Yes No No Yes
G No No Yes No No Yes
H No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
I No No Yes No No Yes
Scenario Regime 7 Regime 8 Regime 9 Regime 10 Regime 11 Regime 12
A Stable Yes - all 3 Yes - all 3 Yes - all 3 Yes - all 3 Yes - all 3
B No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
C No No Yes No Yes Yes
D No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
E No No Yes No Yes Yes
F No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
G No No Yes No Yes Yes
H No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
I No No Yes No Yes Yes
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APPENDIX E
JACOBIAN MATRICES
Linearization about the arbitrary equilibrium point identied by equation 3.49 for Cases 1
and 2, i.e. L < Peq < Pa and Pa < Peq < L, yields a Jacobian matrix that, when evaluated
at this equilibrium point, is given by
0BBBBBBBBB@
 N0PeqC1
C4
M0C2
PeqC4
0 (M0 N0Peq)C3C5
2C02Peqq22C4
P 2aC6C3
2C02Peqq22C4
N0P 2eqC1
C4
 M0C2
C4
0 (M0 N0Peq)( C3)C5
2C02q22C4
  P 2aC6C3
2C02q22C4
 2P 2eqC0q2
C4
 2PeqC0q2
C4
 1 2PaPeqC3
C0q2C4
 2P 2aPeqC6
C0q2C4
 2c1PeqC0q1q2
C4
 2c1C0q1q2
C4
  c1q1
Peq
c1(M0C2C8+N0PeqC1C7)
C0q2C4
 2c1P 2aC6q1
C0q2C4
0 0   c2q2
Pa
0  c2
1CCCCCCCCCA
where
C0 := Pa   Peq ,
C1 := Pa   q2C0,
C2 := Pa + q2C0,
C3 := M0C2 N0PeqC1,
C4 :=M0C2 +N0PeqC1,
C5 :=  2PaPeqq22 + P 2eqq22 + P 2a ( 1 + q22),
C6 :=M0  N0Peq,
C7 := Peqq2   Pa(2q1 + q2), and
C8 := 2Paq1+C1.
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For Case 3 in Section 3.4 where Peq = Pa = L an arbitrary equilibrium point is given
by equation 3.52. Linearization about this equilibrium point yields the following Jacobian
matrix (evaluated at the equilibrium point):
0BBBBBBBBB@
 1
2
N0
2M0
0 N^ (1)   N^(1)2
N0
N^(1)( N0+N^(1))
N0
M0
2N0
 1
2
0 M0N^
(1)( N0+N^(1))
N20
M0(N0 N^(1))N^(1)
N20
0 0  1 2M0N^(1)
N20
2M0(N0 N^(1))
N20
0 0   c1N0q1
M0
c1

 1 + 2N^(1)q1
N0

2c1(N0 N^(1))q1
N0
0 0   c2N0q2
M0
0  c2
1CCCCCCCCCA
.
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APPENDIX F
STABILITY ANALYSIS FOR VARYING CI PARAMETER VALUES
In Section 3.5 we considered equilibrium and stability for equilibrium points of the system
3.39 - 3.43. Recalling that equilibrium is independent of the ci parameters, this section
considers stability for this system as the c1 and c2 parameters vary. As in Section 3.5, we
x the following parameter values: M0 = 30; 000, N0 = 3; 000 and Pa = 12 or 10 depending
upon the case. The q1 and q2 parameters will be set to 1=5, 1, or 5, respectively.
For Cases 1-3 in Section 3.5, we consider diagrams demonstrating the stability of the
system for q1 equal q2 (q1 = q2 = 1), q1 much larger than q2 (q1 = 5, q2 = 1=5) , and q1 much
less than q2 (q1 = 1=5, q2 = 5). The regions were determined via the Mathematica Reduce
command and plotted with the Mathematica RegionPlot utility.
Case 1. 10 = L < Peq < Pa = 12
Although any Peq 2 (10; 12) corresponds to an equilibrium of the system, it is evident
from Figure 3.1 that there exists a smaller range of permissible Peq, i.e. those for which
all assumptions are satised. Utilizing the expressions in the Remark to Corollary 7, the
maximum permissible Peq is 11:2788 if q2 = 1 and 10:5095 for q2 = 1=5. The diagram on the
left in Figure F1 represents stable regions for Peq = 10:05, 10:25, 10:45, 10:65, 10:85, 11:05,
and 11:25. Note that the regions are nested within each other. For example, the stable
region for Peq = 10:65 is given by the union of the Red, Orange, Yellow, and Green regions.
Similarly, the diagram on the right in Figure F1 represents stable regions for Peq = 10:05;
10:15, 10:25, 10:35, 10:45, and 10:5. Again, the regions are nested so that the stable region
for Peq = 10:35 corresponds to the union of the Red, Orange, Yellow, and Green regions.
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Figure F1: Regions in (c2; c1) space for 10 = L < Peq < Pa = 12 with q1 = q2 = 1 (left) and
q1 = 5, q2 = 1=5 (right). For the diagram on the left stable regions correspond to the following
equilibrium prices: Peq = 10:05 (Red), 10:25 (Red and Orange), 10:45 (Red, Orange, and
Yellow), 10:65 (Red, Orange, Yellow, and Green), 10:85 (Red, Orange, Yellow, Green, and
Blue), 11:05 (All colors), and 11:25 (All colors). For the diagram on the right stable regions
correspond to the following equilibrium prices: Peq = 10:05 (Red), 10:15 (Red and Orange),
10:25 (Red, Orange, and Yellow), 10:35 (Red, Orange, Yellow, and Green), 10:45 (Red,
Orange, Yellow, Green, and Blue), and 10:5 (All colors). Note that any point within the
plotted region yields an equilibrium point of the system as equilibrium is independent of the
ci parameters. Areas outside of the designated colored regions correspond to non-stability
for the specied Peq.
Comments on the diagrams in Figure F1:
(1) When q1 is much greater than q2, the regions are similarly shaped, but compressed
vertically and shifted down on the c1 axis. Thus, when there is a much greater emphasis
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on the trend than the valuation, the timescale for the trend (1=c1) must be longer for the
equilibrium to be stable. Alternately, when q1 is much less than q2 (q1 = 1=5 and q2 = 5),
all equilibrium are stable (utilized Mathematicas Reduce command to verify via the Routh-
Hurwitz criterion).
(2) As Peq moves toward the fundamental value, Pa, the stable region increases in size.
For example, in Figure F1 with Pa = 12 and q1 = q2 = 1 the stable region for Peq = 11:05
and 11:25 consists of the entire region, whereas for Peq = 10:05 only the Red region admits
a stable equilibrium. The scenario with q1 = 5 and q2 = 1=5 is similar.
(3) With c1 xed, increasing c2 may impact stability for larger values of c1. However,
for c1 < 1 (Figure F1 with q1 = q2 = 1) or c1 < 0:1 (Figure F1 with q1 = 5 and q2 = 1=5),
all Peq appear to be stable. Thus, increasing c2 has no e¤ect. Indeed, the claim that all
Peq are stable for c1 < 1 for q1 = q2 = 1 (alternately, c1 < 0:1 for q1 = 5 and q2 = 1=5) is
veried by the Routh-Hurwitz criterion via Mathematicas Reduce command.
Case 2. 8 = Pa < Peq < L = 10
Although any Peq 2 (8; 10) corresponds to an equilibrium of the system, similar to Case
1 the minimum permissible Peq (as derived from the Remark to Corollary 7) is 8:60147 for
q2 = 1 and 9:34798 for q2 = 1=5. The diagram on the left in Figure F2 represents stable
regions for Peq = 8:65, 8:95, 9:25, 9:55, 9:85, and 9:99, while the diagram on the right
corresponds to stable regions for Peq = 9:35, 9:475, 9:6, 9:775, 9:9, and 9:99. Note that the
regions are nested within each other. For example, the stable region for Peq = 9:55 in the
diagram on the left in Figure F2 is given by the union of the Green, Blue, and Cyan regions.
Comments on the diagrams in Figure F2:
(1) When q1 is much greater than q2, the regions are similarly shaped, but compressed
vertically and shifted down on the c1 axis. Thus, when there is a much greater emphasis
on the trend than the valuation, the timescale for the trend (1=c1) must be longer for the
equilibrium to be stable. Alternately, when q1 is much less than q2 (q1 = 1=5 and q2 = 5),
all equilibrium are stable (utilized Mathematicas Reduce command to verify via the Routh-
Hurwitz criterion).
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Figure F2: Regions in (c2; c1) space for 8 = Pa < Peq < L = 10 with q1 = q2 = 1 (left)
and q1 = 5, q2 = 1=5 (right). For the diagram on the left stable regions correspond to the
following equilibrium prices: Peq = 8:65 (All colors), 8:95 (All colors), 9:25 (Yellow, Green,
Blue, and Cyan), 9:55 (Green, Blue, and Cyan), 9:85 (Blue and Cyan), and 9:99 (Cyan).
For the diagram on the right stable regions correspond to the following equilibrium prices:
Peq = 9:35 (All colors), 9:475 (Orange, Yellow, Green, Blue, and Cyan), 9:6 (Yellow, Green,
Blue, and Cyan), 9:775 (Green, Blue, and Cyan), 9:9 (Blue and Cyan), and 9:99 (Cyan).
Note that any point within the plotted region yields an equilibrium point of the system as
equilibrium is independent of the ci parameters. Areas outside of the designated colored
regions correspond to non-stability for the specied Peq.
(2) As Peq moves toward the fundamental value, Pa, the stable region increases in size.
For example, in Figure F2 with Pa = 8 and q1 = q2 = 1 the stable region for Peq = 8:65
and 8:95 consists of the entire region, whereas for Peq = 9:99 only the Cyan region admits a
stable equilibrium. The scenario with q1 = 5 and q2 = 1=5 is similar.
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(3) With c1 xed, increasing c2 may impact stability for larger values of c1. However,
for c1 < 1 (Figure F2 with q1 = q2 = 1) or c1 < 0:1 (Figure F2 with q1 = 5 and q2 = 1=5),
all Peq appear to be stable. Thus, increasing c2 has no e¤ect. Indeed, the claim that all
Peq are stable for c1 < 1 for q1 = q2 = 1 (alternately, c1 < 0:1 for q1 = 5 and q2 = 1=5) is
veried by the Routh-Hurwitz criterion via Mathematicas Reduce command.
Case 3. Pa = Peq = L = 10
In this scenario the curve of equilibrium points is parameterized by the N^ (1) variable
with no limitations on N^ (1) other than 0  N^ (1)  N0. The following diagrams represent
stable regions for N^ (1) = 0, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, and 3000. Note that the regions
are nested within each other. For example, the stable region for N^ (1) = 2000 in the diagram
on the left in Figure F3 is given by the union of the Blue, Cyan, and Magenta regions.
Note the following regarding the diagrams in Figure F3:
(1) When q1 is much greater than q2, the regions are similarly shaped, but compressed
vertically and shifted down on the c1 axis. Thus, when there is a much greater emphasis
on the trend than the valuation, the timescale for the trend (1=c1) must be longer for the
equilibrium to be stable. Alternately, when q1 is much less than q2, all equilibrium were
stable (utilized Mathematicas Reduce command to verify via the Routh-Hurwitz criterion).
(2) As N^ (1) moves toward the total number of shares in the system, N0, the stable
region decreases in size. Alternately, as the number of shares owned by investor group 1
decreases to 0, the stable region increases in size. For example, in Figure F3 with N0 = 3000
and q1 = q2 = 1 the stable region for N^ (1) = 0 consists of the entire region, whereas for
N^ (1) = 3000 only the Magenta region admits a stable equilibrium. The scenario with q1 = 5
and q2 = 1=5 is similar.
(3) With c1 xed, increasing c2 may impact stability for larger values of c1. However,
for c1 < 1 (Figure F3 with q1 = q2 = 1) or c1 < 0:1 (Figure F3 with q1 = 5 and q2 = 1=5),
all Peq appear to be stable. Thus, increasing c2 has no e¤ect. Indeed, the claim that all
Peq are stable for c1 < 1 for q1 = q2 = 1 (alternately, c1 < 0:1 for q1 = 5 and q2 = 1=5) is
veried by the Routh-Hurwitz criterion via Mathematicas Reduce command.
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Figure F3: Regions in (c2; c1) space for L = Peq = Pa = 10 with q1 = q2 = 1 (left) and
q1 = 5, q2 = 1=5. For the diagram on the left stable regions correspond to the following
equilibrium values: N^ (1) = 0 (All colors), 500 (All colors), 1000 (All colors), 1500 (Green,
Blue, Cyan, and Magenta), 2000 (Blue, Cyan, and Magenta), 2500 (Cyan and Magenta),
and 3000 (Magenta). For the diagram on the right stable regions correspond to the following
equilibrium values: N^ (1) = 0 (All colors), 500 (Orange, Yellow, Green, Blue, Cyan, and
Magenta), 1000 (Yellow, Green, Blue, Cyan, and Magenta), 1500 (Green, Blue, Cyan, and
Magenta), 2000 (Blue, Cyan, and Magenta), 2500 (Cyan and Magenta), and 3000 (Magenta).
Note that any point within the plotted region yields an equilibrium point of the system as
equilibrium is independent of the ci parameters. Areas outside of the designated colored
regions correspond to non-stability for the specied N^ (1).
Case 4. Peq = L = 10 6= Pa
Rather than consider any diagrams for this case, recall that criteria for the stability
(instability) of an arbitrary equilibrium point is given in Theorem 10, i.e. the equilibrium
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point is stable provided q1 < 1+c12c1 and unstable for q1 >
1+c1
2c1
. Solving for c1 yields the
following:
Stable ,

c1 <
1
 1 + 2q1 and q1 > 1=2

(F.1)
or

c1 >
1
 1 + 2q1 and q1 < 1=2

or [q1 = 1=2] .
Remark 14. For c1 = 1=10 this criteria indicates stability for q1 < 11=2. This agrees with
the result for Case 4 in Section 3.5.
Remark 15. The c2 parameter does not impact stability provided it is always positive.
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